Appeasement Complex

Several years ago, I wrote an article about Burmese cooking. My editor at the magazine inserted a sentence at the end of the piece that read something like this: “And there has never been a better time to visit Burma and sample its delicious cuisine.”

I immediately called up the editor and explained that, yes, Burmese cuisine is delicious, but it was probably one of the worst times to visit the country. I told her about the sanctions against the Burmese government and the tourism boycott favored by opposition leader and Nobel laureate Aung San Suu Kyi. I managed ultimately to persuade the editor to remove the offending sentence, but it wasn’t easy. Editors: can’t live with ‘em, can’t live without ‘em.

Burmese food is still delicious. But the tourism ban is largely a thing of the past. Last fall, the Burmese government released Aung San Suu Kyi from house arrest. She reciprocated by endorsing small-scale tourism, a policy shift that the opposition National League for Democracy (NLD) adopted last May. And last week, the most important tourist of all, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, arrived in Rangoon to tour the famous golden pagoda, among other things. This first visit to Burma by a U.S. secretary of state in more than 50 years heralds a possible breakthrough in U.S.-Burma relations, shines a light on an ongoing transformation in Burmese society, and has generated the predictable pushback from those who suffer from the political disease known as the appeasement complex.

Back in 2008 when the Burmese military junta announced a new constitution as a step toward civilian rule, the international community responded with considerable skepticism. The military didn’t look as though it intended to give up any real power. When Thein Sein won election as president earlier this year, The New York Times described it as “a move that cements the military’s control of a new political system.” The new president was widely considered a puppet of the top military general Than Shwe.

Sometimes, though, puppets manage to take on a life of their own. Burma has not exactly become a democracy overnight. But the changes initiated by Thein Sein are significant nonetheless. “The Burmese government has recently released more than 6,000 political prisoners,” writes Foreign Policy In Focus (FPIF) contributor Iqbal Ahmed in Is Burma Really Changing? “In an uncharacteristic move, former army general Thein Sein, who came to power in March, thwarted the Chinese-funded $3.6-billion Myitsone dam project in the state of Kachin, relenting to continuous pressure from the Burmese citizens in that region.”

The government has passed some significant laws legalizing peaceful protest and union strikes. The head of the censorship bureau, essentially calling for his own early retirement, told Radio Free Asia that “press censorship is non-existent in most other countries as well as among our neighbors and as it is not in harmony with democratic practices, press censorship should be abolished in the near future.” After holding talks with the government, Aung San Suu Kyi plans to run for parliament in upcoming by-elections.

Government mediators are even pursuing agreements with rebels who have been fighting, in some cases for decades, against the military. The first agreement, with Shan rebels, was negotiated a couple days ago. According to one civil society observer, mediators have reached out to Karen, Karenni, Chin, and Kachin rebels as well.

“It’s Burma rebooted,” the NLD’s second-in-command U Tin Oo told Newsweek. “Everything is happening with a speed we couldn’t even foresee.”

When President Obama announced at the end of his Asia tour last month that Secretary of State Clinton would visit Burma, The Washington Post editorialized that the administration was giving the government there “undeserved validation” because the generals had yet to create a “peaceable democracy.” Clinton, who doesn’t represent a peaceable democracy either and perhaps knows something about unreasonable expectations, went anyway. There she sat down with Aung San Suu Kyi, parlayed with Thein Sein, and promised U.S. support in step with democratic changes.

It’s a great irony that Hillary Clinton, who criticized Barack Obama during the 2008 presidential election for being “naïve” in offering to meet with the leaders of “rogue” nations, is the one extending an open hand to Burma. But the Obama-Clinton initiative is far from naïve. It borders on the devious. In addition to ushering in U.S. businesses to compete for Burma’s considerable natural resources, the opening to Burma is part of a much larger effort to reduce China’s sway in its traditional sphere of influence.

China has been heavily invested in Burma. And the Burmese are starting to worry about becoming too dependent on their big brother in Beijing. “Concerns about this Chinese-led development and its many inherent risks are a heated topic in Burma today,” writes FPIF contributor Dan Beaker in Burma’s Big Brother. “Discontent can be heard in the rallies and public statements of opposition armed forces in the border areas, in cabinet and parliamentary meetings in Napyidaw, in the teashop natter of academics in Yangon, and in the day-long councils of elders in swidden and fishing communities across the rural hinterlands. Conducting research in central Burma earlier this year, I often heard talk of ‘the Chinese invasion,’ referring to the investment drive, and of the use of ‘Chinese agents dressed as investors’ in a recent privatization of government assets.”

The imminent détente with Burma has continued to generate criticism from those who suffer from the appeasement complex, a syndrome that causes politicians to conflate diplomacy with selling out and negotiating with kowtowing. Unfortunately, the head of the House Foreign Affairs Committee Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL) has an advanced case of this syndrome. “Secretary Clinton’s visit represents a monumental overture to an outlaw regime whose DNA remains fundamentally brutal,” she chastised the Obama administration.

The Republican presidential candidates have yet to get behind Ros-Lehtinen. Perhaps some of them are still scrambling to find Burma on the map (hint: some people call it Myanmar). But never doubt that Gingrich, Romney, Perry, and Santorum suffer from their own appeasement complexes. My favorite example comes from Michele Bachmann, who is always good for a laugh. After Iranian students stormed the British embassy and London pulled out its diplomatic staff, Bachmann told supporters in Iowa, “That’s exactly what I would do [if I were president]. We wouldn’t have an embassy in Iran. I wouldn’t allow that to be there.”

The United States hasn’t had an embassy in Iran since 1979. The Bachmann team tried to clarify that she was speaking hypothetically about a time when the United States might have an embassy in Iran. But that, frankly, is worse. According to the first interpretation, Bachmann simply made a gaffe. According to the clarification, she was stating a policy. We wouldn’t have an embassy in Iran – or Burma – because…because they’re bad people. And we don’t talk to bad people, ever. And yet Bachmann continues to share the stage with Rick Santorum. Go figure.

Competing with China

The Burma gambit is part of a more complex game in which the United States and China compete for position all over the chessboard. Consider the situation in America’s “backyard.”

“Though the United States is still the biggest provider of military equipment to the region,” write W. Alex Sanchez and Lauren Paverman in China and the End of the Monroe Doctrine, “Latin America has continued to improve ties to China ‘to provide some balance to U.S. power,’ according to Jorge I. Domínguez in a report written for the Inter-American Dialogue. For example, in a display of smart strategic diplomacy, Argentina has aligned itself with China’s stance on Taiwan. While Washington continues to focus its attention on areas like the Arab World and Asia, Beijing has been capitalizing on the impressive array of natural resources that Latin America has to offer. China’s growing involvement will give more Latin American countries the opportunity to diversify their export markets, thereby lessening the effects of the U.S. financial woes on their respective economies.”

The U.S.-China competition is perhaps most intense in Africa. “China has already overtaken the United States as the continent’s main trading partner,” writes Francis Njubi Nesbitt in America vs China in Africa. “According to David Shinn, a former U.S. ambassador to Burkina Faso and Ethiopia, China surpassed the United States as Africa’s main trading partner in 2009. Testifying at a Senate Foreign Relations Committee on African Affairs meeting on November 1, Shinn estimated that China’s trade with African totaled $127 billion in 2010, a 40-percent increase from the previous year, compared to $113 billion for the United States.”

Elsewhere in Africa

Kenya is still in the midst of its military campaign in Somalia. It’s difficult to know exactly what’s happening in Somalia. But the spillover effects on refugee camps in Kenya are clear.

“As a result of Kenya’s recent invasion of Somalia, the situation in Kenyan refugee camps has sharply deteriorated and is now on the verge of a full-scale humanitarian crisis,” writes Andre Vltchek in Postcard from…Dadaab. “In Dadaab, the largest refugee camp on earth with close to half a million people, cholera has broken out, services have deteriorated, and access for both humanitarian agencies and international observers (including press) has become even more difficult.”

We have a new columnist here at FPIF. Kwei Quartey was born in Ghana and raised by an African American mother and a Ghanaian father, both of whom were university lecturers. He lives in Pasadena, California, where he runs a wound care clinic and is the lead physician at an urgent care center. He is the author of two novels, Wife of the Gods and Children of the Street, with Murder at Cape Three Points due out in 2012. He’s written for us about oil in Ghana and the impact of the Nobel Peace Prize on Africa.

This week, he looks at chocolate. “Sub-Saharan Africa produces 70-74 percent of the world’s cocoa beans, 82 percent of which comes from Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire alone,” he writes in Food of the Gods. “Should anything wipe out the cocoa crop from either of these producer nations, there is no other country that could quickly step in to take up the slack.” Find out more about this critical commodity in his debut column.