Death at a Distance: The U.S. Air War

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Published by Foreign Policy In Focus (FPIF), a project of the Institute for Policy Studies (IPS, online at www.ips-dc.org). Copyright © 2008, Institute for Policy Studies.

Recommended citation:
Conn Hallinan, "Death at a Distance: The U.S. Air War," (Washington, DC: Foreign Policy In Focus, August 30, 2007).

Web location:
http://fpif.org/fpiftxt/4511

Production Information:
Author(s): Conn Hallinan
Editor(s): Miriam Pemberton
Production: Saif Rahman

The DoD Inspector General charges against Feith have yet to broaden to where he stands as the first official nexus for the momentous decision that resulted in the current hopeless insurgency that is pinning down the US armed forces. This will be the first tear in the Bush cover-up for his absentee presidency and exposure of the low unauthorized levels at which life and death decisions were made. This is only the beginning of the exposure of neocon usurpation of the Bush presidency in the first term. I can only hope that no one will associate this cabal with the Jewish-American community which, as a whole deeply opposed the neocon machinations.

Daniel E. Teodoru

GW Bush, for example, seems devoid of any empathy for the stress physiology imposed on American troops in Iraq-- most being mothers and fathers-- as a result of having been sent to Iraq, all intelligence blind, language deaf and culture dumb. PBS showed a segment recently covering a unit that lost seven troopers in an armored SUV to an IED, killed an innocent taxi driver and had to stand helpless as a large number of women and children were plummeted by shrapnel from a bomb, all in one day. One soldier said that in six hours on and four off they cannot rest, the adrenaline rush never stops. Another complained that they were supposed to go home in six days but were extended to 15 months. He offered to re-up for another 15 months, at no pay, if only Bush would serve at his side. But Bush won't serve now as he avoided doing during the Vietnam War. He is a totally political animal convinced that if in the end he captures Iraq's oil for US Companies by imposing the the PSA law on the Maliki Government, making the refilling of our SUV at $1.50 a gallon possible, all the needless incompetent loses in blood and treasure will be forgiven and forgotten.

But there's a new kink in his persistence strategy. There are no troops left for continuing the surge after April 2008. What Bush thinks he has a lot left to use are planes and ships and missiles. So what he plans to do is a 21,000 air sorties attack on Iran to devastate its entire armed forces-- never mind just its nuclear plants-- before he is forced to pull back US troops from Iraq. The reason for this is that while his foreign policy in term #1 was in the service of the neocons, term #2 is in service of the Saudis who fear Iran's growing power. They will build his library as they did his dad's and they will fund his lavish Crawford Texas life as an ex-President.

One can only wonder if the legacy of this administration will be, not only one of war criminality in its policies, but one of total moral depravity attributable to the same psychiatric disorders often attributed to the world's most infamous aggressors.

Daniel E. Teodoru

Financially drained by the Great War, the British were under strong pressures to reduce the cost of administering their newly acquired mandates in Iraq and Palestine. Consequently, in the early 1920s, the post-war governments of Lloyd George, and later Law and Baldwin, became quite receptive to the newly independent Royal Air Force’s proposal to substitute relatively inexpensive air power for ground troops. The proposal was championed enthusiastically by Winston Churchill, who, in the five years after World War I, serendipitously held the offices secretary of state for war, colonies and air, and chancellor of the exchequer.

Imperial Britain’s way of dealing with colonial rebellion traditionally involved sending a detachment of troops to the affected area on punitive expeditions with orders to “teach the blighters a lesson” by killing or capturing the offending ringleaders and generally shooting up the place so as to discourage the population from further transgressions against British authority. Such expeditions took time, often lacked the element of surprise and were costly in terms of men and materiel. Consequently, the use of airplanes for such disciplinary forays seemed ideal, inasmuch as air strikes could be delivered swiftly with maximum surprise and minimal expenditure of British blood and treasure. Moreover, Arab tribal warlords, who gained political clout from standing up to the British on the field of battle, had no counter against airplanes. Accordingly, after demonstrating the effectiveness in putting down a minor rebellion in British Somaliland in 1919-20, Air Marshall Hugh Trenchard, RAF chief of staff proposed that the RAF be given full responsibility for conducting military operations in Iraq. In October 1922, the RAF was given the job, initially implemented with eight squadrons of fighters and light bombers, such as DH-9s, accompanied by major reductions in the garrison troop strength, much to the delight of the British taxpayer.

Initially the RAF flew punitive sorties, dropping bombs on offending Arab villagers without notice, killing women and children indiscriminately, presumably along with instigators of the revolt. "The attack with bombs and machineguns must be relentless and unremitting and carried on continuously by day and night, on houses, inhabitants, crops and cattle," Wing-Commander J. A. Chamier wrote at the time, foreshadowing “shock and awe” some eight decades later. From 7,000 feet and without modern navigational aids, to a pilot, one desert village looked pretty much like another, so there were instances of friendly villages being bombed by mistake. The British also borrowed a page from the battlefields of Europe, and, with Mr. Churchill’s blessing, became the first country to launch full-scale aerial mustard gas bombardments on men, women and children. “We shouldn’t be stopped by the prejudices of those who don’t think clearly,” he said. “I am strongly in favour of using poisoned gas against uncivilized tribes.” -- in the “Cradle of Civilization,” no less.

As reports of such incidents began filtering into the British press, the public outcry against “inhumane warfare” (“collateral damage” had yet to be coined) prompted a shift in tactics. Thereafter, offending villages were warned of impending punitive bombardments, giving the villagers time to evacuate.

The British military tried to make it look as if airplanes had virtually replaced troops on the ground. But in practice, punitive sorties were usually combined operations, in which ground and air forces mounted coordinated attacks. Consequently, punishment from the air came to consist almost entirely of loss of relatively low-value property with the intent of disrupting daily life. The more consequential punishment was administered on the ground by British (primarily Indian) troops. Nevertheless, in the 1920s, air power came of age as an accepted instrument of political control in the outer reaches of the British Empire. Britain remained in Iraq until 1932, withdrawing when the mandate was terminated and Iraq became an independent member of the League of Nations. However, Britain retained a strong presence in Iraq until tensions exploded in 1958.

(Excerpt from David L. Smith's Cassandra Chronicle, April 2004: "Dust to Dust in the Garden of Eden," April 2004. For a copy, contact davidlsmith@iname.com)