Issues / War & Peace
There is reason to believe nuclear capability may make the chances of war worse in South Asia.
U.S. foreign policy has been hijacked by a group of unelected unilateralists who seem determined to drag America into an endless morass of brushfire wars to achieve the goal of unrestrained power.
As small Central Asian countries have struck military alliances with the United States, their leaders have asserted their own power more aggressively.
In the United States and around the world, many are questioning why, despite some mild rebukes, Washington has maintained its large-scale military, financial, and diplomatic support for the Israeli occupation in the face of unprecedented violations of international law and human rights standards by Israeli occupation forces.
A year and one-half into his tenure and on the brink of pushing the military budget over $400 billion per year, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld has finally decided to cancel a major weapons program in the name of military "transformation."
When U.S. and Indonesian officials met in Jakarta in late April to discuss resumption of military cooperation, it should have caused alarm bells to ring all over Washington.
The arguments against nuclear-tipped interceptors have salience to this day, and should continue to be heeded.
U.S. press coverage of Israeli attacks on the Palestinian Authority and Palestinian towns on the West Bank often treat the U.S. government as either an innocent bystander or an honest broker in the current conflict, often without giving a full sense of th
Forget that the Bush administration is sending U.S. troops to train local forces in Yemen, the Philippines, and Uzbekistan, and that since September 11th the U.S. has stepped up military aid to Turkey, Pakistan, India, Jordan, and a number of countries wh
Unless the U.S. is willing to use its power to strengthen the political and economic processes that will help rebuild and modernize the country, there is the danger that ethnic divisions could again split the country.