Even as the Bush administration tries to assure Americans that the war in Iraq can still be won, a question hovers in the air like a ghost, even if it is not being explicitly debated: Is Iraq another Vietnam — a war the U.S. is doomed to lose?
The elections in Iraq are shaping up to be another “Bring ’em on” moment.
Elections in Iraq are only days away, and it’s clear that Iraq’s voters aren’t ready for them.
Erik Leaver writes in response to Lakshmi Chaudhry’s ‘Rethinking Iraq,’ posted January 6, 2005. Leaver is the policy outreach director for the Foreign Policy In Focus project at the Institute for Policy Studies in Washington, D.C.
The major justifications for the U.S.-led invasion of IraqÂSaddam HusseinÂs supposed possession of weapons of mass destruction and Iraqi ties to the terrorist al-Qaida networkÂare now widely discredited, and WashingtonÂs claims that its efforts are creating a democratic Iraq are also highly dubious. Although economic factors did play an important role in prompting a U.S. invasion, the simplistic notion that IraqÂs makeover was undertaken simply for the sake of oil company profits ignores the fact that even optimistic projections of the financial costs of the invasion and occupation far exceeded anticipated financial benefits. Furthermore, Saddam Hussein was already selling his oil at a level satisfactory to Western buyers, and his standing among fellow OPEC members was low, so he could not have persuaded the cartel to adopt policies detrimental to U.S. interests. So what actually motivated the United States to take on the problematic task of conquering and rebuilding Iraq?
The U.S. occupation of Iraq officially ended on June 28, 2004, in a secret ceremony in Baghdad . Officially, “full sovereignty” was handed from the Americans to the Iraqi Interim Government. But it was clear from the start that this was sovereignty in name, not in deed. First, there is the continued military occupation: 138,000 U.S. soldiers and Marines, plus 20,000 troops from other countries and an estimated 20,000 contractors, all fully under U.S. control and immune to Iraqi laws. Equally debilitating, however significantly less well reported upon, is the continued political and economic occupation by the Bush administration and its corporate allies.
This report attempts to look comprehensively at the human, economic, social, security, environmental, and human rights costs of this war and the ensuing occupation. An Iraq Task Force of the Institute for Policy Studies spent several months scouring sources as diverse as professional engineers, economists, non-profits with expertise in Iraq, the United Nations, the U.S.-led Coalition Provisional Authority, and the most accurate journalistic accounts we could find.
It is our conviction that democracy is strengthened through informed debate. If this report helps stimulate broader debate and discourse in this country and around the world about the costs and legitimacy of the war and occupation in Iraq, then we will consider this report a success.
Anthony Cordesman, the thoughtful incumbent of the Arleigh Burke Chair in Strategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, titled his May 19, 2004 testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee “The ‘Post-Conflict’ Lesson of Iraq and Afghanistan.” Cordesman presented a devastating critique of the pervasive lack of planning and preparedness throughout the Executive Branch in general and the Pentagon and White House in particular for translating success in war into success in peace.
The signing of the interim Iraqi Âconstitution by the Governing Council represents a significant step in U.S. efforts to legitimize its invasion and occupation of Iraq. By achieving the codification in a U.S.-supervised process of an ostensibly ÂIraqi legal document, the U.S. as occupying power is hoping that its planned June 30th Âtransfer of power will be accepted globally as the Ârestoration of sovereignty to Iraq. In fact, that Âtransfer of power will not end the U.S. occupation, will not lead to the withdrawal of U.S. troops, and will not result in any real sovereignty for Iraq. The Constitution itself implies recognition of its impotence, as it recognizes that all Âlaws, regulations, orders, and directives issued by the U.S. occupation authorities will remain in force.
The drama of the recent capture of Saddam Hussein will likely serve as a short-term distraction from the broader challenge facing the administration of U.S. President George W. Bush: its continued search for a viable “exit strategy” from an Iraqi quagmire, its policy there is appearing ever more incoherent.