Focal Points Blog

As Egypt Protesters Look to U.S. in Vain, Remembering Another Lost Opportunity

China v Japan(Pictured: China fighting Japan in World War II.)

The official response of the White House and State Department to the ongoing protests in Egypt has sparked a much-needed discussion about the contradictions between U.S. avowals of democracy and support for its authoritarian allies in the Middle East.

This is not by any means a new phenomenon nor is it particular to Middle East policy. At this critical juncture, it is worth reflecting on another moment and region where senior policymakers faced a choice between democracy and stability.

As the Second World War drew to a close in Asia, the old colonial and authoritarian regimes were withering in the face of new forces and leadership. The emerging leaders in China and Vietnam sought support from a United States that, against the crusty position of Britain and France, had styled itself as a friend of democratic and anti-colonial movements. While the Chinese Nationalist forces had been lackluster during the war and the French government in Indochina had capitulated to the Japanese occupation, both the Chinese Communists (CCP) and the Indochina Communist Party (ICP) had fought valiantly against the Japanese.

In January 1945, Zhou Enlai and Mao Zedong sent a joint message to President Truman expressing their desire to travel to the United States to discuss the future of China. One year later, Ho Chi Minh sent a telegram to Truman urging the president and the American people to “interfere urgently in support of our independence.” Both of these letters went unanswered.

We will never know what might have happened had these gestures been taken more seriously. But we do know how much was lost in the subsequent hot wars that was the Cold War in Asia. Not only in terms of lives, which realists will readily shrug off,

but also in terms of the ever-so-important “prestige” in the eyes of the world, which, in the modern era, has been a priority for even the most cynical of American foreign policymakers.

Admittedly, the situation in the Middle East in 2011 is different than Asia in 1945. Egypt is not China or Vietnam and the protesters flowing into the streets in Cairo are not the CCP or the ICP. Notably, they are not the Muslim Brotherhood either. In fact, there is no evidence that there is any particular leader, radical or otherwise, pulling the strings. One would be hard-pressed to find a more liberal-secular-democratic appeal than the kind being articulated on the streets of Cairo.

Another key difference between these two moments involves how much we in the United States actually know about them while they are happening. The letters from Mao and Ho were safely guarded from the public for decades. This made it possible for Truman and subsequent administrations to characterize the People’s Republic of China and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam as anti-American regimes whose rule posed a worldwide threat to freedom and democracy.

In contrast, thanks to camera phones, Twitter, Facebook, and Al Jazeera, which has been broadcasting the protests in Egypt despite verbal and physical threats, we can see the protesters as well as the government’s crackdown on them. Seeing these images makes it harder to buy the notion that supporting the protests could pave the way for a more radical regime in Egypt, posing a danger to security and freedom in the Middle East. If such a regime actually does assume power, then decades from now, we can once again wonder what might have been different if, rather than cast its lot with unpopular regimes, the United States had actually supported an organic democratic movement in the Middle East.

Iran, the New York Times and the Laws of Physics

Iran nuclearWhy is the New York Times claiming the laws of physics are different in Iran then they are anywhere else? Well, the tip off to that answer is the word “Iran.”

First, a few basics:

The thing about physics is that it is black and white: things happen or they don’t. Want to live forever? The Second Law of Thermodynamics says, nope, can’t do that (unless you can get rid of entropy, and you can’t). Want to rocket off to the nearest star a la Star Trek? Well, okay, but it is going to take a really, really long time to get there because you can’t go faster than the speed of light (and inertia would kill you long before you got close to 186,000 miles per second).

Back to the Times.

For the past several weeks the Times has been claiming that Iran is very close to producing weapons-ready nuclear fuel. On Jan. 23, Steven Erlanger, in an article entitled “Talks on Iran’s Nuclear Program Close With No Progress,” wrote that Iran is stepping up its production of enhanced uranium and has “enriched about 90 pounds of it to 19.75 percent, which is more than halfway to the level required for a bomb.”

Not close. Again, a little physics.

Uranium occurs naturally as U-238. In order to make a bomb you have to turn U-238 into U-235 or Plutonium 239. “Enrichment” is used for a lot of things besides obliterating cities. Uranium enhanced to 3 percent can run a power plant. Uranium enhanced to 19.75 percent can be used for medical purposes, like zapping cancer. For a nuclear weapon, however, uranium must be enhanced to between 80 percent and 90 percent.

Virtually all nuclear warheads currently use uranium that is 90 percent enhanced, although it is possible to produce a weapon with as little as 80. To detonate a weapon using U-235, all you need to do is blast two pieces of sub-critical fuel into one another. Two sub-criticals equal one critical, you achieve “fission” and a really big “bang!” The so-called “nuclear gun” is virtually foolproof and was the design of the Hiroshima bomb. In fact scientists were so confident it would work that they never bothered to test it.

Plutonium is trickier. The “gun” method doesn’t work because of the unique properties of Pu-239. You have to wrap plutonium with an explosive, and then implode it. The result is called “fusion.” The Nagasaki bomb (Fat Man) was composed of both U-235 and Pu-239, and it was the device that was tested at White Sands New Mexico in 1945. Today almost all nuclear weapons in the world are fusion devices, because fusion is more efficient than fission.

The Hiroshima bomb carried 64.1 kg of U-235 enhanced to 80 percent. The South Africans also produced at least six nuclear weapons that worked on the “gun” model, and those were enhanced to between 80 percent and 93 percent. The greater the enhancement, the less fuel you have to use. U-235 makes a perfectly serviceable nuke, but plutonium gives you more bang for the buck. The Department of Energy estimates that you can make a small nuclear weapon with a little as 4 kg of plutonium, and some scientists say you can make a nuke with as little as 1 kg of plutonium.

Keep in mind what they mean by “small.” The Hiroshima bomb—“Little Boy”—had an explosive force of between 12 and 15 kilotons of TNT. It killed over 70,000 people in the initial blast, and more than 30,000 in the weeks and years that followed. Its fireball reached 6,000 degrees centigrade at ground zero, and it utterly destroyed 62,000 buildings. Today “Little Boy” would be considered a tactical nuclear weapon.

Here is “big”:

  • The W76 warhead: 100 kt
  • The B61 warhead: 350 kt
  • The W88 warhead: 475 kt
  • The B53 warhead: 9,000 kt
  • The B41warhead: 25 megatons
  • The Tsar Bomba (Russian): 50 megatons.

What the laws of physics tell us is that 19.75 percent enhancement is not even a quarter of the way toward producing fuel that could be turned into a weapon. It is not nice stuff, mind you. Do not hug a container of 19.75 percent fuel. Radiation poisoning is really not the way you want to go.

The problem with the Times’s error (and it was repeated several times in other articles) is that it makes it sound like the Iranians are on the threshold of producing weapons-grade fuel. By virtually every account, they are not. Even Israeli military intelligence says Teheran is not currently working on producing a nuclear weapon, although it adds that Iran could produce the requisite fuel within two years if it wanted to.

According to Agence France Presse, Israeli Brigadier General Aviv Kochavi told the Knesset’s foreign affairs and defense committee that “it was unlikely that Iran, which currently enriches uranium to 20 percent, would start enriching it to the 90 percent level needed for a bomb, because it would be an open breach of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, exposing it to harsher sanctions or even a U.S. or Israeli military strike.”

But the Times has Teheran more than halfway there—providing you ignore those annoying laws of physics. It is one thing to get someone’s name wrong, or misspell a word. Getting things about nuclear weapons wrong can have very dire consequences in the real world.

The Jerusalem Post reports that Israel has just acquired a new mid-air fuel tanker from the U.S. that would make an attack on Iran easier. The Israeli daily Ha’aretz says the Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu and his defense secretary Ehud Barak are seriously considering a strike at Iran. And according to UPI, the new Israeli chief of staff, Lt. Gen. Yoav Galant, also favors attacking Iran. If Iran is “more than half way to the level required for a bomb,” why not?

In the real world bad science has the potential to produce dangerous politics.

More of Conn Hallinan’s work can be found at Dispatches From the Edge.

Egypt Protests Shine Light on How U.S. Profits From Foreign Aid

Egypt democracy(Pictured: Anti-Mubarak protesters in 2006.)

Cross-posted from the Dissent Magazine blog Arguing the World.

If you have to shut down Internet access and texting for your whole country, that’s a pretty good sign that your regime is not legitimate. It’s also a good sign that your regime is in big trouble.

Such is the situation right now in Egypt. And the Mubarak government is not the only one in the region that is panicking. Following a democratic uprising in Tunisia that unseated the notoriously corrupt and repressive regime there, mass protests have spread to Yemen and Jordan—and who knows where they will end?

The situation is very dynamic, with live coverage available here. You can hear commentary from Middle East experts Juan Cole and Stephen Zunes. I also found this first-hand account of protests in Cairo by Yasmine El Rashidi at the New York Review of Books blog to be very interesting.

At this point, I would add just a few comments.

First, the situation in Egypt is helpful in making clear how U.S. foreign aid functions. In international development circles, there’s a debate about whether foreign aid actually works. On the political scene, a variety of doubters, especially those on the right, rail against corruption, mismanagement, and dependency—arguing that aid sent abroad is a giant liberal boondoggle.

But a huge percentage of U.S. foreign aid is not meant to ease poverty or foster humane development, nor is it backed by any progressive intention. Rather, it is given out basically in the form of bribes to various regimes so that they will align themselves with U.S. geopolitical interests. As Juan Cole further notes in his Democracy Now interview, a large amount of aid money meant for foreign countries actually serves to subsidize U.S. corporations, which are contracted to produce goods or services (or armaments or farm surplus) that are then sent abroad. The actual utility of these things for aid recipients is questionable, and any benefits to the poor in recipient countries are at best indirect.

Aid to the Egyptian government is a nice case in point. Even though it is notoriously undemocratic, the Mubarak regime has for decades received a massive amount of U.S. aid, both military and non-military. We’re talking billions of dollars per year, regularly placing Egypt just behind Israel on lists of top recipients. But the United States has no incentive to demand any sort of accountability for the aid. On the contrary, our leaders have incentives to use aid flows as pork for our corporations and to allow the Egyptian government to siphon off the remaining largess however it wishes. An attitude of permissiveness makes the aid all the more effective as a means of ingratiation.

Since the protests have erupted in Egypt, the Obama administration has put on a sorry display of standing by its man (just as the Bush administration no doubt would have). Vice President Biden has gone to bat for the regime, resulting in headlines reading, “Joe Biden says Egypt’s Mubarak no dictator, he shouldn’t step down…

But if you look at what Biden actually says, it’s sort of comical—and fairly honest. He never asserts that Mubarak isn’t a dictator; he just admits that, since he wants the current Egyptian regime to remain an ally, he’s not in any position to come out and say it. Biden stated:

Mubarak has been an ally of ours in a number of things. And he’s been very responsible on, relative to geopolitical interest in the region, the Middle East peace efforts; the actions Egypt has taken relative to normalizing relationship with—with Israel. … I would not refer to him as a dictator.

Well, of course he wouldn’t call Mubarak a dictator! As he just explained, the regime is a vital ally of the United States in the region, and he has no interest in alienating it.

President Obama has tried to have it both ways by at once supporting the regime and telling it to use the protests as occasion to implement reforms. “[T]he government has to be careful about not resorting to violence, and the people on the streets have to be careful about not resorting to violence,” he said. “And I think that it is very important that people have mechanisms in order to express legitimate grievances.” But even as the Egyptian state began to crack down, the White House wouldn’t speak of curtailing military aid. It has been practicing realpolitik, plain and simple.

(Although, as the situation rapidly develops, there are signs that the Obama administration might be changing its position—something that is surely a grim sign for Mubarak.)

The other point I would make is that when demonstrations like these erupt, they’re inevitably labeled “spontaneous uprisings.” However, that characterization is usually more a product of previous media neglect and ignorance than it is an accurate description of protest activity. If you’re not paying any attention to a country’s politics and only swoop in when things have reached a crisis point, events will invariably look out-of-the-blue. Yet that’s hardly the whole story.

Yes, there are extraordinary moments when public demonstrations take on a mass character and people who would otherwise not have dreamed of taking part in an uprising rush onto the streets. But these protests are typically built upon years of organizing and preparation on the part of social movements.

I haven’t seen great backgrounders out yet detailing movement activity in Egypt and Tunisia, but there have been some signs of foresight and preparation. In Cairo, for example, polished manuals have been passed from hand-to-hand among protesters, serving as guidebooks for action:

Anonymous leaflets circulating in Cairo also provide practical and tactical advice for mass demonstrations, confronting riot police, and besieging and taking control of government offices.

Signed ‘long live Egypt’, the slickly produced 26-page document calls on demonstrators to begin with peaceful protests, carrying roses but no banners, and march on official buildings while persuading policemen and soldiers to join their ranks.

Well-produced twenty-six-page booklets—reflecting a lot of careful thought—do not exactly fit within the image of “spontaneous uprising.” As we continue to watch this story, I’ll be eager to see pro-democracy organizers who have been at it over the long haul get their due.

Mark Engler is a senior analyst with Foreign Policy In Focus and author of How to Rule the World: The Coming Battle Over the Global Economy (Nation Books, 2008). He can be reached via the website Democracy Uprising.

How Lebanon Got So Complicated

Col. Hassan(Pictured: Colonel Wissam Hassan, head of Lebanese intelligence.)

Viewed through the prism of the American mainstream media, Lebanon always appears a place that best defines the term Byzantine: a bewildering mélange of different religions, rival militias, cagey politicians, and shadowy regional proxies taking orders from Teheran, Tel Aviv, Damascus, Riyadh, and Ankara.

Lebanon is a complex place indeed, but it is not quite the labyrinth it is made out to be, and, if France, the United States, and Israel would stop putting their irons in the fire, the country’s difficulties are wholly resolvable. But solutions will require some understanding of the pressures that have forged the current crisis, forces that lie deep in Lebanon’s colonial past. While history is not the American media’s strong suit, to ignore it in Lebanon is to misunderstand the motivations of the key players.

Lebanon, like a number of other countries in the region—Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Israel, to name a few—is a child of colonialism, created from the wreckage of the World War I and the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. The colonial power in Lebanon was France, although Paris’ interest in the area goes back to 1861. In that year the French helped Maronite Christians establish a “sanjack,” or separate administrative region around Mt. Lebanon within the Ottoman Empire.

Christian Maronites and French Catholics were natural allies, and the French saw the potential of controlling traffic going from the Mediterranean coast to inland Mesopotamia. For their part, the Maronites had picked up a powerful ally for their dreams of creating a “Greater Lebanon” that would take in not only the mountains they lived in, but the fertile Bakaa Valley to the east and the rich coastline to the west.

Lebanon’s mountains are mostly Christian dominated, though not all Christians are Maronites. There are also Greek and Syrian Orthodox, Armenians, Copts, and Roman Catholics. But the Bakaa—the northern extension of Africa’s Great Rift Valley—is mostly Muslim, as is much of the coastal plain. The Muslims themselves are divided between Shiites and Sunnis. As in much of the Middle East, Shiites have been marginalized politically and economically.

Those divisions were set in stone when the great imperial powers carved up the corpse of the Ottoman Empire at San Remo in 1920. France got “Greater Lebanon,” while the British seized oil-rich Mesopotamia—modern Iraq, Kuwait, Jordan and Israel. Since Britain already had Egypt, it now dominated the Persian Gulf, and hence Iran’s oil, as well as the Red Sea. While Lebanon may have seemed small potatoes in that exchange, it was the gateway to Damascus and the easiest land route for land-based goods going east and west. It also became the banking capital of the Middle East, with the French skimming off the cream. Manufactured goods flowed east, raw materials and gold flowed west.

“Greater Lebanon,” however, was formed by slicing off a big hunk of western Syria. Indeed, many Syrians still think of Lebanon as “occupied.” Since the Maronites were France’s allies, they got to run the place, and the Sunnis and Shiites—particularly the Shiites—took the hindmost. The latter became day laborers and peasants, squeezed by absentee landlords and taxed and exploited by the colonial government.

In many ways, Lebanon resembled Ireland, where religion was used to drive a wedge between landless Catholics and privileged Protestants. In reality, Protestants were also exploited, but the fact that they also had rights and privileges denied the Catholics—including the right to own land— kept the two communities divided and easily manipulated by the British.

And so it was in Lebanon. There the religious mix was more complex—it also included a sizable minority of Druze—but the strategy of divide and conquer through the use of religious and ethnic divisions was much the same. Those divisions pretty much defined the country until two great catastrophes befell Lebanon: the 1975-1990 civil war and the 1982 Israeli invasion and occupation.

It was the Israeli invasion that ignited the Shiite community and led to the creation of Hezbollah. And it was Hezbollah that finally drove Israel out of southern Lebanon, though it took 18 years of ambushes and roadside bombs to make the price of occupation unacceptable. And, for the first time in Lebanese history the Shiite community had a voice. It is the sound of that voice we are hearing these days.

Shiites are not a majority in Lebanon, but they may be a plurality. Christian communities likely make up about 32 percent of the population, and the Druze 5 percent, although no one actually knows how large each community is. There has not been a census since 1932, because the Christians, in particular, are nervous about what it would show. Political power in Lebanon is divided up on the basis of ethnicity.

The Israelis characterize Hezbollah as an Iranian proxy, and the Americans dismiss the organization as terrorist. Indeed, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton recently warned that the U.S. would cut off aid to Lebanon if a government friendly to Hezbollah emerges from the current crisis. The Americans are currently backing away from that threat.

But Hezbollah is not al-Qaeda, it is a homegrown organization that represents the long pent-up frustrations of the Shiite community, nor is it a cat’s paw for Iran, and any thought that the organization would go to war because Teheran ordered it to is just silly. For starters, Lebanese Shiites are very different than their Iranian counterparts. The latter come from a strain of Shiism that believes clerics and religious figures should govern directly. Lebanese Shiites think political power eventually corrupts religion, which is why they are backing Sunni Najib Mikati for the post of prime minister. Under Lebanon’s ethnic-driven system, that office must go to a Sunni.

As for the “terrorism” charge: That all depends on how you define the term. There is no question that Hezbollah has used assassinations and bombs to deal with its enemies, but then so have Israel and the U.S. In any case, Hezbollah is a major player in Lebanese politics, and any attempt to sideline it is the one thing that actually might touch off a civil war.

The current uproar was sparked by the refusal of former Prime Minister Saad Hariri to reject the findings of a United Nations-backed Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) investigating the death of Hariri’s father, Rafik al-Hariri, in a massive bomb attack in 2005. The bombing led to the so-called “Cedar Revolution” that pushed Syria out of Lebanon and brought Saad Hariri into power.

The STL investigation is apparently ready to pin the blame for the attack on Hezbollah, and when Hariri backed the Tribunal’s findings, Hezbollah withdrew its allies and the government collapsed.

Reading U.S. press accounts, one would assume that an unbiased investigation found Hezbollah the guilty party and that the Shiite organization ignited the crisis to avoid getting blamed. But a closer look suggests that the STL’s case is less than a slam-dunk. An investigation by the Canadian Broadcasting Company (CBC) late last year found several key witnesses had apparently lied to the Tribunal, including the man responsible for Hariri’s security that day, Lebanese Colonel Wissam Hassan.

The Tribunal started off blaming the Syrians, then jailed four Lebanese generals—after four years, the generals were released for lack of evidence—and finally settled on the Shiite organization. Hezbollah presented documents to the STL this past summer indicating that the Israelis were monitoring Hariri the day of the assassination and may have been behind the bombing. If so it would not be the first time that Tel Aviv has resorted to assassination in Lebanon. But the STL has not questioned any Israeli officials to date, nor has it examined Hassan’s alibi, one that the CBC called “flimsy, to put it mildly.”

Chief UN inspector Garry Loeppky considered Hassan a suspect in the murder, but the Tribunal refused to investigate his alibi because, according to the CBC investigation, he was considered “too valuable to alienate.” Hariri says Hassan’s loyalty is “beyond question.”

Hezbollah and its allies are also upset that the STL leaked its investigation to the Israeli Chief of Staff, General Gabi Ashkenazi, as well as the CBC, Der Spiegel, and the French newspaper Le Figaro.

It may be that Hezbollah—or a rogue element within the organization—is behind the bombing, but the STL’s consistent missteps have lost it a good deal of credibility, and many in the region view it as deeply politicized, and little more than a way for France and the U.S. to pressure Syria and Hezbollah.

In any case, the crisis in Lebanese politics is not over “terrorists” seizing a government. Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah said in a speech Jan. 23 that his organization wanted a national unity government and that “We are not seeking authority.” A U.S. effort to influence who governs in Beirut has not been well received. “Mikati is not coming to power by force of a coup or by civil unrest,” said Hassan Khalil, publisher of the Lebanese daily Al-Akhbar. “Mikati is coming to power by the parliamentary system of Lebanon.”

Nor is this a proxy war between Iran and Israel. It is an attempt by Lebanese players to rebalance and reconfigure a political system that has long favored a rich and powerful minority at the expense of the majority. The U.S., France and others may want to turn this into an international crisis—Israeli Vice Prime Minister Silvan Shalom called it an “Iranian government” on Israel’s northern border— but its roots and solutions are local.

Certainly there is a role for regional powers, including Turkey, Syria, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia. But talk of proxy wars or a triumph for “terrorists” is the language of war and chaos, something the Lebanese are heartily sick of.

More of Conn Hallinan’s work can be found at Dispatches from the Edge.

Discouraging Civilian Cooperation With Counterterrorism, Part 963

Thanks to the Progressive Realist, we were alerted to this piece at UN Dispatch, where Daniel J. Gerstle writes:

The Moscow Airport Bombing, which killed 35 people on Monday and injured over 100, provides evidence yet again that the Kremlin’s security policies continue to fail.

Why are Russia’s security forces unable to protect their people? Gerstle supplies one reason:

As I wrote in my story about Chechnya and Ingusetia in the Guardian Weekly, many moderate believers in peace in the Muslim Caucasus region would be happy to support efforts to take on radicals and reduce violence, except that they fear bringing information to the authorities will be met with violent over-reaction.

E.g.:

I’ve experienced this personally. I was working with Chechen and Ingush humanitarians to help rebuild and restore stability in the war-ravaged region when co-workers told me a refugee camp had been attacked by the government. Ingush government security forces acting on Kremlin policy pursued a lone suspected militant into the [camp, which was inhabited by the elderly, women, and children. . . . When the suspect hid in a family shelter, security forces locked all the civilians in the camp into a laundry and washroom and then began raining mortars and bullets onto the shelter until the suspect was dead.

Enlisting civilian aid in halting terrorism isn’t only a problem in the Middle East. Apparently, forced to choose between the disease or the cure, Russians, too, are likely to choose the former.

WikiLeaks: For Norway, Oil Wealth and Humanitarianism Go Hand in Hand

Norway oilWe’re honored to have Michael Busch dissecting the latest WikiLeaks document dump for Focal Points. This is the thirty-sixth in the series.

Most variations of international-relations realism include some notion of states sacrificing ethical considerations at the altar of national interest. It’s never been completely clear, of course, whether this is a descriptive claim, or a prescriptive one — whether, in other words, the idea is that states should behave this way, or that they in fact do.

Those pondering this question ought to consider the case of Norway. In a brief but revealing cable included in the vast WikiLeaks “CableGate” trove and published last week by the Norwegian paper Aftenposten, US embassy officials report that the Nordic nation opted to divest its sovereign wealth holdings from companies violating “humanitarian principles” and “fundamental ethical norms.”

In case you are thinking that major global corporations aren’t exactly quaking in their boots at the prospect of divestiture by Norway, think again. Built on the healthy revenues of Norway’s thriving oil sector, the country’s sovereign fund invests its considerable wealth in over 7,000 corporations worldwide. In fact, the fund is the largest single investor in Europe.

To judge from the WikiLeaked cable, the combination of Norway’s financial heft with its righteous ethical stance concerned American diplomats because, well, it disproportionately affects US corporations — specifically, America’s highly profitable and politically influential arms manufacturers.

The cable notes that according to the ethical guidelines governing Norway’s sovereign wealth fund, the country is not to invest in “companies who handle ‘weapons that through their normal use may violate fundamental humanitarian principles’” which Norway’s minister of finance “identified as weapons such a [sic] cluster munitions or nuclear weapons.” According to the cable, “it is as a result of this screening that Norway divested from several American arms manufacturing companies.”

American companies are hardly alone in courting the disapproval of Norway’s ethical watchdogs. According to the embassy dispatch, the Norwegian Ethics Council, the agency tasked with reviewing the behavior of companies, “has determined that if companies build large gas pipelines in Burma they will likely be involved with the Burmese Armed Forces and thus probably undermine human rights. Thus, if a company builds a pipeline in Burma, the stage is set for possible divestiture from that company. The companies at risk include Total, Daewoo and PetroChina.”

And it’s not just the American military-industrial complex or authoritarian regimes that Norway wants nothing to do with. The country also severed ties with a global behemoth of a different kind: Walmart. Norway washed its hands of Sam Walton and friends after determining that the company “is considered to have ‘serious violations of fundamental ethical norms.’” The minister of finance made clear to the Americans and others that “exclusions only happen after the Ethical Council tries and fails to get the company to change its practices.” In the case of Walmart, the cable admits that it was not clear if Walmart ever tried to address Norway’s concerns, but posits that the Norwegians simply might have thought any effort at doing so “would be fruitless.”

In point of fact, Norway did reach out to Walmart, asking for the company’s response to allegations that the world’s largest company “consistently and systematically employs minors in contravention of international rules, that working conditions at many of its suppliers are dangerous or health-hazardous, that workers are pressured into working overtime without compensations, [and] that the company systematically discriminates against women in pay.”

The country’s central bank reported that Walmart never responded.

Will Stuxnet Leave as Much Collateral Damage as Any Weapon?

Flash drive(Pictured: The virus’s most likely mode of transmission.)

Reuters quotes Dmitry Rogozin, Russia’s ambassador to NATO, on the Stuxnet computer virus that struck Iran’s Russian-built reactor at Bushehr.

“‘This virus, which is very toxic, very dangerous, could have very serious implications,’ he said, describing the virus’s impact as being like explosive mines.

“‘These ‘mines’ could lead to a new Chernobyl,’ he said, referring to the 1986 nuclear accident at a plant in Ukraine, then part of the Soviet Union.”

Sure, Rogozin’s comments may be laughed off as hyperbole. But just how much control is party that initiates a virus attack (in this case, presumably Israel and/or the United States) able to exert over a virus, no matter how embedded it may be with commands informing it when and where to activate?

At the very least, Stuxnet sets off, or accelerates, a cyberwar “arms” race. Think the difficulty Iran has experienced subduing the virus (a computer expert advises them to throw out all Bushehr’s computers) prevents it from upping the cyberwarfare ante? Consider all the contractors — from China to Russia, even — willing to sell Iran its services and thus enable it to strike back at the West.

The perfectly clean, collateral-damage-free weapon has yet to be invented.

WikiLeaks XXXV: The Gathering of a Storm — a History of bin Laden in Diplomatic Cables

bin Laden Saudi ArabiaWe’re honored to have Michael Busch dissecting the latest WikiLeaks document dump for Focal Points. This is the thirty-fifth in the series.

Not to be outdone by the emergence of an actual social movement in the Arab world, Osama bin laden reemerged from media obscurity this past weekend, pathetically taking advantage of the spotlight shining on former French-controlled North Africa to issue threats against none other than Nikolas Sarkozy’s proud nation of cheese-eating surrender monkeys. According to reports in the Tehran Times, bin Laden has promised to have French hostages captured last year in Niger killed if French forces are not removed from Afghanistan.

In almost knee-jerk response, the Norwegian newspaper Aftenposten published a string of Wikileaked embassy cables concerning bin Laden. Collectively, the series of cables offer a partial timeline of intelligence building by US diplomats on the Saudi terrorist in the years leading up to the attacks of September 11.

Bin Laden first flits across the page in a cable from 1993 describing diplomatic discussions with a prominent Saudi banker who reveals to the Americans that his brother had been a Mujahid in Afghanistan during the resistance fight against Soviet occupation years earlier. The cable reports that while the banker noted the rise of religious conservatism in Saudi Arabia, the country remained “stable” under the firm rule of the royal family. Nevertheless, the banker

did concede that some businessmen do stand out for their support of Islamic groups, citing the example of Usama bin Laden. Although most known for his funding of mujahideen groups in Afghanistan, bin Laden has given money to several Islamic causes throughout the world.

A year later, bin Laden surfaces again in another cable describing impotent Saudi efforts at providing internal security to its people. While the Saudis are portrayed as nothing less than incapable of controlling acts of political violence on their sovereign turf, American diplomats applauded the government’s decision to revoke [sics, as always, courtesy of the cables -- RW]

the citizenship of Osmama bin Laden, a Saudi known to support extremist groups and suspected of financing terrorism in Yemen, Sudan, Afghanistan, Egypt, Lebanon, and the occupied territories.

Unfortunately, the cable also notes “several reports that [the government] s or has been funding terrorist groups in Egypt, Algeria and Israel” as well as indirectly “financing extremist Muslim secessionist groups in the Southern Philippines.”

Around the same time, a cable from State Department headquarters in Washington, DC reported intelligence claims that bin Laden was in eastern Afghanistan, and sought permission from what was then the neutral Nangarhar Shura which controlled the area. The cable relates that when the Shura rejected bin Laden’s request—“Nangarhar officials will not allow ‘these people’ to live in the eastern provinces” because “Afghans were already living in an ‘emergency situation’ and did not need more problems”—bin Laden retreated to Kabul and the protection of the notorious warlord, and later al Qaeda collaborator, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar.

This intelligence was refined a few months later when, in September 1996, Taliban forces swept through Afghanistan’s Pashtun east on their way to capturing the state. Another cable emanating from Foggy Bottom notes that “recent Taliban advances in eastern Afghanistan may mean that several militant training camps belonging to Hekmatyar…have or will come under Taliban control. Also, there are recurrent reports that Osama bin Laden is still in the eastern provinces.” The headquarters dispatch requests that diplomats reach out to Taliban representatives and ask them “do you know where he is? We hope that you will expel him from territory under your control. The presence of Osama bin laden in Afghanistan is not a positive development for Afghanistan.”

Meanwhile, back in Saudi Arabia, a relative of bin Laden’s was telling American officials they had nothing to worry about. According to this unidentified source, bin Laden is a “simple person easily influenced by others,” and that he had been “brainwashed” by Egyptian radicals. Bin Laden’s turn to zealotry had not gone over well with the family, the source told American officials, and that they had all cut him off completely. The source weirdly speculates that bin Laden was receiving support from Iran, points out that any monies changing hands would likely be funneled “through middlemen, since Usama would not openly maintain ties with a Shia government.” Either way, “Usama is no longer protected by the Saudi government and can now be reached by his enemies,” the unnamed source confidently claimed. “He is finished.”

Jump to nearly two years later, and it becomes evident that the source had basically no idea what he was talking about. In a secret cable from State headquarters, an urgent message from a counterterrorism chief was sent to embassies throughout the Middle East and Central Asia warning of possible imminent attacks against unidentified targets. The cable expresses concern over bin Laden’s call for jihad against US troops in Saudi Arabia and public threats “that an attack could take place in the next few weeks.” The State Department “takes these statements very seriously,” the cable reports, and requests that American embassies secure “diplomatic and military facilities. You may also wish to increase security at US businesses and other potential targets which might be associated with the US.” American diplomats were right to worry. Two months later, al Qaeda operatives carried out devastating bombings in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi which left 200 dead and over 4,000 people injured.

The final cable of the series—dating from spring 2001—provocatively, if briefly, discusses the possibility that the Taliban might be willing to extradite bin Laden to Qatar to face charges in the East African bombings. Describing a meeting between American and Qatari officials in Doha, the cable notes that foreign and prime minister Hamad bin Jasim tells the American ambassador point blank that Qatar has no interest in hosting any trial involving bin Laden unless the Taliban themselves were to approach him with the proposal. As it happened, a “Taliban delegation was arriving in Qatar” that same day, and the “ambassador reminded him that the US is the single largest contributor of humanitarian aid to Afghanistan.”

So what happened? The dispatch ends with a classic cliffhanger: “We will get a read out on the Taliban’s visit when it is concluded.” While we’ll have to wait for the details to leak at some later date, we already know that the unfortunate end to this particular chapter unfolds at Pentagon headquarters, across an anonymous field in Pennsylvania, and on the southern tip of Manhattan Island.

WikiLeaks XXXIV: Hu a “Cautious, Vacillating Leader” (Who Does That Sound Like?)

Hu Jintao Obama(Pictured: Chinese Premier Hu with President Obama.)

We’re honored to have Michael Busch dissecting the latest WikiLeaks document dump for Focal Points. This is the thirty-fourth in the series.

Over at Foreign Policy, Daniel Drezner has published what seems to me to an exactly accurate take on Forbes Magazine’s decision to name Chinese premier Hu Jintao as the world’s most powerful person. If nothing else, the past week of media attention on Hu has demonstrated just how little influence the Chinese leaders wields within his own government.

By far the most shocking indication of Hu’s political impotence surfaced last week in his meeting with Defense Secretary Robert Gates. The New York Times reports (and Drezner links) that

Mr. Hu’s strange encounter with Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates here last week—in which he was apparently unaware that his own air force had just test-flown China’s first stealth fighter—was only the latest case suggesting that he has been boxed in or circumvented by rival power center. . . .

President Obama’s top advisors have concluded that Mr. Hu is often at the mercy of a diffuse ruling party in which generals, ministers and big corporate interests have more clout, and less deference, than they did in the days of Mao or Deng Xiaping, which commanded basically unquestioned authority.

As if on cue, the Norwegian newspaper Aftenposten published a cable yesterday which demonstrates that American diplomats in China have long been aware of Hu’s leadership failures. The cable conveys a candid conversation between an unnamed American political scientist and a Chinese entrepreneur in 1988 as Hu was transitioning from his post as party secretary of Guizhou province to the top spot in Tibet. “The entrepreneur said that he thought Hu had two significant failings which made it doubtful he could succeed in Tibet.” His observations are almost exactly those being highlighted this week in the press.

First, Hu had no close relationship with the military. Second, he was a cautious, vacillating leader. As an illustration of Hu’s timidity, the entrepreneur said that during one of his trips he had worked out a project which would have resutled in the expansion of Guizhou’s exports. He sent a copy of his suggestion to Hu who said that it seemed like a good idea and he should suggest that the appropriate government departments implement it. When the entrepreneur [sics courtesy original cables] tried to do so, there was the usual bureaucratic opposition from various offices, and in the end nothing was done. He commented that Hu was prepared to move only if everyone agreed with something; he was not prepared to tackle opposition. Given the situation in Tibet, Hu will be facing many differences and will get little done if he is not prepared to exert himself.

It was precisely this penchant for indecision which Hu’s critics point out contributed to the violent protests in Tibet after the cable was produced. The journalist Willy Lam recounts claims that as the 1989 protests gathered momentum in Lhasa, Chinese police repeatedly asked for but did not receive orders from a waffling Hu on how to properly respond. Eventually a police commander purportedly took matters into his own hands, directing a violent suppression of Tibetan activists that left over forty dead. Some have argued that the events in Lhasa served as a prelude to the violent state response to protests in Tiananmen Square months later.

Evidence of Hu’s weakness at home does not sit well with any optimism of China’s actions abroad. At a moment when Beijing has taken a startlingly tougher stance in its dealings with friends and foes alike, it is hardly comforting to recognize that China’s government does not present a united front. “There is a remarkable amount of chaos in the system, more than you ever saw dealing with the Chinese twenty years ago,” former national security advisor Brent Scowcroft told the Times. “The military doesn’t participate in the system the way it once did. They are more autonomous—and so are a lot of others.”

WikiLeaks XXXIII: Algeria’s Youth Too Dazed and Confused to Even Become Terrorists

Harraga apprehended(Pictured: Harraga apprehended.)

We’re honored to have Michael Busch dissecting the latest WikiLeaks document dump for Focal Points. This is the thirty-third in the series.

Every once in a while, on the long march through the often mind-numbing bureaucrateeze that characterizes the mountain of embassy cables published by WikiLeaks, you’re rewarded for your labors with a bit of hilarious gossip, razor-sharp political analysis, or some surreal storytelling. And then there are the moments when you’re treated to nothing less than absorbingly excellent writing.

Such was the case this weekend when WikiLeaks published an otherwise unremarkable cable outlining Algeria’s growing problem with disaffected young people attempting dangerous escapes from North Africa’s shores to the promised land of opportunity in Europe. The dispatch, which dates from the summer of 2008, opens with a literary journalism hook more appropriate to the pages of Mother Jones than anything a diplomatic database might spit out.

On the desolate beach of Sidi Salem, in the eastern suburb of Annaba, a dozen young Algerian males alternate between kicking a soccer ball and working on several small, unmarked wooden boats. Each week, several boats leave from this beach, filled with a cross-section of frustrated young Algeria—doctors, lawyers, dropouts, the unemployed. They set out across the open sea, usually ten or twelve to a boat, armed with water, food, blankets, a small motor and GPS tracking device, headed for the Italian islands of Lampedusa, Sicily, or Sardina. They are the harraga—literally, “ones who burn”: identity papers and vital documents before departure—and over 90 percent of them will either die at sea, be arrested and detained indefinitely in Tunisia or Libya, or be returned by the Algerian, French, Spanish or Italian coast guards.

The numbers of harraga are not insignificant: in 2007 alone, over 50,000 young Algerians reportedly attempted to flee their homeland to Europe, numbers that show no sign of letting up with each passing year. The situation “has paralyzed the Algerian government,”as the “harraga have become a fixture in the Algerian media, popular media and daily conversation, a symptom of a society in which entertainment is limited, the education does not link to the job market, and the doors of opportunity are closed but to the well connected.”

Seeking to familiarize themselves with this emerging phenomenon, embassy staff in Algiers took to the streets to collect first-hand impressions of the human trafficking network that transports hundreds of Algerians to Europe each month.

During out [sic] April visit to the beach at Sidi Salem, police officers standing in front of their precinct watched harraga prepare for departure. “We are not the border police,” they told us…A look around revealed a soccer field littered with trash, a trash heap and a mosque alongside public low- to middle-income housing projects.

A source

pointed down the street from the police station at two small, dingy cafes. Those cafes, he told us, are where harraga gather to exchange information, meet with departure organizers, and pay their way. [The source] said that would-be harraga from all over Algeria know by word of mouth to come to the cafes, where an “oral bulletin board” exists of young men pooling resources, organizing departures and coordinating basic supplies.

US diplomats also interviewed harraga youth to get a sense of the often harrowing journey between North Africa and European shores.

On the western ourskirts of ASnnaba lies the smaller and more secluded beach of La Caroube. XXXXXXXXXX sat idly with three friends on a concrete stop, while several old wooden fishing boars lay overturned on the sand nearby. XXXXXXXXXXXX told us that last summer he set out in a boat of ten people, leaving Algerian territorial waters, which he was quick to point out represented a victory for him. He and his shipmates follows the coastline to Tunisia [where] the waters turned rough and they were forced to turn back at which point they were stopped by the Algerian coast guard…and sent back. All of XXXXXXXXXXXX three friends said they had also tried at least once to leave their country by sea.

Harraga cite three reasons “Algerian youth want to burn their documents and leave: hogra (humiliation), poverty and corruption.” In a country that country that continues to operate under a nearly twenty-year state of emergency that disproportionately suffocates the hopes of Algeria’s ambitious young, illegal exit is often seen as the only way out. The situation has obviously not escaped the attention of the Algerian government which “simply does not know what to do” about it. According to sources interviewed by embassy staff, the Algerian government was

“well aware”of the public passions that have been aroused by the harraga…Minister of National Solidarity Djamel Ould Abbes, in a highly publicized April visit to the coastal towns of Ain Temochent and Tiaret in western Algeria, gathered returned in front of the press and offered 400,000 dinar (about USD 615) to each, along with an offer of work.

The visit, coming just a week after ten harraga were killed attempting to cross over to Europe, was not well-received by the public which came to view it as “‘an insult,’ since at the end of the meeting [Ould] asked all those assembled to sign a statement of support for President Bouteflika.” In fact, the situation almost spiraled out of control. The cable reports that the local harraga

rallied and encircled the house Ould Abbes was staying in, intending perhaps to take him hostage…When the minister got wind of this, he left Tiaret before dawn, earlier than expected, and rushed back to Algiers.

The cable tellingly registers one young harraga’s disgust at the ploy. “We do not want someone to throw money at us,” the young man asserted, “we want opportunity. XXXXXXXXXXXXX then said he would ‘sweep this beach’ if someone gave him a broom and a modest salary. Instead, he and his friends agreed that the best thing to do with Ould Abbes’ 400,000 dinars was ‘to buy a better boat.’”

Embassy personnel also take note of the fact that many harraga ultimately assuage their frustration by finding refuge in the country’s mosques. And while the embassy’s concern naturally drifts to the threat of terrorist breeding amongst disaffected harraga, what they discover is far more depressing. According to one local sociologist interviewed by diplomatic staff,

“Algerian society is still suffering from ‘cultural post tramatic stress syndrome’ after the violence of the 1990s. This, when added to current pressures of terrorism and socioeconomic stagnation, leaves many ‘dazed and paralyzed, with their eyes glazed over. Most people simply don’t understand what has hit them over the past fifteen years.’”

Despite the fact that the issue has captured the country’s popular imagination—the harraga have become the subject of movies and pop songs—the prospect of positive change in the near term for Algeria’s struggling young remains remote. The cable wraps up its report “back on the beach of La Caroube, “where XXXXXXXXXXX listed at least six jobs he had applied for over the last year, all of which he said ultimately went to ‘people with connections.’” When embassy diplomats asked where they could contact him and his friends in the future “if [they] needed to, he smiled and shook his head. ‘You can come back in ten years,’ he said. ‘and we’ll be sitting right here.’”

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