Focal Points Blog

WikiLeaks: “You cannot surrender to an aircraft” (at least not Crazyhorse 18)

Apache helicopterPutting aside the myriad reports of everything from abuse to murder by Iraqi police and soldiers recorded in the latest WikiLeaks document dump for a moment, let’s turn to, as the Guardian refers to it, “the readiness of US forces to unleash lethal force.”

“In one chilling incident [the documents] detail how an Apache helicopter gunship gunned down two men in February 2007. The suspected insurgents had been trying to surrender but a lawyer back at base told the pilots: ‘You cannot surrender to an aircraft.’”

Kind of reminds you of the opening to the song the The Soft Parade by the Doors: “You cannot petition the lord with the prayer.” But, if the United States can wage a War on Terror (a tactic, as has often been pointed out, not an entity), why can’t insurgents surrender to an inanimate object?

As if that lawyer’s counsel wasn’t cracked enough, check this out (emphasis added):

The Apache, callsign Crazyhorse 18, was the same unit and helicopter based at Camp Taji outside Baghdad that later that year, in July, mistakenly killed two Reuters employees and wounded two children in the streets of Baghdad.

You remember — issuing a video incident titled “Collateral Murder” put WikiLeaks over the top as a world-class whistleblower.

Wait, I’ve got an idea. With the horror film series Saw winding down, why not send this Apache unit to Afghanistan with a film crew and turn Crazyhorse 18: Death From Above into a bona fide franchise with a third installment?

WikiLeaks: Putting Attacks on Assange in Perspective

The New York Times chose the day that, along with the Guardian, it published its reports about WikiLeaks’ latest document dump to run an unflattering article about the organization’s founder Julian Assange by John F. Burns and Ravi Somaiya. In fact, one part of the angle of the story did prove troubling.

From the point of view of the United States, back in August, Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates wrote Committee of Armed Services Chairman Carl Levin that a review of the first Wikileaks dump had “not revealed any sensitive intelligence sources and methods compromised by this disclosure.” However, Burns and Somaiya now report:

A Taliban spokesman in Afghanistan . . . said in a telephone interview that the Taliban. . . . had a “wanted” list of 1,800 Afghans and was comparing that with names WikiLeaks provided. “After the process is completed, our Taliban court will decide about such people,” he said.

The authors devote the bulk of the article, however, to an attack on Assange’s character, noting that “some of his own comrades are abandoning him for what they see as erratic and imperious behavior, and a nearly delusional grandeur.” An example . . .

When Herbert Snorrason, a 25-year-old political activist in Iceland, questioned Mr. Assange’s judgment over a number of issues in an online exchange last month, Mr. Assange was uncompromising. “I don’t like your tone,” he said, according to a transcript. “If it continues, you’re out.”

In another instance, Assange describes his colleagues “as ‘a confederacy of fools,’ and asked his interlocutor, ‘Am I dealing with a complete retard?’”

Exactly how does Assange’s behavior differ from what one might expect of the leader of an organization engaged in an enterprise as explosive as Wikileaks is while he himself attempts to come to grips with the knowledge that he’s unwelcome in any country on which he alights?

Mr. Assange’s detractors also accuse him of pursuing a vendetta against the United States. In London, Mr. Assange said America was an increasingly militarized society and a threat to democracy. Moreover, he said, “we have been attacked by the United States, so we are forced into a position where we must defend ourselves.”

Poor United States — who will defend it against big, bad Julian Assange? Of course, it’s actually Assange who needs someone to stand beside him. None other than Daniel Ellsberg, Burns and Somaiya report, “flew overnight from California to attend [the announcement] and compared the Obama administration’s threat to prosecute Mr. Assange to his own treatment under President Richard M. Nixon.”

Compared to the momentous work that Assange has spearheaded, his foibles are trifling. If its intention in publishing this article was to preclude the appearance of a loss of objectivity in its presentation of the WikiLeaks documents, the Times miscalculated and instead appear pretty.

WikiLeaks: Pouring Fuel on the Iran Fire?

At Danger Room, Spencer Ackerman and Noah Shachtman write: “No one would accuse WikiLeaks of being pro-war. . . . Not when its founder, Julian Assange, said that its trove of reports from the Afghan conflict suggested . . . American ‘war crimes.’” They continue.

So it’s more than a little ironic that, with its newest document dump from the Iraq campaign, WikiLeaks may have just bolstered one of the Bush administration’s most controversial claims about the Iraq war: that Iran supplied many of the Iraq insurgency’s deadliest weapons and worked hand-in-glove with some of its most lethal militias.

For example . . .

. . . its elite Quds Force trained Iraqi Shiite insurgents and imported deadly weapons like the shape-charged Explosively Formed Projectile bombs [and] “neuroparalytic” chemical weapons . . . into Iraq [as well as a] surface-to-air missile, .50 caliber rifles, rockets and much more. [Also] Iranian agents plotted to kidnap U.S. troops from out of their Humvees.

In other words, aren’t Assange and WikiLeaks just adding ammunition to those calling for an attack on Iran to halt its nuclear program? In fact, though, withholding documents unflattering to Iran for fear of fomenting yet more war would only undermine the credibility of their work. Future efforts on their part to draw the brakes on unwarranted American interventions abroad would thus be compromised.

Progressives, meanwhile, must guard against the temptation to jump to the defense of Iran. Attempting to undermine the credibility of WikiLeaks is as much of a losing proposition as defending Iran’s dubious contention that it has no aspirations to nuclear weapons. Instead of defending Iran, we need to stay focused on the role that the United States played in eliciting such responses as aiding and abetting Iraqi insurgents and developing the capability to manufacture nuclear weapons.

Of Horns and Beaks and the Afghanistan War

NATO Afghanistan“Troops were poised to retake the most nefarious area of all, the horn of Panjwai, an area 19 miles long and 6 miles wide where the Taliban had built up a redoubt of command posts, courts and mined areas over the last four years. Afghan and American troops mounted an airborne assault into the region last weekend.”
New York Times, 10.21.10

Dial the calendar back to April 1970, and shift the scene from southern Afghanistan to South Vietnam. Then the all-important piece of turf was the “Parrot’s Beak,” a slice of Cambodia jutting into Vietnam’s Kien Tuong Province, just 40 west of Saigon. The “Beak” was the supposed dwelling place of the elusive COSVN, the headquarters of the North Vietnamese army. Take the “Beak,” said the U.S. military, and we will break the back of the insurgency.

So, following the screening of the Movie “Patton,” President Richard Nixon sent tens of thousands of U.S. and South Vietnamese Army troops (ARVN) troops into Cambodia on April 30 to turn the tide of the war against the insurgents.

But COSVN wasn’t there, nor were any North Vietnamese troops. It seems that two weeks before the attack, COSVN sent out a memo detailing the U.S. operation and pulled everyone out. What the Parrot’s Beak operation did accomplish was to further weaken the Lon Nol dictatorship in Cambodia and pave the way for a Khmer Rouge victory. It also killed a lot of Cambodian peasants, who, of course, went into the U.S. “body count” of dead insurgents for the month.

Those North Vietnamese troops did not vanish, however, they just followed Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap’s dictum of “Disperse where the enemy is strong, concentrate where the enemy is weak.” They went somewhere else. Five years later the National Liberation Front and the North Vietnamese took Saigon.

Jump ahead 35 years to the current U.S. and NATO offensive going in Kandahar Province, southern Afghanistan.

“We now have the initiative. We have created momentum,” says British Maj. Gen. Nick Carter, commander of NATO forces in southern Afghanistan and in charge of the Kandahar operation. The police chief of the local district, Hajii Niaz Muhammad added, “We broke their [the Taliban's] neck.”

But the fighting has been low key, and few weapons have been seized. A Taliban fighter told the Times, “We are not there anymore.”

Where did they go?

PUL-E-KHUMRI, Afghanistan — The Taliban’s influence in northern Afghanistan has expanded in recent months from a few hotspots to much of the region, as insurgents respond to the U.S.-led coalition’s surge in the south by seizing new ground in areas once considered secure.
Wall Street Journal, 10/18/10

In recent weeks the Taliban have been launching attacks in Badakshan, Balkh, and Samangan, formally among the most peaceful in the country. “Day by day, the Taliban are advancing into new districts,” Baghlan provincial council chief Mohammad Rasoul told the Journal. Attacks have more than doubled and the Taliban recently assassinated the governor of Kunduz Province.

Disillusionment with the government has helped fuel the insurgency.

“People don’t love the Taliban—but if they compare them to the government, they see the Taliban as the lesser evil,” Baghlan Governor Munshi Abdul Majid told the Journal.

While Gen. Carter is calling Kandahar the key to defeating the insurgency, his counterpart in Northern Afghanistan, Maj. Gen. Hans-Werner Fritz, commander of NATO’s 11,000 troops in the north, sees it differently: “The northern part could become the game-changer for all of Afghanistan,” he says, because much of the fuel for the U.S. and NATO passes through Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, as does Kabul’s electricity.

U.S. Col. Bill Burlson, commander of the 1st Brigade of the 10th Mountain Division, sums up the dilemma of the Afghan War: “In order to deny the terrain to the enemy, you’d have to have people all over Afghanistan in combat outposts. But since that would take hundreds of thousands of troops, ‘You’ve got to pick and choose where you hold.’”

And when you “pick” one place, the Taliban will “choose” another.

There is always a Parrot’s Beak, a Fish Hook—yet another “strategic” battle in the Vietnam War—a horn of Panjwai, a hill, or a valley that is the “key” to winning a war against an insurgency. But there are millions of hills and valleys and horns and beaks, and they are as meaningless in Afghanistan as they were in Vietnam and Cambodia.

All this talk about the “horn of Panjwai” would be laughable were it not for the fact that this nonsense translates into a lot of pain, death and destruction. It also tends to harden positions on both sides, making peace that more elusive.

More of Conn Hallinan’s work can be found at Dispatches from the Edge.

Will Rockets or Schools Tell the Tale of Afghanistan?

Afghan schoolTwo pieces in Wednesday’s New York Times allege progress on two key fronts in the United States’ engagement in Afghanistan. Reporter Carlotta Gall offers a comparatively jubilant piece valorizing a supposed “rout” of Taliban forces in the vital province of Kandahar. Comparing the success favorably to the ill fated and highly publicized Marja incursion of last year, Gall credits much of the advance to the skillful employment of the new High Mobility Artillery Rocket System, or Himars, a precision rocket-delivery system that has enabled coalition forces to attack Taliban supply routes, command centers, and weapons facilities. Taken aback by the intensity of the strikes as well as the perceived unfriendliness of some local residents, many Taliban soldiers have buried their weapons and fled for the time being to Pakistan.

While NATO commanders express a great deal of encouragement at the development, there remains ample space for skepticism. No amount of expensive innovation in armaments can provide for a sustainable counterinsurgency operation – witness Iraq, where insurgents hobbled the massive Pentagon apparatus with the development of the IED, which is said to cost no more than a pizza. Clearing a field of weeds is of little efficacy without the sowing of a strain of seeds suitable to local conditions. While the Afghan National Army remains a relatively popular national institution, its shortcomings are well documented. However thoroughly the area is cleared of Taliban soldiers, it is difficult to imagine anyone other than the Taliban returning, as they have promised to do, or else a local warlord filling the void, the latter of which would hardly be alien to the greater thrust of American strategy in the country. While some warlords have pressed down on the Taliban, it was the very proliferation of such disreputable figures that created a climate favorable to the Taliban in the first place.

Thus even at its most successful, a military-led counterinsurgency campaign remains inherently unsustainable. This is particularly well illustrated by a PBS Frontline piece from last year called “Obama’s War,” which documented the incursion into Marja. The piece features footage of American soldiers speaking with local residents as Taliban soldiers fire shots off in the distance. The bullets are not meant to strike anybody but rather to disrupt the conversation and remind the villagers of an undeniable political fact: the Taliban will remain long after NATO has declared victory and gotten out, and they are keeping track of who speaks to whom. With such an unmistakable cue within one’s own earshot, where would you hedge your bets?

Nicholas Kristof, in yet another piece on mountain climber turned master school builder Greg Mortenson, offers a tale of progress of a different sort. Kirstof reminds us that Mortenson has been able to bypass the security blankets of bullets and bombs to build schools even in Taliban-held territory. Staffing his development crews entirely with locals and consulting with village elders, Mortenson has provided for an education program that locals are willing defend against the Taliban, even while the organization eschews the protection of NATO soldiers.

“Aid can be done anywhere, including where Taliban are,” Mr. Mortenson said. “But it’s imperative the elders are consulted, and that the development staff is all local, with no foreigners.”

In volatile Kunar Province, which borders Pakistan, the Taliban recently ordered a halt to a school being built by Mr. Mortenson’s organization, the Central Asia Institute. But the villagers rushed to the school’s defense. The Taliban, which have been mounting a campaign for hearts and minds, dropped the issue, according to Wakil Karimi, who leads Mr. Mortenson’s team in Afghanistan.

In another part of Kunar Province, the Central Asia Institute is running a girls’ primary school and middle school in the hear

t of a Taliban-controlled area. Some of the girls are 17 or 18, which is particularly problematic for fundamentalists (who don’t always mind girls getting an education as long as they drop out by puberty). Yet this school is expanding, and now has 320 girls, Mr. Karimi said.

While the construction of schools is not a silver bullet for the Afghanistan werewolf, surprisingly simple elements of Mortenson’s approach offer a refreshing contrast to military-led efforts. Aligning educational priorities with those of local leaders, he has created space for local Taliban leaders to do the same by demonstrating the value of such projects to locals and reconfiguring the Taliban’s incentive structure. The success of this approach is born out in the experience of other Track II organizations as well:

Government schools regularly get burned down, but villagers tell me that that’s because they’re seen as alien institutions built by outside construction crews. In contrast, CARE runs 300 schools in Afghanistan and not one has been burned down, the aid organization says. The Afghan Institute of Learning, run by a redoubtable Afghan woman named Sakena Yacoobi, has supported more than 300 schools and none have been burned, the institute says. Another great aid organization, BRAC, runs schools, clinics and microfinance programs — and operates in every single province in Afghanistan.

Then there’s the Global Partnership for Afghanistan, which is based in New York and helps Afghan villagers improve agricultural yields in the most unstable parts of the country. Some Taliban commanders have even sent word inviting the group into their areas.

One hopes that it is not passé to invoke the celebrity at the center of Three Cups of Tea. But given that we seem to have defined our Afghan strategy along a willful conflation of the Taliban and al-Qaeda, and given further that the Taliban are unlikely to disappear in the near term (even if they must camp out in Pakistan for a time), it seems eminently pragmatic to align our stars with those who can improve the condition of Afghanistan and nourish its hearts and minds even while keeping neighborly company with the Taliban. To invoke the lexicon of civil society, acts of solidarity will carry themselves much further than acts of imposition.

However precise, no expensive rocket system will accomplish that.

Would Dramatic Disarmament Impress Iran or Not?

When it chose to post We Can’t Stop Iran From Going Nuclear, So Stop Pretending That We Can, the New Republic no doubt thought it was a quintessentially moderate piece on U.S.-Iran relations. The author, Barry Gewen, an editor at the New York Times Book Review who sometimes writes about foreign affairs, writes:

Just about every major publication in America and England (and no doubt Israel as well) has contributed to the debate. All possible viewpoints and positions have been expressed. . . . Yet [as] someone who has reached the conclusion that military action against Iran would be a bad idea . . . I worry that the way the argument has been framed makes military action all but inevitable.

So far, it sounds like the article the New Republic had hoped for. After quoting writers and statesmen, Gewen writes, “Taken together, all these statements add up to a consensus that if sanctions don’t work, the U.S. or Israel will move to the next step and bomb Iran.”

Nothing if not well-meaning, Gewen comes at the issue from another angle.

The key assumption here seems to be that we have it within our power to stop Iran in its tracks by military means. But do we? Read the fine print of the debate and it becomes clear that very few commentators believe we do. Instead, what’s being argued is the much more modest proposition that we can delay Iran from going nuclear. . . . The advantages of denying Iran the bomb are self-evident, but how much will be gained from delay, and how much lost? . . . The question answers itself: Delay doesn’t get the job done, and probably leaves us worse off.

Of course, “delaying Iran” means military strikes, some of ‘the possible negative consequences of [which] have already been catalogued.” Gewen concludes that “the debate we’re having is all wrong. We shouldn’t be discussing whether or not to bomb but what to do once Iran succeeds in going nuclear.”

While many of us, from Gewen to the further left, wants to believe that Iran can’t yet be prevented from developing nuclear means via a policy heavier on carrots than sticks, Gewen makes some sense. But, despite his good intentions, he goes awry when he considers how to handle an Iran with nuclear-weapons capability.

Should Israel be offered security guarantees from the U.S., and perhaps even suggested for NATO membership? [Yikes! Sorry, that jumped out. -- RW] Should other countries in the region be brought under the American nuclear umbrella?

In other words, as with almost all mainstream opinion pieces about U.S.-Iran relations, there’s no mention of the United States pursuing a policy of nuclear reciprocity — that is, disarmament. Of course, since the Obama administration is attempting to secure the Senate votes to ratify new START, that may be assumed. But to think it hasn’t escaped Iran how compromised this treaty is, nor how the administration is selling the disarmament farm by promising $16 billion to the nuclear weapons industry, is to sell it short.

Conservatives, as well as many “realists,” maintain that substantive disarmament measures on the part of the United States doesn’t provide it with any “credibility” to nations aspiring to acquire nuclear weapons. But the insistence of the Non-Aligned (to any major power bloc) Movement on interpreting Article IV of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty to the letter suggests otherwise. One man’s vague — “Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to . . . nuclear disarmament” — is another man’s “You promised.”

As Jonathan Schell says, the most dangerous illusion is that “we can hold on to nuclear weapons while at the same time stopping their proliferation to other countries. That is an absolutely unworkable proposition. It just cannot happen in the real world.”

Attempting to de-link nonproliferation from disarmament is a fool’s game. Failure to feature substantive disarmament prominently in the Iran nuclear debate virtually guarantees that Gewen’s wondering aloud about security guarantees and nuclear umbrella is the best-case scenario.

Spitting in the Face of U.S. Troops

Snyder v. PhelpsCross-posted from the Dissent Magazine blog Arguing the World.

Last week, the Supreme Court took up a case regarding a right-wing fundamentalist pastor, Fred Phelps, whose anti-gay congregation has taken to protesting at military funerals, carrying signs that read “Fag Troops” or “Thank God for Dead Soldiers.” Phelps doesn’t seem to care whether or not the dead soldiers in question were actually gay. He believes that the killing of U.S. troops in Iraq and Afghanistan is the result of America’s immorality and its tolerance for abortion and homosexuality—the latter supposedly expressed in the military’s “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy.

The father of one Marine killed in Iraq sued after his son’s funeral was protested, beginning a long legal battle. The Supreme Court ultimately heard arguments about whether his family’s right to grieve in peace should be taken into consideration in constraining the free speech of Phelps’s followers.

I’ll put aside the legal issues involved in this case going to the Supreme Court. (That the current court is taking on any free speech case probably bodes ill for civil liberties.) Instead, I want to consider for a moment the concept of demonstrating at military funerals—or targeting returning troops in general with protests.

The idea that the people rallying outside military funerals are “Fags Die, God Laughs” adherents of the religious Right, rather than godless leftists, will be a shock for many Americans, especially conservatives. It contradicts a deep-rooted myth.

A persistent narrative about the Vietnam War is that anti-war protesters of the 1960s and 70s vilified the troops, spitting in their faces upon their return to the United States. This storyline was perhaps most memorably presented by veteran John Rambo in the now-classic film First Blood. When he breaks down at the end of the movie, Rambo explains resentfully:

I come back to the world, and I see all those maggots at the airport, protesting me, spitting. Calling me baby killer and all kinds of crap! Who are they to protest me?! Who are they?! Unless they’ve been me and been there and know what the hell they’re yelling about!

I like Rambo as a series of action movies, and I’ve written about the franchise’s conflicted politics. But this point is definitely one that Rambo’s writers get wrong. Historian Jerry Lembcke, author of The Spitting Image: Myth, Memory, and the Legacy of Vietnam, has done a very convincing job of debunking the story of spat-upon soldiers. As Jack Shafer summarized in an article for Slate, Lembcke

investigated hundreds of news accounts of antiwar activists spitting on vets. But every time he pushed for more evidence or corroboration from a witness, the story collapsed—the actual person who was spat on turned out to be a friend of a friend. Or somebody’s uncle. He writes that he never met anybody who convinced him that any such clash took place.

While Lembcke doesn’t prove that nobody ever expectorated on a serviceman—you can’t prove a negative, after all—he reduces the claim to an urban myth. In most urban myths, the details morph slightly from telling to telling….

Lembcke uncovered a whole lot of spitting from the war years, but the published accounts always put the antiwar protester on the receiving side of a blast from a pro-Vietnam counterprotester. Surely, he contends, the news pages would have given equal treatment to a story about serviceman getting the treatment. Then why no stories in the newspaper morgues, he asks?

Lastly, there are the parts of the spitting story up that don’t add up. Why does it always end with the protester spitting and the serviceman walking off in shame? Most servicemen would have given the spitters a mouthful of bloody Chiclets instead of turning the other cheek like Christ. At the very least, wouldn’t the altercations have resulted in assault and battery charges and produced a paper trail retrievable across the decades?

Despite its implausibility, the “spitting image” lives on. So persistent is the concept of progressive demonstrators confronting soldiers that if you mention to someone the picture of a “protest at a military funeral” I have no doubt that most would assume that anti-war activists are the ones doing the picketing. The idea that opponents of a given U.S. war must personally despise the troops is a notion central to demonstrating the rank unpatriotic disloyalty of the Left.

I think a version of this idea came into play in the recent Supreme Court arguments. During the session, Justices Roberts and Kagan pursued a line of questioning about whether the content of the protesters’ signs mattered in determining the scope of First Amendment rights:

Chief Justice Roberts asked, “What if the sign simply said, ‘Get out of Iraq?’” [plaintiff Albert Snyder's lawyer, Sean Summers] answered that there would be no problem with that. Justice Sotomayor pressed him on whether it makes a difference if the person to whom the speech is directed is a public or private person. Mr. Summers said yes, and that you have to look at the context, that this was a private funeral, which was disrupted, and there were personal attacks on a private person.

“But suppose,” said Justice Kagan, “it was a standard anti-war demonstration, and the funeral was not disrupted, the protesters were just taking advantage of a private funeral?”

Later, Kagan asked if a wounded soldier could sue someone who demonstrates “outside the person’s home, the person’s workplace, outside the person’s church… saying these kinds of things: ‘You are a war criminal,’ whatever these signs say or worse?”

I understand that Kagan was positing hypothetical scenarios. But her reference to “these signs”—as if placards charging individual troops with war crimes are commonplace at a “standard anti-war demonstration”—reveals that a powerful imaginary is at work.

These days, this idea of anti-war protesters targeting individual troops for abuse, far less gathering at their funerals, is almost as mythical as the “spitting image.”

Can you find anti-war protest signs calling George W. Bush a war criminal? Sure. Cheney? Blair? Kissinger? Yes, yes, yes. But after attending plenty of anti-Iraq War rallies, I can’t recall a single person wielding the “baby-killer” or “war criminal” charge in the way that is typically assumed—to indict your average enlisted soldier. I think that anyone trying to document this type of incident would have a hard time. The closest they could come would be protest signs publicizing the notorious and grotesque Abu Ghraib photos. Of course, interpreting outrage among domestic anti-war activists over those atrocities as unpatriotic hatred for all people in military uniform would require several faulty leaps in logic.

Likewise, I think the closest thing you could find to anti-Iraq War leftists protesting at military funerals would be progressives denouncing the government ban on news coverage of returning war dead. But that stance was hardly anti-troop. The longstanding White House policy represented a propagandistic move to sustain support for military efforts by preventing flag-draped caskets from making it into the press, thereby keeping us ignorant of the true human cost of war.

In truth, those investigating anti-war protests are likely to spot signs saying, “Support the Troops, Bring Them Home,” and to see veterans themselves present as honored participants in marches—members of organizations such as Veterans for Peace. Retired military officials who have spoken out against the folly of the Vietnam and Iraq Wars have been crucial to resistance efforts, and anti-war movements have long emphasized the importance of including returning soldiers in demonstrations.

The recent documentary Sir, No Sir! documented the prevalence of anti-war activism within the ranks of U.S. soldiers in Vietnam, as well as among veterans. Part of Lembcke’s argument about the powerful negative impact of stories like Rambo’s is that “the myth of spat-upon Vietnam veterans…displaced from public memory the reality that thousands of GIs and veterans were integral to the anti-war movement, a fact that startles many Sir! No Sir! viewers when they see it so graphically revived on the screen.”

Outreach to returning veterans and to military families remained vital after George W. Bush’s invasion of Iraq. That is one reason that Cindy Sheehan exploded in the media as a leading protest figure in 2005.

Despite this, the anti-war Left has for decades been made to answer for a storyline that has little basis in reality. While someone in progressive circles expressing personal hatred for enlisted members of the military would be quickly and widely repudiated, homophobia remains rampant on the Right. The notion that “God Hates Fags”—or at least the unholy “homosexual lifestyle”—holds currency well beyond its extreme fringes. Last week’s Supreme Court case should make us ask: when will the homophobes and religious fundamentalists have to answer for the likes of Pastor Phelps?

Mark Engler can be reached via his website, Democracy Uprising.

To the ISI, Its Hidden Agenda for the Mumbai Attacks Made Perfect Sense

Political entities such as states are notorious for the hidden agendas behind their policies. The most obvious recent example is the Iraq War. First, the Bush administration used two reasons that were false — responsibility for 9/11 and hiding nonexistent weapons of mass destruction — to hide its real motives for invading and occupying Iraq.

Selections from that palette of pretexts included: establishing a more tractable base in the Middle-East than Saudia Arabia, staking a claim to Iraq’s oil, opening up the country to free markets, simply showing the Middle East who’s boss (never mind that the 9/11 attackers were predominantly Arab). But, looking back, the Bush administration wasted an opportunity to introduce some clarity to its hidden agenda — against the day when it was bound to be revealed. Instead of marginalizing its intelligence agencies, Bush & Co. would have been wiser to let organizations such as the CIA and DIA take the lead — like Pakistan does with its Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence (the ISI, of course).

On Monday, Jason Burke of the Guardian reported on the interrogations that Indian investigators in America are conducting on David Headley, the Pakistani-American suspected of scouting targets for the 2008 Mumbai attacks that killed 168. His confirmation of ISI support for Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), the Islamist organization that carried out the attacks, is no surprise. Just as it uses the Taliban to keep India from making incursions into Afghanistan, the ISI was presumably using the LeT to keep India off balance at home. Turns out there was more to the attacks.

Burke reports that “Headley . . . told the investigators that the ISI hoped the Mumbai attack would slow or stop growing ‘integration’ between groups active in Kashmir, with whom the [ISI] had maintained a long relationship, and ‘Taliban-based outfits’ in Pakistan and Afghanistan which were a threat to the Pakistani state.” It seems, said Headley, that the “aggression and commitment to jihad shown by [those groups] influenced many committed fighters to leave” LeT.

Apparently, to show that it could be as jihadic as the next Islamic extremist group, LeT conjured up, with the support of the ISI, this massive strike in the middle of a major Indian city. It would not only put LeT back in the headlines but, reports Burke, shift “the theatre of violence from the domestic soil of Pakistan to India.”

At Foreign Policy, David Rothkopf sheds more light on the ISI’s motives (emphasis added).

Further, [Headley tells] an unsettlingly logical story of how the Mumbai attacks were undertaken as part of a deliberate strategy by the historically more regionally-focused Lashkar-e-Taiba to remain relevant in a world in which competing terrorist groups were attracting members seeking the grander mission of jihad against the West.

It is a nauseating image: officials of a government nominally allied to the United States working with terrorists to plan a murderous attack on innocents as a marketing ploy on behalf of their stone cold terrorists of choice. Nauseating, but despite Pakistani denials that it is baseless, with the unmistakable ring of truth.

To put it another way: Nauseating, but damned if Pakistan’s hidden agenda, however baroque, was more logical than the U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq.

What Makes a Great Power Like China So Casual About Aiding and Abetting Nuclear Proliferation?

I have a friend who, shortly after the fall of the Soviet Union, worked with Russians on securing their nuclear weapons. To this day, the casualness she encountered about their loose nukes continues to puzzle her. It’s as if they didn’t take seriously or care about the consequences of a nuclear explosion on their own soil.

That was brought home to me yet again by an article in the Washington Post by John Pomfret that begins: “The Obama administration has concluded that” in violation of recent United Nations sanctions, Chinese firms and banks “are helping Iran to improve its missile technology and develop nuclear weapons, and has asked China to stop such activity.”

The Chinese government, which didn’t authorize these deals, has agreed, whether perfunctorily or not, to investigate. For its part, the United States, because of differences over the value of Chinese currency, among other things, is reluctant to press China on the issue.

Still, writes Pomfret, “China’s involvement in Iran’s energy sector and the role that some of its companies are believed to be playing in Tehran’s military modernization could disrupt U.S.-Chinese relations.” In fact, on over 60 occasions the U.S. government banned American companies from doing business “with Chinese companies during President George W. Bush’s first term, generally regarding dealing with Iran.”

While it’s thought that China has come to understand “that selling missile and nuclear weapons-technology, especially to neighbors such as North Korea, was a bad idea” it must be remembered that China is also “generally believed to have supplied Pakistan with a blueprint for a nuclear weapon in the 1970s.”

As one who’s as skeptical of sanctions as he is of recent tepid U.S. disarmament initiatives such as new START, I acknowledge that the United States at least pays lip service to disarmament. Of course, it’s much keener on nonproliferation — preventing states presently without them from acquiring or developing nuclear weapons — which we pretend isn’t contingent, as required by the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, on disarmament by the nuclear powers.

Developing nations, though, blinded by the prestige and the upgrade to national security that they anticipate from nuclear weapons, tend, like the Russians, to neglect one small detail — that they too can be destroyed in a nuclear attack. Or, out of nationalistic or religious zeal, they don’t care. (Please hold your calls and letters accusing me of claiming that the developing world, especially Muslims, doesn’t value human life!)

But when a large power such as China exhibits a willingness to abet or fail to prevent proliferation, it sends the message that helping the economy grow is worth the risks that a new nuclear state poses, to itself as well. If China thinks that, because it’s helping it develop nuclear energy and/or weapons, it can bend a state like Iran to its will, it’s kidding itself.

On an unconscious level, one can’t help but wonder if the seeming casualness of a nuclear power about proliferation is evidence of a deep-seated fatalism about the continuation of life on earth. But neither is the United States — with recent polls indicating the proliferation (sorry, couldn’t resist) of those who believe that the world will end in an Apocalypse — immune to that kind of thinking.

U.S. in Afghanistan: a Perpetual Motion Machine for the Generation of Grief

Afghans voteHow does our presence in Afghanistan harm it as well as the United States? Let us count the ways. On second thought, they’re too numerous to catalog. We’ll just cite some of the lesser-known examples instead.

For instance, last Sunday in the New York Times, Nicholas Kristof wrote of having tea in Kabul with a woman named “Soora Stoda, who runs a logistics company serving the American military. [She] despises the Taliban and shudders as she remembers her terror as a seventh grader when the Taliban stormed her secret school for girls. . . . Yet Ms. Stoda, like all contractors, has to pay off the Taliban directly or indirectly to work in insecure areas. [For instance, last year] she had a $200,000 contract to transport laptop computers to the American military in Kandahar. The Taliban seized the shipment, and she says she had to pay $150,000 to get it released.”

Kristof concludes:

With the money they milk from the United States, the Taliban hire more fighters. One security expert here did the math for me. A single American soldier in Helmand Province, he estimated, causes enough money to leak to the Taliban to recruit another 10 fighters trying to kill that American.

No one writes more powerfully about how such Americans are killed and maimed in Afghanistan than Brian Mockenhaupt in his November Atlantic piece The Last Patrol. Along with wrenching readers’ guts as U.S. soldiers fall in action, he makes us feel other afflictions to which they’re subject. Of the squad he covered, he writes:

They moved east through a long, dense orchard south of the compound . . . the temperature now well over 100 degrees. Already some of the new soldiers, unconditioned to the heat, terrain, and weight of their gear, were falling behind. . . . A new soldier, underhydrated and overheated, passed out. Then another. . . . The two soldiers were unconscious—one had stopped breathing—and if their temperatures rose much more, their brains would bake. [Then] a third heat casualty. The soldier lay on the ground and moaned, his muscles racked by heat cramps. . . . Soon after, a fourth 101st soldier collapsed. . . . But the situation at the compound wasn’t much better. Two soldiers brought another man, barely conscious from heatstroke, into the dirt-floored room being used as an aid station. . . . Two more 101st soldiers were brought in, dazed and dehydrated.

Even the experienced soldiers suffered.

Pfc. Larry Nichols pitched a grenade to McDaniel, who was so exhausted from running that he had trouble pulling the pin. . . . The group stumbled across the road and into the next orchard. . . . Luke took point. Jackson, his muscles weak from dehydration, nearly collapsed. McDaniel vomited and kept running.

Why are we putting our young people through this again? Oh yeah, to institute, among other things, democracy in Afghanistan to fortify it against the incursions of Islamic insurents. Afghans are not exactly thrilled with the Taliban, but, beside abject fear of them — and even if civilian casualties caused by U.S. and NATO forces didn’t turn them against us — their priorities and values prevent them from aligning themselves with us.

Craig S. Barnes was an attorney as well as a mediator who once negotiated nuclear issues with Russia’s Academy of Sciences and facilitated talks in the war between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Theses days he hosts a radio show called Our Times on KSFR in New Mexico. What follows is from a transcript of the podcast of a speech he gave.

Late in September . . . I was in Chicago for four days participating in a seminar for nearly 60 Afghan Fulbright students who have been brought here to study in the United States. . . . . The Fulbrighters were asked to form groups of five or six and select values of their home culture from a stack of cards upon each of which was written a value. [Both young men and] women offered the following five: religion and spirituality, developing relationships, tradition, extended family, and reputation. Nothing was said by them about advancement, education, speed, prosperity or independence.

Then the groups were asked to identify the bottom five of the values that had been on the cards. They selected: equality, individual rights, law and order, privacy, self as individuals.

The leader of the workshop then provided us a typed page of values drawn from research about Americans. Among those top American values were: equality, privacy, individual rights, law and order, freedom.

Barnes’s conclusion may be an understatement, but it certainly bears repeating: “The conflict in Afghanistan today is therefore in some sense defined by these two poles.”

In other words, two ships passing in the night. Democracy is an abstraction to most Afghans, elections a curiousity.

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