Focal Points Blog

Think Tanks Are Rolling Over Moderate Republicans

“[A] divide has emerged between the ‘realist’ wing of the Republican foreign policy establishment and its more radical right-wing counterpart. The debate over nuclear policy has demonstrated that the latter now essentially dominates the institutional apparatus of right-wing foreign policy thinking.”

. . . writes Robert Farley at at IPS’s own Right Web in a piece he quotes on his own Lawyers, Guns and Money (as reproduced at the Progressive Realist). He’s demonstrating how Mitt Romney‘s infamous anti-START op-ed reflects that trend. More:

Many of the moderate Republicans who favored arms control and engagement with the Soviet Union [such as] Henry Kissinger, James Baker, Brent Scowcroft, Colin Powell, and George Schultz have [failed to develop] an extensive base within the institutional right wing, the constellation of independent organizations and foundations (including the Heritage Foundation and the American Enterprise Institute) that have emerged as key players in internal Republican Party debates.

In his Lawyers, Guns and Money post, Farley concludes that . . .

. . . it’s worth additional investigation to determine why [the moderates] were so helpless in the face of the dire fanatics when it came to developing an institutional [think-tank] base. I suspect that at least part of the answer is personality based; Baker and Scowcroft, for example, seem to have eschewed institution building in favor of cultivating an elite consensus. For whatever reason, [the moderates'] strategy has failed utterly to steer the last ten years of foreign policy production in the Republican Party.

I imagine hawkish Republican think tanks rumbling over the countryside flattening everything — whether former friend or foe — in their path.

Iran Sanctions a Slap in the Face to Other Countries Too

Iran Turkey Brazil nuclear fuelIn a Washington Post op-ed, former Senator Charles Robb and retired General Charles Wald — the Chuck & Chuck show — align themselves with those for whom sanctions against Iran are not enough. It’s not that they don’t welcome the sanctions that President Obama signed against companies that provide gasoline to Iran, as well as again financial institutions that handle Iran’s nuclear transactions. But without “a broader and more robust strategy. . .” they write, “sanctions alone will prove inadequate to halt Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons. … Similarly, even many supporters of the new U.S. law acknowledge that without multilateral participation and enforcement, Iran will continue to evade many of these new U.S. restrictions and acquire gasoline . . . beyond the reach of U.S. law.”

First, no matter how targeted sanctions are, the ruling classes always seem to find a way to pass the hardships they cause along to the public. Besides, it’s true that sanctions are as unlikely to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons as they are Burma from improving its human rights record (or, for that matter, developing nuclear weapons as well).

As Alastair Crooke wrote at Foreign Policy: “No one really believes sanctions will force a change in Iranian policy; nor will they improve the chances of renewing real negotiations.” But the “single-minded furor to impose these sanctions. … speaks to us about something other than Iran.” In part, “the rush to sanctions [was] hurried forward to torpedo the Turkish and Brazilian” nuclear fuel swap deal those states brokered with Iran.

This “speaks to us about rising American fears . . . about the evaporation of deference toward American leadership, and the concern about the rise of ‘the new powers.’ In fact, Crooke notes, the “bringing forward of sanctions were intended to ‘stiff’ two of these new powers — Brazil and Turkey.” [Emphasis added.]

While many of us on the left agree with Chuck & Chuck that sanctions will once again prove ineffective, few of us would see eye to eye with them about a solution: “The stakes are too high to rely on sanctions and diplomacy without credibly preparing for a potential military strike as well.”

Then they add: “We cannot fall prey to the inertia of resignation.” If I were charitable, I wouldn’t have included that last line. It’s just too funny, though, how flat their attempt at a rallying cry falls. Even more humorous — in a vein as bleak as it is unwitting — they write:

“An even more likely scenario, however, is that Israel would first attack Iranian nuclear facilities, triggering retaliatory strikes by Iran and its terrorist proxies. This would put the United States in an extremely difficult position. [It] could be dragged into a major confrontation at a time not of its choosing.”

Do you catch their meaning? The United States should bomb Iran to keep Israel from bombing Iran. I think we’ve caught Chuck & Chuck in a true “Are you even listening to yourselves?” moment. All frivolity aside, it’s discouraging that in the 21st century a strategy such as bombing Iran is being discussed in U.S. policy circles. It’s just so, I don’t know, stone age.

Meanwhile consider what the New America Foundation’s Michael Lind wrote at Salon in How I learned to stop worrying and live with the bomb.

“Genuine great power status today requires massive, expensive conventional forces. Iran would be much more alarming if instead of trying to obtain nuclear weapons it were building up a first-rate navy, a long-distance air force and an enormous army capable of occupying one or more of its neighbors. The fact that it is not doing so suggests that the nuclear weapons capability it evidently seeks is for deterrence, not offense.”

I’m the last one to make excuses, as some progressives actually do, for Iran developing nuclear weapons. But if the world is doomed to grow ever more nuclear, Lind’s observation can be the source of some small measure of solace.

Middle East: What’s Hot — North, What’s Not — South

The title, no doubt chosen by the editors of the Washington Quarterly, is corny at best, stereotypical at worst. But the article itself, The Shifting Sands of State Power in the Middle East by Alastair Crooke of Conflicts Forum, couldn’t be more enlightening. Thanks to Paul Woodward at War in Context for alerting us to the piece, which we present in digest form. [All emphases added.]

Iran, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Syria — nothing has been exactly easy for U.S. policymakers this past year. … In a sense, the president is facing the consequences of three key events that took place in the region more than 20 years ago. … the implosion of the Soviet Union, the military defeat of Iraq in 1991 [and the 1992] overthrow of the Ben-Gurion doctrine [in which Israel allied] itself with the region’s non-Arab periphery, namely Ethiopia, Iran, Lebanon, and Turkey.

[Among the consequences] is that the United States’ old allies in the ‘”southern tier” — namely Egypt and Saudi Arabia — are likely to wield less influence in the future. The “northern tier” — which includes Turkey along with Iran, Qatar, Syria, and possibly Iraq and Lebanon — represents the nascent “axis of influence.”

On Turkey . . .

[P]otentially balancing the rising power of Tehran in the future. … Turkey had been the “wing” state of NATO for 44 years — at the Soviet Union’s periphery, it was in charge of containing communism. … Ahmet Davutoglu, the architect of Turkey’s new stance and now its foreign minister, argued in his 2001 book, Strategic Depth, that Turkey no longer needed to be NATO’s wing state [and should instead] position itself at the pivotal point between Asia, Europe, and the Middle East [using] its unique geography and history to its own advantage.

On Israel-Palestine . . .

[When] U.S. policymakers indicate that it was unrealistic . . . to ever expect Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu to be able to freeze settlement expansion, this is seen widely as confirmation that the settlement project has now become irreversible. In other words . . . no Israeli prime minister can aspire to reverse the settlements.

The unraveling of [the Oslo process] naturally weakens U.S. allies within the region, such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia [who] have justified their alliance with the United States, and warded off internal dissent, [with] the receding prospects of the realization of a Palestinian state.

On Syria . . .

[The] ascent of Iran as well as Turkey more or less at the expense of Egypt and Saudi Arabia . . . forms the background to Syria’s re-entry into the mainstream of Arab politics as a key figure in a new regional alliance. … Israel invaded Lebanon in 1982 . . .

. . . not only to consolidate its position there, but also to realize the goal of its commander, Ariel Sharon, to bring about the fall of [Hafez al-Assad] in Syria.

At this point, [Assad] made a strategic alliance: he linked with his fellow Shi’a . . . in Lebanon and with Ayatollah Sayyed Khomeini of Iran. This . . . enabled the Shi’a movements in Lebanon to successfully resist Israeli and U.S. ambitions there.

[Hafez's son] Bashar al-Assad’s own strategic contribution to Syria, however, has been to recognize Turkey’s aspiration to resume its traditional central position [and to unleash] a cascade of trade and visa alleviation agreements, Syria has opened a window for Turkey into the Sunni Arab world that had effectively been closed since Kamal Ataturk’s time.

On Islam . . .

What is more striking, however, is that much of the new thinking in Islam . . . is taking place outside of the traditional centers of Sunni Arab strength. … Should the northern tier assume some political ascendency in the region, it is not hard to see that the Shi’a orientation, together with the Turkish and other forms of Sufi Islam . . . are likely to gain influence at the expense of literal, dogmatic, and intolerant Islam.

In conclusion . . .

Behind the northern tier’s ascendancy in regional politics lies the perception that Syria and its allies have read the Middle Eastern ground better than the United States and its allies, especially since they — Iran, Syria, and Turkey — judged the Iraq war correctly from the perspective of the region. … More importantly, all three are seen to have read the prospects for a Palestinian state more accurately [and] are in a better position, especially due to their links with Hamas and other Palestinian groups, to be able to craft a comprehensive regional solution.

Ultimately, the United States, as it digests the significance of the region’s shifting strategic balance as well as the drift toward this “other” reading, may well conclude that its true interests lean more toward working with this emergent northern tier than by clinging to its hitherto exclusive reliance on the wobbling platform of U.S. traditional regional allies.

[Also] the political vision of the northern tier is rapidly acquiring a commercial dimension. One key element is the proposed Nabucco gas pipeline, bringing gas from Azerbaijan to central Europe, and probably from the giant South Pars field in Iran through Turkey to Europe. … In this new decade, it seems that the politics of supplying natural gas to the Europeans are likely to eclipse the importance of traditional oil as the touchstone to Middle East politics, which makes a shifting center of gravity toward the northern tier even more likely.

For more about Turkey ascendant, see John Feffer’s Foreign Policy in Focus piece Stealth Superpower.

Africa: No Butter, But Lots of Guns

The developed world has a message for Africa: “Sorry, but we are reneging on our aid pledges made at the G8 summit at Gleneagles, Scotland back in 2005, but we do have something for you—lots and lots of expensive things that go ‘bang’ and kill people.”

And that was indeed the message that came out of the G8-G20 meetings in Canada last month. The promise to add an extra $25 billion to a $50 billion aid package for the continent went a glimmering. Instead, the G8 will cut the $25 billion to $11 billion and the $50 billion to $38 billion. And don’t hold your breath that Africa will get even that much.

The G8 consists of Britain, the U.S., Germany, France, Italy, Japan, France, and Russia, although Moscow is not part of the aid pledge.

Canada’s Muskoka summit hailed “significant progress toward the millennium development goals”—the United Nations’ target of reducing poverty by 2015—but when it came time to ante up, everyone but the United Kingdom bailed. The Gleneagles pledge was to direct 0.51 percent of the G8’s gross national income to aid programs by 2010. The UK came up to 0.56 percent, but the U.S. is at 0.2, Italy at 0.16, Canada at 0.3, Germany at 0.35, and France at 0.47. Rumor has it that France and Italy led the charge to water down the 2005 goals.

The shortfall, says Oxfam spokesman Mark Fried, is not just a matter of “numbers.” The aid figures “represent vital medicines, kids in school, help for women living in poverty and food for the hungry.”

AIDS activists are particularly incensed. “I see no point in beating around the bush,” said AIDS-Free World spokesman Stephen Lewis at a Toronto press conference. He charged that Obama Administration’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief “is being flat-lined for at least the next two years.” Lewis said AIDS groups were treating five million patients, but that another nine million needed to be in programs. “There are AIDS projects, run by other NGOs [non-governmental organizations], where new patients cannot be enrolled unless someone dies.”

But if the poor, sick, and hungry are going begging, not so Africa’s militaries.

According to Daniel Volman, director of the African Security Research Project, the White House is following the same policies as the Bush Administration vis-à-vis Africa. “Indeed, the Obama Administration is seeking to expand U.S. military activities on the continent even further,” says Volman.

In its 2011 budget, the White House asked for over $80 million in military programs for Africa, while freezing or reducing aid packages aimed at civilians.

The major vehicle for this is the U.S.’s African Command (AFRICOM) founded in 2008. Through the Trans-Saharan Counter-Terrorism Initiative, AFRICOM is training troops from Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Chad. The supposed target of all this is the group al-Qaeda in the Islamic Meghreb (AQIM), but while AQIM is certainly troublesome—it sets off bombs and kidnaps people— it is small, scattered, and doesn’t pose a serious threat to any of the countries involved.

The worry is that the various militaries being trained by AFRICOM could end up being used against internal dissidents. Tuaregs, for instance, are engaged in a long-running, low-level insurgency against the Mali government, which is backing a French plan to mine uranium in the Sahara. Might Morocco use the training to attack the Polisario Front in the disputed Western Sahara? Mauritanians complain that the “terrorist” label has been used to jail political opponents of the government.

In testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Assistant Secretary of State Johnnie Carson said the U.S. was seeking to bolster Nigeria’s “ability to combat violent extremism within its borders.” That might put AFRICOM in the middle of a civil war between ruling elites in Lagos and their transnational oil company allies, and the Movement for the Emancipation of the Delta, which is demanding an end to massive pollution and a fair cut of oil revenues.

The National Energy Policy Development Groups estimates that by 2015 as much as 25 percent of U.S. oil imports will come from Africa.

So far, AFRICOM’s track record has been one disaster after another. It supported Ethiopia’s intervention in the Somalia civil war, and helped to overthrow the moderate Islamic Courts Union. It is now fighting a desperate rear-guard action against a far more extremist grouping, the al-Shabaab. AFRICOM also helped coordinate a Ugandan Army attack on the Lord’s Resistance Army in the Democratic Republic of the Congo—Operation Lightning Thunder— that ended up killing thousands of civilians.

The U.S. has been careful to keep a low profile in all this. “We don’t want to see our guys going in and getting whacked,” Volman quotes one U.S. AFRICOM officer. “We want Africans to go in.”

And presumably get “whacked.”

AFRICOM’s Operation Flintlock 2010, which ran from May 3-22, was based in Burkina Faso. Besides the militaries of 10 African nations, it included 600 U.S. Special Forces and elite units from France, the Netherlands, and Spain. Yes, there are other arms pushers out there, and the list reads like an economic who’s who: France, the United Kingdom, China, Russia, Sweden, and Israel. Some 70 percent of the world’s arms trade is aimed at developing countries.

So, is AFRICOM about fighting terrorism, or oil, gas and uranium? Nicole Lee, the executive director of Trans Africa, the leading African American organization focusing on Africa has no doubts: “This [AFRICOM] is nothing short of a sovereignty and resource grab.”

And who actually benefits from this militarization of the continent? As Nigerian journalist Dulue Mbachu warns, “Increased U.S. military presence in Africa may simply serve to protect unpopular regimes that are friendly to its interests, as was the case during the Cold War, while Africa slips further into poverty.”

Costa Rica’s Love-Hate Relationship With Heavy US Military Footprint

Playa Dominical, Costa RicaThe Costa Rican Congress recently voted to open its country to 46 U.S. warships (with their attendant helicopters and planes) and 7,000 U.S. Marines from July through the end of the year. The U.S. military’s stated mission is to interdict drug dealers and arm merchants, as well as expedite humanitarian missions. (Thanks to Sean Paul Kelley of the Agonist for bringing this to our attention.)

The Tico Times reports:

“What seemed like normal protocol — seeking the approval of the Costa Rican Legislative Assembly for another group of Marines, with their support ships and planes, to monitor the country’s coastline for signs of drug traffickers — erupted into protests and angry comments as some Costa Ricans complained that their country’s sovereignty was being trampled upon.”

Insidecostarica.com reports:

Costa Rica’s opposition [describes] the permission as illegal and in violation of national sovereignty. … Luis Fishman . . . presidential candidate in the past elections, said the legislative approval was like handing over a ‘blank cheque.’

The Tico Times again:

The response caught the U.S. Embassy . . . by surprise. “We are not sure why there is this uproar,” U.S. Ambassador Anne S. Andrew said, explaining that the request is the same one that has been submitted each year for the last 10 years under a bilateral agreement between the two countries.

But, according to the opposition, as reported in the Insidecostarica.com article, the agreement “allowed the entry of coast guard vessels, but not war ships.” Furthermore, it “urged consideration of the geopolitical situation [which] the US [has created] in the region . . . which includes offensive actions such as the coup d’etat in Honduras and the installation of military bases in Colombia.”

Also at Insidecosta rica.com, John Holtz writes:

Limiting the attack to our oceans makes no sense for such a large scale operation. Money is not laundered on the high seas and neither are those who direct the drug trade. … Many Costa Ricans are angry, scared and certainly confused.

On the other hand, it can’t be denied that, devoid of a standing army, they feel more vulnerable than ever. The Tico Times again:

A recently released study by polling company Unimer showed that Costa Ricans’ greatest fears involve issues relating to security and crime. And few disagree the problem has arrived mostly from the outside, much of it on the backs of drug-smuggling cartels that have found room to maneuver along Costa Rica’s lightly protected coastlines and borders. … “This (protest) seems to arise at a point where there is no question that there is a serious security challenge ahead for Costa Rica,” [Ambassador] Andrew said. “In the last 10 years, the efforts of Costa Rica and the United States under the Joint Maritime Agreement have been responsible for the interception of 115,000 kilograms of cocaine and $24 million in laundered money off the coast of Costa Rica.”

From the Tico Times report again, a member of the opposition argues that “the destructive force of the ships and manpower [and] helicopters is disproportionate to the threat caused by drug traffickers.” For one year, the figures above break down to 11,500 kg of coke and $2.4 million of laundered money. Will 7,000 marines, 46 ships, and 200 helicopters and planes substantially improve on that? Oh, sorry. The deterrence inherent in the knowledge that this massive force is patrolling Costa Rica’s shores is, uh, priceless.

Sri Lankan Minister’s Sad Parody of Satyagraha

Sri Lankan housing minister hunger strike“A Sri Lankan minister says he has begun a hunger strike outside the UN’s Colombo offices demanding that it stop its probe into alleged war crimes. Housing Minister Wimal Weerawansa’s announcement follows two days of demonstrations outside the office by protesters angry over the inquiry.”

. . . reports the BBC . . .

“The BBC’s Charles Haviland in Colombo says Mr Weerawansa is lying alone on a mattress on a bed near the main gate of the UN office. …

“Several Buddhist monks are also there and have given blessings to the demonstration.”

Maybe, but Gandhi would be rolling over in his grave to see satyagraha* used as an instrument of the state.

*Satyagraha, of course, is Gandhi’s nonviolent resistance.

It’s Not an “Anthropology of Afghanistan” We Need, But of Us

At Armchair Generalist, Jason Sigger comments on an op-ed that a British member of Parliament wrote for Der Spiegel on July 1. But Scotsman Rory Stewart isn’t just any MP. He’s the man who wrote The Places in Between (Mariner Books, 2006), an astonishing account of trekking across Afghanistan in the wake of the initial post-9/11 U.S. attacks. Incidentally the danger to which he exposed himself was not only to an alternately hospitable and hostile people, but to winter storms while hiking in the mountains.

Stewart gained instant authority, beyond diplomats and military commanders, on the subject of Afghanistan and, while one might not always agree with him, he’s always worth reading.

“. . . everyone — politicians, generals, diplomats and journalists — feels trapped by our grand theories [such as counterinsurgency] and beset by the guilt of having already lost over a thousand NATO lives, spent a hundred billion dollars and made a number of promises to Afghans . . . which we are unlikely to be able to keep. [Thus] it is almost impossible to imagine the US or its allies halting the counter-insurgency in Afghanistan in the years to come. … And all our policy debates are scholastic dialectics to justify this singular but not entirely comprehensible fact. …

“The only way in which we could move beyond the counter-insurgency theory [is] to understand that however desirable [defeating the Taliban and creating a legitimate state in Afghanistan] might be, they are not things that we — as foreigners — can do. … But to acknowledge these limits and their implications would require not so much an anthropology of Afghanistan, but an anthropology of ourselves.”

Jason Sigger writes:

“It would be nice to have some articulate, moderate Democrat voice these words. It would be even nicer to imagine that Obama’s National Security Council has recognized these issues. … I am not sure if there’s a significant difference between the objectives of neocon ‘idealism’ and liberal internationalism right now, and I think that’s a major flaw in the Democratic party right now.”

Applied to neocons today, the term was once more commonly used to describe rebellious youth in the sixties, such as those who protested against Vietnam. As for that “anthropology of ourselves,” after that war, the United States, including the national security community, seemed to have done a national soul searching in hopes of inoculating ourselves to future such situations. But the Vietnam vaccine didn’t take — apparently our “work-up” of the body politic was flawed.

What Barry Should Say to Bibi

Behind all the photo ops and making nice speeches from US President Obama and Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu at the White House today, a hard reality lurks. The blank check Israel has enjoyed from the US all these years is about to be torn up. After over 60 years of friendship, Israel – of its own volition and through its own actions – has become an economic and security liability to the US.

Here’s what POTUS needs to say to the PM . . .

“Sorry, dude, it’s out of my hands. You have from two and a half to four and a half years before a congress is elected that is, at best, indifferent to Israel, and at worst, actively hostile. As the Holocaust generation and their children die off, the allegiance and priorities of American Jews are shifting. More are now in support of social justice and repairing the world (tikkun olam) than an overseas ‘homeland’ that is increasingly seen as both incompetent and immoral.

“You have been blessed by an American media that is largely Jewish or sympathetic to Jewish causes. That model is dead. The new media is a 16 year old with an iPhone and a Facebook account, and he / she will take great delight in exposing your perfidies to the world. This will only get worse as technologies advance.

“AIPAC, AJD and JDL are the past. They are newspapers in a digital age. The new forces are entities like J Street and Another Jewish Voice, plus passionate individuals with strong networks. With the exception of evangelicals, the American public is mostly indifferent to Israel. Leon Uris is dead, and the myth he and you helped perpetuate of a plucky David against an ugly, evil, Arab Goliath is dying, too. The Gaza invasion and the flotilla fiasco were your Waterloo – you just haven’t tallied the butcher’s bill.

“America is broke. We will soon have to give up a significant chunk of our defense budget, raise taxes and reduce services. No one is going to be able to stand up in Congress and explain why our money should go to build illegal settlements for a fundamentalist, apartheid regime. Especially when high visibility people whom Americans believe in, like David Petraeus, explain how Israeli intransigence threatens our security. We may be able to shield you from condemnation in the UN, but on the ground and in the voting booth, it’s just about over.

“If you truly want Israel to continue to exist, then figure out how to make peace within the 1967 borders AND with compensation for those who were displaced in the 1948 nakba. We can help you with that and I’ll lead the charge if you’re truly willing to play.

“If you don’t, demographic forces will compel a one state outcome, and you will not be its ruler. If that happens, your best case scenario will be a secular, democratic state in which Jews will be a minority. Your worst case is that it will be an Islamic state, and the oppressions and proscriptions you have inflicted on others will come back to you like karmic whiplash.

“The simple fact is, it’s probably too late for a two state ending. You have done too good a job in erasing those old boundaries. The Occupied Territories are a tar baby, and you’re stuck fast.

“Nor can you hope to hunker in the bunker of ‘Fortress Israel’. The ‘evolution of lethality’ means that your model of deterrence – massive conventional and even nuclear force – is obsolete. We live in an era of ‘open source’ warfare, where small groups and even individuals can fight states and have a reasonable chance of winning. Consider the implications for your economy when you have to buy F-35’s for hundreds of millions a copy, while your opponents can build increasingly sophisticated rockets and even cruise missiles in a garage-based ‘fab lab’ for thousands. To say nothing of the implications of DNA sequencers being sold on EBay for a few thousand dollars, and biogenetic precursors available by mail order.

“In an open source world, you cannot expect your opponents to remain incompetent. (Which of your former leaders was it who said, ‘Thank God our enemies are Arabs, and not Germans’?) Just as Iraqi and Afghani insurgents have begun to master the tactics and technologies of open source warfare, so will the Palestinians if you force them to.

“Even worse, the ability of your enemies to attack your systems will only increase. And they may not even need to do it themselves. Expect not only boycotts and disinvestment drives, but also focused attacks from contractors, such as the Russian Business Network and Chinese hackers. Your information, financial and governance systems, along with physical infrastructure, will be attacked relentlessly. The point is to make return on investment so lousy that investors and supporters will go away.

“Israel is incredibly vulnerable. Your economy is reasonably diversified, but it’s heavily dependent on imports and a few export markets. The vast majority of your oil, grains, raw materials, and military equipment come from abroad, and 80 percent of your GDP results from foreign trade. Most of that trade is with the US and the European Union, and that’s where public opinion is shifting from pro-Israel to actively anti-Israel.

“There’s an old saying, ‘If you’re in a hole, stop digging.’ You’re in a serious hole, but you keep buying new shovels. If you don’t change course dramatically and almost immediately, our own actions – tied to demographic shifts and economic realities, multiplied by open source media and networked information flows – will lead to Israel’s implosion in the foreseeable future. Some of my advisors have put a 20 year window on this, but the pace of history keeps accelerating, and I suspect it will really be less than that. Maybe even less than 10 years.

“In short, Bibi, the fat lady is singing her final stanza. You have a very brief window to make nice and try to salvage a Jewish state. I’ve already bet Hillary $100 that Israel is toast – and I gave her 8 – 5 odds. It’s probably the only profit I’ll make on this deal.”

Picture Obama Authorizing a Nuclear Attack

Since the end of the Cold War, the circumstances under which a U.S. president might authorize the launch of nuclear weapons have changed. First, it bears mentioning that, even though he or she is always accompanied by the “nuclear football,”* a president’s ability to exercise complete command over the response to a nuclear attack has long been overrated. Back in 2004, Global Zero Co-Coordinator and President of the World Security Institute Bruce Blair wrote:

“. . . the president’s supporting command system is not actually geared to withhold retaliation in the event of enemy missile attack, real or apparent. [Nuclear commanders] knew full well that the U.S. nuclear command system would collapse under the weight of . . . a Soviet first strike, and that their ability to [retaliate depended] on not waiting more than a few minutes before initiating a large-scale counterattack. [Thus the] bias in favor of launch on electronic warning is so powerful that it would take enormously more presidential will to withhold an attack than to authorize it.”

Today, however, a nuclear attack is less likely to be the result of another state dropping bombs from above or launching missiles than a non-state actor (terrorist group) detonating a weapon without warning on American soil. If there’s an upside to such an occurrence, it’s that it allows a president time to consider his response.

Most assume that a nuclear attack is automatically met by nuclear retaliation. But that might prove equally uncalled for and unfeasible. Andrew Krepinevich, director of defense think tank the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, makes that clear in his 2009 book 7 Deadly Scenarios: A Military Futurist Explores War in the 21st Century (Bantam Books).

The second of Krepinevich’s seven eye-opening and plausible scenarios is titled “War Comes to America.” In 2011, a Hiroshima-sized nuclear weapon is detonated in San Antonio, home to several major Air Force bases and an intelligence center. Krepinevich writes:

“Strategic Command’s nuclear forces are placed on high alert . . . military specialists pore over incoming satellite imagery to determine if they somehow missed a missile launch indication . . . and to detect any additional missile launches that would indicate a follow-on strike. … That evening President David Reynolds . . . informs the American public that [they've found] no indication that the weapon was delivered by any kind of missile or aircraft. Simply stated, the bomb was prepositioned in the city covertly and then detonated, perhaps remotely.”

Thus neither was it possible to initiate a retaliatory strike at the time nor mount an attack in the aftermath. For better or worse, the situation rendered launch on warning and hair-trigger alerts useless. Still, even though it’s a different kettle of fish from the Cold War, nuclear forensics reveals that it’s a Soviet weapon. But the Russians disavow the attack, though they concede that the weapon was stolen from them. They vow to track down the guilty parties, which they soon locate among rogue elements of their military and the Russian mafia and military. Krepinevich again:

“‘Intensive interrogation’ (that is to say, torture) of these individuals reveals that nine Soviet-designed atomic demolition munitions (ADMs) have been sold on the black market to Islamic militants. … but no group has presented compelling evidence that it is the true source of the attacks.”

As you can imagine, the American people “want the perpetrators identified and destroyed. Around-the-clock news coverage, along with intense blogosphere activity, keeps the public’s anger and fear at a high level.” But retaliation is still just a gleam in generals’ eyes because 1. the attackers have yet to be identified and 2. even when they are, since they don’t inhabit a state per se, they don’t present a ready target.

Two more nuked cities (sayonara San Diego and Chicago) and a total of 60,000 dead later, various Islamist groups now claim responsibility. Worse, two stolen Soviet weapons are still outstanding.

By this point, Krepinevich writes, “Many Americans would welcome a broad attack on Arab states like Syria and Lebanon and the occupation of Persian Gulf oil fields as a means of providing reparations to the United States for the attacks.” (Can we do that second one now? Kidding, of course.) “With no indications from the president that he’s inclined to either course of action, his “public support . . . has now plummeted. Most Americans see his efforts as weak and ineffectual.”

Then Boston is struck and during a “U.S. Coast Guard boarding of a cargo ship approaching U.S. territorial waters, a nuclear weapon . . . believed to be the final weapon . . . detonates.” The national nightmare seems to be coming to an end. The “president announces that the United States will work with its allies and partners . . . to pressure those states suspected of supporting radical Islamist elements to cease all such activities. In the interim the United States is intensifying its worldwide military operations to locate and destroy radical Islamist groups with the cooperation” of other countries. [But the] response to the president’s address is lukewarm at best. [His] approval ratings sink below 20 percent [and soon] the House of Representatives begins hearings to determine if the president should be impeached.”

Finally, a radical Islamist group provides irrefutable proof to the CIA that it perpetrated the attacks. Just when it feels like the United States can at last put a name to its pain, the Director of National Intelligence delivers the punch line: “Mr. President, they inform us that they have other nuclear weapons in the United States and will begin using them within a week unless we meet their demands, which are as follows . . .”

Scenario 2, were it to come to pass, would be our second object lesson in that unique way nuclear weapons have of fast-tracking us into crisis mode while leaving us without the means to retrace our steps back to a steady state. The first, of course, was the Cuban Missile Crisis. Krepinevich’s President Reynolds might have been intended as a hybrid of President Obama, attributing to him a reluctance to use nuclear weapons, and President John F. Kennedy, who finally became obstinate in his refusal to resort to nuclear weapons. Of Reynolds, Krepinevich writes: “Privately, he tells those closest to him that he is willing to suffer public disapproval in order to spare the country the dangers of a full-scale war.”

In fact, the pressure Kennedy faced from the military to use nuclear weapons was much stronger than that which Obama has thus far faced about remaining in Afghanistan or, for that matter, dialing down our nuclear-industrial complex. Kennedy, however, had proved his intestinal fortitude during World War II with PT-109. (Revisit that incident: his heroism bordered on a death wish.) Besides, in those days, bold initiatives were expected from leaders, unlike today, when consensus rules at the executive level in business and government.

Returning to Krepinevich’s scenario, even Kennedy might have nuked a host state after hearing about the additional bombs. Obama, I regret to report, unlike President Reynolds, might have succumbed to pressure to authorize a nuclear attack after the initial attacks.

*The nuclear football is an industrial-strength briefcase containing retaliatory options, site locations, and authorization codes.

————
Speaking of authorization codes, here’s one for Technorati to verify our blog: Q7N2EXJ85J9R

The Red Mosque Was Pakistan’s Waco

Ghazi, Pakistan's David Koresh“Pakistani authorities now believe a dangerous new militant group [the Ghazi Force], out to avenge a deadly army assault on a mosque in Islamabad three years ago, has carried out several major bombings in the capital previously blamed on the Taliban,” reports Kathy Gannon for the Associated Press.

“The emergence of the Ghazi Force was part of the outrage among many deeply religious Pakistani Muslims over the July 2007 attack by security forces against the Lal Masjid, or Red Mosque, a stronghold of Islamic militants. … The new group is made up of relatives of students who died in the Red Mosque assault. It is named after the students’ leader, Maulana Abdul Rashid Ghazi, who was also killed.”

Last June I hosted a FireDogLake book salon for Nicholas Schmidle, the author of To Live or to Perish Forever: Two Tumultuous Years in Pakistan. Before the attack, he visited Lal Masjid and interviewed Ghazi, who, along with his brother, inherited its leadership from his father, who was assassinated there. Of the three only Ghazi’s brother, who, you may recall, escaped dressed as a woman in a burqua, was spared that fate. (Later caught, he was recently released from prison. Guess Pakistan’s prison system is still a swinging door for jihadis.) The first mosque built in Islamabad, Lal Masjid once served an exclusive neighborhood of Islamabad.

Ghazi impressed Schmidle with his genial nature — in appearance, he reminded the author of Jerry Garcia! Gannon again:

A former senior official [said] that the police wanted to storm the mosque and end the siege at its outset [and] send the students home . . . until tempers cooled. President Gen. Pervez Musharraf refused, the official said, even though police knew that members of [an al-Qaida] affiliate organization . . . were bringing in weapons for the students. Musharraf relented and ordered the assault after militants kidnapped several Chinese nationals running a massage parlor in Islamabad, accusing them of prostitution.

Since the Chinese had invested hundreds of millions in buiding up the port in Gwadar (on the Arabian Sea), they pressured Musharraf to protect their people in Pakistan. Despite a government clean-up after the attack faster than Ground Zero after 9/11, Schmidle estimates that as many as 1,000 of those inside the Red Mosque were killed.

Meanwhile, news that it wasn’t the Taliban that had committed the string of Islamabad attacks caught many by surprise. In retrospect, though, it was no more surprising than when David Koresh and his Branch Davidians were slaughtered at Waco, Texas in 1993 and, along with Ruby Ridge, became a rallying point of the American militia movement.

Me to Nicholas Schmidle: How is it that the genial, level-headed Ghazi, as you wrote, “morphed from an outspoken extremist with a perma-smirk into a bona fide terrorist”? In other words, how did he wind up becoming Pakistan’s version of David Koresh and backing himself and his followers into an apocalyptic corner?

Schmidle: Ghazi was not a suicidal dude, or at least I didn’t think so. If anyone reads my account of him, you’ll see that he was critical in me getting access to jihadis that would have otherwise been unthinkable. … I felt remarkably safe in his presence.

But I believe that he was a victim of his own personality cult. … He had built up the jihad and built up himself to such a degree, and surrounded himself with some bad-ass fighters from Pakistan’s most elite jihadi organizations, that when it came down to the final showdown, he left no room for himself to back down.

Likewise, apparently, those carrying on his legacy leave no room for themselves to back down — or give no quarter.

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