While Saudi Arabia Goes to War Abroad, It’s Simmering at Home

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(Photo: Tribes of the World / Flickr)

To hear Saudi leaders tell it, the primary threat to the kingdom’s stability is the Islamic Republic of Iran. Worried over Washington and Tehran’s slowly improving relationship, Riyadh has projected an increasingly militarized and sectarian foreign policy aimed at countering Iran’s alleged hegemonic aims in the Middle East.

Yet tension with Iran is only one element of an increasingly complicated mosaic of threats to Saudi Arabia. In fact, the gravest dangers to the kingdom come from within.

Saudi Arabia is a classic rentier state. In exchange for the absolute acquiescence of its 29 million subjects, the ruling al-Saud family provides services such as housing, health care, education, and a variety of subsidies — all funded by the country’s substantial oil wealth. Combined with intolerance for dissent, control over these resources has historically served as the ruling family’s hedge against instability of all varieties.

In 2011, for example, the Saudi leadership responded to the Arab Spring revolts across the region by injecting $130 billion in the form of salary increases, public-sector job creation, and housing subsidies to minimize the potential for an uprising. Meanwhile, the kingdom’s appalling human rights record has deteriorated. Over the past four years, beheadings have skyrocketed and torture has flourished.

However, this authoritarian rentier state model is unsustainable. Oil revenues are down, local unrest is simmering, and extremists are taking aim at the kingdom from without and within. The roots of all these problems come not from Iran but from inside Saudi Arabia itself.

Feeling the Pinch

The global slide in oil prices has taken a toll on Saudi Arabia’s fossil-fueled economy. Foreign reserves dropped by $36 billion this spring, and are projected to fall another $300 billion within two years. The kingdom’s 2015 budget deficit — the first in seven years — is projected to reach $40 billion. With the kingdom waging a costly military campaign in Yemen, and the recently installed King Salman granting salary bonuses to public employees and military families, Saudi Arabia’s coffers are being drained at a rapid pace.

Demographic realities exacerbate these fiscal pressures. Unlike many Arab states that have declining or stable birth rates, Saudi Arabia’s population is growing. More half of the kingdom’s population is under the age of 25 and two-thirds are under 29. With a high youth unemployment rate and an estimated 25 percent of Saudis living in poverty, the economic grievances that drove Arabs in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, and Syria to revolt could spark similar forms of resistance among Saudi Arabians, constituting a major worry for the royal family.

The kingdom’s educational system is in dire need of reform. While many young Saudis are well-versed in the Koran as a result of their religious education, they often lack skills that are more practical and applicable to the global economy. The human capital of the country’s women is especially underdeveloped. Sixty percent of Saudis enrolled in higher education are women, yet the country’s female unemployment rate is 32.5 percent.

King Salman’s predecessor, King Abdullah, pursued progressive reforms (by Saudi Arabian standards) on gender issues, but the kingdom’s conservative elements prevented much progress. The reality is that Saudi law still recognizes women as property of their male relatives. In Saudi Arabia, which remains the only country that bans female drivers, if a woman falls in public it’s even illegal for an ambulance to pick her up.

Militant Jihadism

Since the 18th century, the Saudi ruling family has relied on an alliance with the ultra-conservative Wahhabi sect of Sunni Islam. Yet Saudi Arabia’s leadership has increasingly found this arrangement problematic, with several Wahhabi militant groups accusing the ruling al-Saud family of corruption and dedicating themselves to overthrowing it.

Scores of jihadist terrorist attacks in the kingdom, which peaked during the al-Qaeda insurgency of the mid-2000s, highlight the failure of Saudi Arabia’s rulers to maintain the loyalty of certain Wahhabi hardliners. Even as Saudi Arabia contributes to the U.S.-led military campaign against Daesh — another name for the self-styled “Islamic State” — thousands of Saudis have fled the kingdom to join Daesh’s ranks on the Iraqi and Syrian battlefields. Meanwhile, its supporters have launched a spate of “lone wolf” attacks against foreigners and Shiites in the kingdom.

The caliphate’s leaders have openly targeted Saudi Arabia’s leadership. In a statement last November, Daesh leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi announced his intention to expand Daesh to the “lands of al-Haramein” — a reference to Mecca and Medina. He referred to the ruling family as “the serpent’s head” and the “stronghold of the disease,” likening them to the pre-Islamic pagan rulers of Mecca and calling on supporters in the kingdom to rise up against them.

A few months later, when King Abdullah died, the group’s supporters took to social media to celebrate the death of the “thief of the two holy mosques,” further demonstrating Daesh’s vitriol for the monarchy.

Although Riyadh has made combatting Daesh a lower priority than fighting Houthi rebels in Yemen, the kingdom is extremely vulnerable to the group and its quest to foment chaos in the Gulf region. Given Daesh’s rapid rise to power in large portions of Iraq and Syria, and the mushrooming of its affiliated groups from Libya to Pakistan, Riyadh has every reason to be concerned about implications for the kingdom’s security.

Rising Sectarian Temperatures

Ever since the Wahhabi conquest of the Arabian Peninsula, the Shiites of modern-day Saudi Arabia — roughly 15 percent of the total population — have endured state-sponsored discrimination, social marginalization, and campaigns of violence waged by anti-Shiite hardliners.

Particularly since the Arab Spring, Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province — home to virtually the entire Shiite minority and all of the kingdom’s oil reserves — has experienced growing sectarian unrest and heightened political tension. In response to increasingly vocal demands for political, economic, and social reforms from their Shiite subjects, Saudi authorities have waged a harsh crackdown in the Eastern Province, maintaining that Shiite dissent is a product of Iranian meddling.

Saudi Arabia’s actions in neighboring countries have further raised sectarian temperatures. Riyadh’s decision in 2011 to deploy security forces to neighboring Bahrain to help the Sunni rulers in Manama suppress a democratic revolt from Bahraini Shiites intensified tensions between Saudi Arabia’s Sunni rulers and their own Shiite subjects. Furthermore, while Saudi Arabia’s conservative religious establishment has called Riyadh’s military campaign in Yemen a “holy war,” Shiites in the Eastern Province have vocally condemned the kingdom’s war against the Houthis. In early April, clashes erupted in Awamiyah between security forces and Shiite protestors demanding an end to Saudi Arabia’s campaign in Yemen.

Last year, Sheik Nimr al-Nimr — a revered Shiite cleric in the Eastern Province — was sentenced to death for allegedly inciting violence against the kingdom. Saudi Arabian Shiites see his sentence as a political maneuver aimed at quelling dissent in the Eastern Province. If Nimr is actually executed, sectarian tensions in the kingdom, as well as in other Middle Eastern countries, can only rise. Documented attacks against security forces by armed Shiite factions in the Eastern Province represent a growing potential for militancy and violent unrest.

Some hardline Wahhabis complain that Saudi authorities are too soft on Shiite dissent. Daesh has exploited this tension by demanding that Gulf Arab backers of the group carry out violence directed at all Shiites of the Arabian Peninsula. Daesh claimed responsibility for two suicide bombings targeting Shiite mosques in the Eastern Province this May, following a shooting of Shiites in the district of al-Ahsa on November 3, which marked the Shiite holy day of Ashura.

The threat of more Daesh-orchestrated and inspired terrorism in the Eastern Province poses a difficult dilemma for Saudi Arabia’s leadership. Following May’s violence, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Nayef bin Abdulaziz al-Saud immediately visited the Eastern Province in an effort to convince locals that their rulers are committed to the security of all Saudi Arabians. However, many Shiites hold the kingdom’s religious establishment responsible for the attacks and maintain that officials in Riyadh turn a blind eye to Daesh’s sectarian agenda in the kingdom.

Ultimately, it will be difficult for Riyadh to maintain a lid on Shiite dissent while Daesh openly inflames sectarian tensions. Daesh’s recent suicide bombing at a Shiite mosque in Kuwait City, which killed 27 and injured 227, along with its calls for violence against Bahrain’s Shiites, underscores its commitment to exploiting the Gulf’s sectarian tensions as a means of spreading its violent campaign to the region’s monarchies — with Saudi Arabia being the group’s top prize.

This balancing act is further complicated by Saudi Arabia’s efforts to topple the Iranian-backed regime in Syria and the kingdom’s ongoing war against the Zaydi Shiite Houthis in Yemen, which will continue to fuel tension between Saudi Arabia’s Sunni leadership and Shiite subjects.

While the Saudi government relies on its petro-wealth to buy loyalty and crush all dissent, a plethora of domestic and regional developments make the need for genuine and serious reforms in the kingdom increasingly urgent. Failure to implement them can only result in the deepening of these grievances.

The prospects for political and social stability in the kingdom will depend on the new leadership’s ability to address these internal issues in a truly meaningful way. Changes in Saudi Arabia’s reactionary society and political system cannot be expected in a short period of time. But they won’t get underway at all until Saudi leaders stop blaming Iran for their problems and start looking within.

Giorgio Cafiero is the Founder of Gulf State Analytics. Daniel Wagner is the CEO of Country Risk Solutions.

  • Abdulrahman A. Al-Zuhayyan

    I wonder whether or not you had visited the country and talked to the people about their social and political concerns to get an overall true sense of their state of affairs before you had jotted down this impressionistic (subjective) article. In other words, it is apparent that you have not done your homework by doing a thorough research.

    • Woodles11
    • Astrid Nova

      Abdulrahman A. Al-Zuhayyan,

      Assuming you are in Saudi Arabia and have talked to the people about their social and political concerns, what is your opinion on these domestic and foreign affair issues?

      • Abdulrahman A. Al-Zuhayyan

        Unfortunately, those who do publish work about Saudi Arab and the Gulf
        region are Westerners, Middle Easterners, and even Asians (Indians and
        Pakistanis) in recent years, and none of them is a Saudi. These political pundits
        have either visited the country for a brief time or lived in it in their own
        isolated habitats with no direct interaction with Saudis, and if there were
        any, they were courteous visitations that lack any substantial dialogues with
        respect to the local social and political issues. I have attended some of them,
        and I was not greatly impressed.

        Nonetheless, no matter how rigorously those authors research Saudi
        Arabia, it would be very hard for them to get a full grasp of the interactional
        dynamics of the various components of its society. This dynamic is shrouded
        with shades of history and theocracy, and other social factors.

        For instance, the dynamics between the various tribes that comprises the
        society and their in-group and out-group relationships; the dynamics between
        the urban inhabitants on one hand, and the tribes on the other; and the
        relationship between these segments altogether and the ruling body.

        What is really shocking is most of those alleged analysts come from different cultural backgrounds, and they have no compunction to juxtapose the causes of a specific social or political phenomenon that is or has occurred in their home countries on the Saudi society, which is uniquely different from theirs. For example, an Indian author, who grew up with the vibrant idea of the cast system in the back of his mind, will interpret the Saudi society according to this pattern of though. Even in the United States, this worldview impacts human communication and interactions between Indians who entertain this idea and other ethnic groups.

        Because other Asian Muslims (Pakistan, Bangladesh, Afghanistan) share with Saudis the same religion of Islam, they just assume that they are the same with respect to historical, social and political backgrounds, and have the same patterns of thoughts and worldviews. Other than the Gulf people, Middle Easterners, on other hands, interpret events from the colonial perspective, and their specific backgrounds.

        Moreover, Israeli authors were not able to avoid committing those grave
        conceptual and methodological errors, majority of them apply their historical, social, and political understanding of the Palestinians in the occupied territories on the Saudi case and by extension to the rest of the Arab and Muslim societies. And the list goes on.

        One can only imagine the outcomes of their studies. Of course, the conclusions will be hilariously funny. However, shockingly, the US political elite rely on these so-called studies to understand Saudi Arabia. Luckily, few Saudis give a little heed to these scribbling.

        • Abdullah bin-Raju

          Abdulrahman A. Al-Zuhayyan
          Would you like to use this forum to address any points made in the article? I think it would be most productive to discuss the content of the article and not sepcuate about the authors’ backgrounds while making ad hominem attacks against them based on baseless assumptions.

          • Abdulrahman A. Al-Zuhayyan

            I already did address the primary claim of the article. People like
            bin-Raju and Mr. Smith write about the history of Saudi Arabia and its social
            and political conditions with minimal knowledge of these issues.

            A good example is “The Arab Mind”, which is a book written based on a conversation between two individuals, one was an elderly Palestinian
            living in the occupied territories, and the other was an Israeli Author. If you can leave your assumptions aside, you will immediately realize, starting from the title, that it was –at best—a qualitative work that cannot be generalized on the entire Arabs and Muslims. Yet, in many instance, this book is used as a reference.

            Other writers, such as Asian, Middle Easterners, and some Western
            analysts, are not much different, but worse. In spite of most of them do not speak the Arabic language and do not know its geographical territories, they make horrible assumptions about Saudi Arabia. For instance, I have come across several articles written by Indian-Americans, who many them head the Middle East section in various think-tank institutions, and I can name them, that were infested with historical fallacies. What would be the outcomes?

            In addition to those books written on Saudi Arabia, you may watch the talk of those analysts on youtube to realize that they are telling fairytales. Therefore, their ain’t any assumptions in my comments, but rather solid facts.

        • neroden

          Courtier’s Reply. (Look it up if you don’t know what it means.) Doesn’t address the essential unsustainability of the authoritarian rentier state. Authoritarian rentier states are collapsing around the world.

    • Bob

      Well, I read exactly the same conclusions this author makes in a publicly released Israeli government assessment of Saudi Arabia. The Israeli Intelligence Services have published a document that states explicitly Saudi Arabia in its current state is unsustainable to see out this century. Now, whatever you think of Israel, you have to admit their Intelligence service is pretty damn good and are no slouches at analysis of their regional neighbours.

      • Abdulrahman A. Al-Zuhayyan

        Most have read the exact same reports done by the Israeli Intelligence
        and others (e.g., Henry Kissinger), which said that Israel would be vanished in
        10 years. This time has passed and it still where it is. As far as the Israeli Intelligence, I know how they work, and they are not as good as you think are. In the meantime, let us wait and see what would happen in the region by the end of the century. All the best

        • aspadistra

          To the extent that Americans have any interest at all in real information about Saudi Arabia, Iran, etc., it is fed to them through Israeli-ish sources. Israeliists — Wurmser, Feith, etc. — fed the information that led to war in Iraq.
          I don’t have to know the intricate details of intelligence – craft to know that Israeli Intelligence, like every other element of zionism, is built on perception management rather than honest and elegant assessments of cultures. One key to learning about Israel is to understand that much of what Israelis say about other countries is “projection” — Israelis see a situation and know how they would react, then assess that that is how the Target group would react.
          The campaign to spread throughout the USA the talking-point that “Iran cannot be trusted,” which penetrated media in ludicrous proportions, is a prime example. As another article on this forum reveals, USA cannot be trusted: “US Using Iran Inspections to Tweak Targeting in Event of Military Action”. In my view, this was/is the goal of the Iran “deal,” — to infiltrate and defang Iran in advance of an attack.

    • Vichapte

      Super media job 680.98$/day

      >c……

      http://www.World Media Point Network//Digital //Money

  • neroden

    The Saudi government has been a dead country walking for a long time now. It’s quite apparent to any outside observer. What’s much harder to tell is *when* it will collapse; probably sometime shortly after the oil money stops coming in, which is hard to predict as it depends on a lot of global variables.