Although largely seen as the outgoing heir to President Rodrigo Chaves, Costa Rica’s President-elect Laura Fernández is poised to push the country even further to the right. In the election on February 1, she gained a significant majority in the country’s 57-seat legislature and can apply pressure to impact social, economic and political reform at a rapid pace. Domestic critics worry about the underfunding of education and health services at the expense of a singular reliance on security policy and a push for “fiscal responsibility.” Aside from her policy agenda scaling back the welfare state, she also falls short on articulating social protection for marginalized groups.
The conservative shift in Costa Rica started as early as the country’s fiscal crisis in 2009-10. Further, a noticeable rise in crime by 2016, along with allegations and findings of embezzlement scandals as recently as 2018 and the “Chinese cement scandal,” produced more indifference toward traditional and elite political parties.
Democracy Now! reports that the new president “campaigned on favoring harsher criminal sentencing and mandatory prison labor for convicts. She’s proposed a massive new prison in Costa Rica modeled on CECOT, the so-called Terrorism Confinement Center built by Salvadoran President Nayib Bukele.”
In short, Costa Rica has provided yet another case study for analyzing right-wing populism in the Americas.
Not a Landslide
Fernández, however, won with a plurality, not a majority, and with a relatively low turnout of 50-60 percent. She ran on a “mano dura” (“iron fist”) platform to address economic anxiety. Her candidacy did not manage to attract a substantial percentage of the eligible voting population. Just over a majority of the voters selected opposition parties, and nearly half of Costa Ricans, including registered and nonregistered, abstained from voting altogether.
With roughly 48 percent of the vote, Fernández represented the Partido Pueblo Soberano (PPSO) and defeated 20 candidates including the center-right Álvaro Ramos of the PLN, whose 33 percent represented the National Liberation Party. Claudia Vanessa Dobles Camargo of the CAC, or Coalición Agenda Ciudadana, acquired nearly 5 percent while the progressive leftist and social democrat Ariel Robles Barrantes, representing Frente Amplio, collected just short of 4 percent.
Fernández cashed in on a widely-held suspicion of large-scale institutional power. Despite the country enjoying a favorable freedom score of 91 percent, according to Freedom House, former President Robles was accused of corruption and fiscal mismanagement. In addressing Costa Rica’s growing inequality and large scale problem with crime, Fernández managed to capitalize on voter skepticism and increased hostility toward traditional governance. There is a growing concern that, in creating an even “more lawful” Costa Rica, the new president could suspend civil liberties and constitutional protections.
Fernández’s predecessor leaves office with a decent approval rating, writes Catherine Osborn of Foreign Policy. Fernández vows to continue the policies of Chaves and insists on maintaining the plans of the neoliberal security state and overall “rodriguismo.” Still, Osborn points out, “the guardrails of Costa Rica’s democracy remain strong.” She quotes Argentine analyst Facundo Robles to the effect that “real power is distributed among actors with high technical legitimacy and low political control: the judiciary, the comptroller’s office, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, and a dense network of autonomous agencies that act as guardians of the status quo.”
Historical Rupture
The election of Fernández marks a rhetorical shift away from Costa Rican political history. The founding of the country saw the era of the First Republic and the 1848 Constitution, followed by the Second Republic in 1949 based on social democracy and the rule of law.
According to anthropologist Andrés León Araya, rodriguismo seeks to advance a “Third Republic” marked by challenges to institutions and the centering of executive power. Rodriguismo, he writes
does not break with democracy so much as it reconfigures it. Popular mandates and the language of “the people” remain central, but they are increasingly used to discipline opposition, contain social demands, and protect an unequal economic order. Thus, the real danger is not democratic collapse, but the normalization of governing through insecurity and permanent conflict.
The International Center for Non-Profit Law (ICNL) reports that despite the “strong guardrails” and a reconfigured democracy, there is a need to monitor Costa Rican government via a robust civil society. “Some de facto businesses operate as nonprofit entities to take advantage of tax benefits and limited oversight,” cites ICNL. Further, “enforcement of financial transparency rules, particularly around foreign funding—has increased, and foundations receiving public funds are subject to growing scrutiny.”
The Financial Times has alluded to a much stronger executive presence under Fernández. Costa Rican civil society have raised additional concerns in terms of civic freedom. Organizations involved in Costa Rican LGBTQIA+ activism, ADELA and climate coalitions, FUNPADEM and state-led development programs, and peace and democracy thinktanks could all face setbacks, reduced prioritization, and obstacles in creating policy moving forward. Fernández could significantly limit the role of activists in lawmaking if it interferes with her notions of state power, state security and state capitalism.
Foreign Policy Shift?
Only three years ago, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Worship Arnoldo André Tinoco outlined a foreign policy for Costa Rica “based on human rights, multilateralism, climate action, ocean protection, sovereignty, disarmament, and the promotion of peace.” Domestically, Costa Rica has been defined as a place with “clear principles and tangible realities,” dedicated to internal stability, health, and education. It has been lauded for not possessing a military and being committed to regional peace, although its foreign policy has historically aligned with dubious forms of American and Israeli regional hard and smart power. Now concerns are being raised about its own election integrity.
Although the emerging global right-wing has been critical of “progressive left globalization,” it has all the while been devising effective ways of forging reactionary internationalism to the great detriment of worldwide institutional stability and governance. In the current moment, the Americas have a fondness for what has been called the “Chainsaw International.”
Costa Rica’s election can serve as a wakeup call for the left in building regional coalitions around climate, disarmament, and a fair economy in the Americas. If civil society can continue to organize around human rights, job creation, and sustainability, a progressive response is still possible to rescue Costa Rica from its “bruised exceptionalism.”