Two weeks ago, as aid trucks rolled into Gaza for the first time in months, the world breathed a collective sigh of relief. After 467 days of brutal warfare that killed over 47,000 people, Hamas and Israel had finally agreed to stop fighting. International headlines celebrated the Qatar-brokered ceasefire as a breakthrough. World leaders called it a step toward peace. Even the stock market rallied on the news.

But this ceasefire is not about peace. In the complex game of survival and strategy that has been playing out for nearly two decades, ceasefires are less about ending conflict and more about mastering the art of the tactical pause. The January 15, 2025 agreement includes significant provisions: the release of hostages, the transfer of prisoners, and the allowing of humanitarian aid into Gaza.

Although these developments sound like progress, understanding their true significance requires a deeper examination of the dynamics at play and what’s really happening behind the scenes.

Why Hamas Can’t Just Choose Between War and Peace

Here’s what makes Hamas different from most political organizations: since 2007, it’s been trying to be two things at once. It’s both the government of Gaza, responsible for 2.3 million people’s daily needs, and a resistance movement committed to armed struggle against Israel.

Imagine running a city while simultaneously fighting a war against it. That’s essentially Hamas’s situation. It needs to keep the garbage trucks running and the streets policed while also maintaining its identity as a militant organization. This contradiction helps explain why Hamas makes the decisions it does about war and peace.

This dual identity creates constant operational challenges. When schools need funding, hospitals require supplies, and municipal workers demand salaries, Hamas must function as any other government would. Yet simultaneously, its military wing makes decisions that often directly impact the group’s ability to provide these basic services. During the recent conflict, for instance, while Hamas officials worked to maintain essential services in Gaza, military actions led to severe restrictions on incoming supplies and humanitarian aid.

The organization’s leadership structure reflects this duality. The political bureau manages civil administration and international relations, while the military wing, the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, operates with significant autonomy. This separation allows Hamas to engage in diplomatic negotiations through its political leadership while maintaining its militant stance through its armed wing.

This complex balancing act affects every major decision. When considering the 2025 ceasefire, Hamas had to weigh both its governance responsibilities and its ideological commitments. The devastation in Gaza demanded immediate humanitarian relief for the population, yet any agreement had to be framed in a way that didn’t compromise the group’s fundamental positions.

Why a Ceasefire Now?

The numbers tell a devastating story. After more than a year of fighting, over 46,000 Palestinians and 1,200 Israelis are dead. Sixty percent of Gaza’s buildings are damaged or destroyed. Hospitals barely function. Water and electricity are scarce.

For Hamas, this created an impossible situation. Gaza’s government faced a humanitarian catastrophe it couldn’t solve. But as a resistance movement, Hamas couldn’t simply surrender. The ceasefire offered a way out of this dilemma—at least temporarily.

The scale of destruction reached unprecedented levels by the end of 2024. International aid organizations reported that 90 percent of Gaza’s 2.3 million residents had fallen below the poverty line. The territory’s medical infrastructure collapsed, with only 35 percent of hospitals maintaining even basic operations. The United Nations warned of an impending public health crisis as water treatment facilities failed and medical supplies dwindled to critically low levels.

These conditions forced Hamas to confront a stark reality. Continuing the conflict meant watching Gaza’s civil infrastructure completely collapse, while accepting a ceasefire meant finding a way to maintain governance to address urgent humanitarian needs. The Qatar-brokered agreement provided a framework to accomplish both objectives, allowing Hamas to frame the pause as a strategic decision rather than a defeat

This Has All Happened Before

During the Second Intifada in the early 2000s, and again in 2008, 2012, and 2014, Hamas agreed to stop fighting when it needed to. Each time, they used these pauses to rebuild, regroup, and strengthen their position.

The current ceasefire follows this pattern. It gives Hamas a chance to address Gaza’s humanitarian crisis while maintaining its fundamental position toward Israel. Think of it less like a peace treaty and more like a tactical timeout in a longer game.

Looking deeper into these historical examples reveals a consistent strategy. The 2008 ceasefire, which followed Operation Cast Lead, allowed Hamas to rebuild its administrative infrastructure while maintaining its military capabilities. Similarly, the 2012 agreement, brokered by Egypt, provided Hamas with an opportunity to strengthen its political position in Gaza while securing economic concessions. The 2014 ceasefire, following Operation Protective Edge, demonstrated Hamas’s ability to emerge from intense conflict with its governance structure intact.

These previous agreements share key characteristics with the current ceasefire: each came at moments of significant humanitarian pressure, each included provisions for aid and reconstruction, and each was framed by Hamas as a strategic necessity rather than a permanent solution. The pattern suggests that Hamas has developed a sophisticated approach to using ceasefires as tools for balancing its dual roles as governors and resistance fighters.

What Hamas Actually Says About Peace

Even when Hamas appears to moderate its position, the fine print matters. In 2017, when it released a new political document that seemed to signal a softer stance toward Israel, its leaders were quick to clarify: this was a tactical move, not a change in fundamental beliefs.

The same pattern appears in the statements about the current ceasefire. Hamas leaders consistently describe it as a temporary measure to address immediate needs, not a step toward permanent peace.

This approach to public communication reflects a careful balancing act between international perception and internal messaging. In Arabic-language statements to local audiences, Hamas officials emphasize the temporary nature of any agreements, while English-language communications often focus on humanitarian concerns and diplomatic engagement. This dual messaging strategy allows Hamas to maintain credibility with its base while engaging in necessary tactical negotiations.

The organization’s response to international reaction to the 2017 document provides a clear example of this dynamic. Although Western media interpreted the document as a potential shift in ideology, Hamas officials gave interviews to regional media outlets explicitly stating that their acceptance of 1967 borders was a provisional position that didn’t alter their longer-term objectives.

The Money Problem

Rebuilding Gaza isn’t cheap—current estimates put the cost at around $4 billion. Qatar, which helped broker the ceasefire, has promised significant financial support. This external aid allows Hamas to address the humanitarian crisis without having to compromise on its core positions.

Meanwhile, the deep divide between Hamas and the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank continues, suggesting that this ceasefire hasn’t changed anything about the fundamental political landscape. The reconstruction challenge extends beyond mere finances. International donors face complex questions about how to rebuild Gaza’s infrastructure without strengthening Hamas’s political position. The UN Development Program estimates that beyond the $4 billion needed for immediate reconstruction, an additional $3 billion will be required for long-term development projects. This massive financial undertaking involves multiple stakeholders, including the European Union, Gulf states, and international aid organizations.

The political dynamics of reconstruction add to another layer of complexity. The Palestinian Authority’s limited influence in Gaza complicates the distribution of aid and the implementation of rebuilding projects. Despite international pressure for unity, the geographical and political separation between Gaza and the West Bank continues to deepen, with both Hamas and the Palestinian Authority maintaining separate administrative structures and security forces.

What This Means for the Future

The evidence points to an uncomfortable conclusion: this ceasefire probably isn’t a step toward lasting peace. Instead, it’s more like a pause button on a conflict that’s likely to resume once conditions change.

Benjamin Netanyahu’s government has one clear aim in Gaza: dismantle Hamas, both as a fighting force and governing body. Israel insists that it won’t accept any group in Gaza that could threaten Israeli security, calling for the “complete operational destruction” of Hamas’s military wing.

But this hardline position complicates the ceasefire’s future. Will Israel use this pause to continue weakening Hamas politically and militarily? Or will it focus on stabilizing Gaza to reduce future threats? As long as Israel sees Gaza’s governance and military threat as intertwined, fighting could easily resume.

This doesn’t mean the ceasefire isn’t important. For Gaza’s civilians, any break from violence matters enormously. Eighty percent of the population depends on humanitarian aid. Ninety percent live below the poverty line. The ceasefire allows critical aid to reach these people.

But understanding the ceasefire’s true nature helps explain why lasting peace remains so elusive. Hamas has shown it can be flexible in its tactics while remaining firm in its fundamental positions. Until those changes, ceasefires like this one will likely remain what they’ve always been: temporary breaks in an ongoing conflict.

Ameer Al-Auqaili is a PhD Candidate in political science at Wayne State University, specializing in World Politics with a focus on power dynamics, non-state actors, and the intersection of religious and political identities in the Middle East and the United States.