Imagine Iraq as a football game. It’s late in the fourth quarter. Coach George W. Bush is looking at a grim situation on the field. He has just told quarterback Don Rumsfeld to hit the showers, and now he is sending in the new boy, Bob Gates. Several other team members have been sidelined. The clock is ticking. The current strategy doesn’t seem to be working, but Coach Bush is reluctant to try something new.
Despite the breathless hype, the Baker-Hamilton Iraq Study Group (ISG) report did not include any dramatic new ideas for ending the war in Iraq. In fact, it did not include a call to end the war at all. Rather, the report’s recommendations focus on transforming the U.S. occupation of Iraq into a long-term, sustainable, off-the-front-page occupation with a lower rate of U.S. casualties. Despite its title, it does not provide “A New Approach: A Way Forward.”
Since the beginning of the republic, U.S. presidents have used some form of secrecy in the course of governing. In the wake of the Watergate scandal, congressional hearings in the 1970s and the disclosure of covert U.S. programs of assassination and destabilization overseas temporarily reduced the scope of secret activities sponsored by the executive branch. From the 1980s on, however, presidents have come to rely increasingly on secrecy-related practices. Though the U.S. Constitution does not explicitly grant executive secrecy in the list of Article II powers, presidents have increased their powers through legislation, the federal courts’ recognition of legal defenses to conceal information, and responses to the ongoing threat of terrorism.
The latest recruitment brochure from the Central Intelligence Agency, which beckons the uninitiated to Âbe a part of a mission that’s larger than all of us, opens to reveal an image of the red-roofed entrance to Beijing’s Forbidden City. From an oversized portrait on the ancient wall, Chairman Mao and his Mona Lisa smile behold the vast granite expanse of Tiananmen Square. The Cold War is over, and the Soviet Union is gone. The cloak-and-dagger games of Berlin and Prague have been replaced by business and tourism. But ChinaÂland of ancient secrets, autocratic leaders, and memories of suppressed uprisingsÂstill holds out the promise of a world-historical struggle that can help the CIA meet its recruitment goals.
The latest recruitment brochure from the Central Intelligence Agency, which beckons the uninitiated to Âbe a part of a mission that’s larger than all of us, opens to reveal an image of the red-roofed entrance to Beijing’s Forbidden City. From an oversized portrait on the ancient wall, Chairman Mao and his Mona Lisa smile behold the vast granite expanse of Tiananmen Square. The Cold War is over, and the Soviet Union is gone. The cloak-and-dagger games of Berlin and Prague have been replaced by business and tourism. But ChinaÂland of ancient secrets, autocratic leaders, and memories of suppressed uprisingsÂstill holds out the promise of world-historical struggle that can help the CIA meet its recruitment goals.
Great power competition in Central Asia ebbs and flows in a timeless and tireless fashion. Unlike in Europe and East Asia during the Cold War and after, the fault line for the current jockeying for position in Central Asia between Washington and Beijing is not easily discernible. Instead, fluidity, uncertainty, and even outright reversal of fortunes among the major players have been the norm.
The HBO series Deadwood depicts a town on the American frontier where law is the exception rather than the rule. The inhabitants of this gold-mining town in the Dakota Territory in the 1870s rely on guns and intimidation and, if necessary, a little torture to secure their claims. Outside, in the wilderness, Indian tribes use terror to repel the intruders, though the canny leaders of Deadwood often magnify that threat to justify their own bending of the rules of civilized behavior. Meanwhile, politicians in nearby state capitols and far away Washington try to establish the rule of law in the territory. But Deadwood sees only more hands reaching for their gold and meddling in their way of life.
Inaugurated last July, Peruvian President Alan García Perez completed the first 100 days of his second administration in early November. Winning a run-off in the June elections with 52% of the vote, García inherited a country torn by divisive socioeconomic and political issues. His first three months in office have been marked by a combination of policy innovation and continuity as he seeks to find workable solutions to difficult problems.
In his bid to appeal to a conservative base on the road to 2008, John McCain repeatedly urged last week that the United States send more troops to Iraq to get the job done. The military response to McCain’s political appeal demonstrates that military intelligence is no oxymoron.
In this Two-Question Interview with novelist Charles Johnson, E. Ethelbert Miller asks about the relationship between Buddhism and war.