The guiding maxim of medicine, “Do no harm,” has a common-sense counterpart in anti-guerrilla military operations. This should not be surprising, for these military operations, when conducted by lawful governments, try to excise a perceived imminent and grave danger to civil society without causing additional trauma to the body politic.
Why Turkey? Why now? Why twice? These are among the central questions arising from the 4 horrendous attacks on synagogues and British interests in Istanbul recently. Jewish places of worship outside of Israel have been targeted in various locations–such as Tunisia and Morocco–over the past 2 years. Britain hosted U.S. President George W. Bush on a controversial state visit the week the attacks occurred. So, within the mindset of the perpetrators, the targets in Istanbul make some sense–and the timing of the anti-British bombings had an obvious rationale.
The U.S. has shown the Iraqi Governing Council the door, not just because of the need to speed up the transition to self-government, but because the council has become a little too independent for its own good. With the council to be replaced by another set of U.S.-installed Iraqis, the search is on for a new batch of collaborators.
“Mending Wall,” penned in 1915 by American poet Robert Frost (1874-1963), includes a line that has become an American aphorism: “Good fences make good neighbors.” Those who quote Frost’s line generally do so uncritically, undoubtedly thinking that the poet himself approved. In reality, Frost was highly dubious of this bit of “common wisdom.” As the poem shows, he was questioning, not declaring: “Do good fences really make good neighbors?”
Vice President Dick Cheney’s office continues to grow as a homebase for prominent neoconservative foreign policy strategists. Earlier this year Aaron Friedberg, a prominent neoconservative China hawk joined Cheney’s staff, (China Hawk Settles in Neocons’ Nest, http://www.fpif.org/commentary/2003/0305friedberg.html). The latest addition is David Wurmser, a neoconservative strategist who has long called for the United States and Israel to work together to “roll back” the Ba’ath-led government in Syria, who joins Cheney’s staff as an adviser on the Middle East. Wurmser, who had been working for Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton, joined Cheney’s staff under its powerful national security director, I. Lewis “Scooter” Libby, in mid-September, according to Cheney’s office.
The tug of war between the hawks and doves over North Korea policy continues within the Bush administration. In the latest move, the administration has unveiled its new, flexible negotiating position with Pyongyang: a willingness to provide security guarantees. Examined more carefully, however, this new dovish position appears to have the wing prints of the hawks all over it.
Look for the Bush administration to push its “Proliferation Security Initiative” (PSI) during the president’s October trip to Asia. Look for Asian leaders already not on board (only Japan an Australia are participating) to politely agree–and get on with other priorities.
With Iraqi oil proving to be insufficient to finance the occupation of post-war Iraq and with U.S. taxpayers recoiling at covering the shortfall, the result of a donors’ conference in Madrid will decide whether the United States can stay on in Iraq. The donors’ decision, in turn, depends on whether the occupation turns from a unilateral to a multilateral form of corporate invasion.
A September 6th New York Times story on Iraq quoted Pentagon spokesperson Bryan G. Whitman as saying: "All known Iraqi munitions sites are being secured by coalition forces."
On May 1, 2003, U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, on a visit to Kabul, triumphantly declared that “major combat activity” in Afghanistan was over and that the “the bulk of the country is now secure.” Rumsfeld scoffed at those analysts and critics who dared to challenge this optimistic assessment, derisively labeling them “armchair columnists.” Four months later, on September 7, 2003, during a return trip to Kabul, Secretary Rumsfeld delivered a very different message. He was in the Afghan capital to shore up an increasingly fragile Afghan Transitional Administration (ATA), beset by insecurity and struggling to advance a sputtering reconstruction process.