As U.S. forces consolidate the occupation in Iraq the neoconservatives are bringing the war home again, re-opening the front in Washington with an artillery barrage against the State Department.
It’s about the size of North Dakota; its annual military expenditure is under $925 million. But from all the attention it has received as the fighting in Iraq has diminished, one has the impression that Syria is a major threat to the United States.
“Democracy,” Winston Churchill declared, “is the very worst form of government in the world–except for all the other forms.” By that he meant it is a frustrating, time-intensive, messy affair, with bickering a central element in the process. So when some country attempts to export and guide the creation of democracy in another country, it undertakes an almost impossible task. And if it is not careful, the task itself can, literally as well as figuratively, lead to the demise of the very form of governance it attempts to foster.
With the main fighting in Iraq ending and the Ba’ath party hold on the levers of power broken, the U.S. and UK can justly claim military success. Coalition casualties have been low, and all coalition personnel known to have been held by the Iraqis have been freed. For the second time in 18 months, governments accused of harboring and supporting terrorists have been deposed. Iraqis, like their Afghan brethren last year, have been released from an oppressive and brutal regime.
Post-War Iraq: Asking the Right Questions By Col. Dan Smith (Ret.) | April 11, 2003 Editor : John Gershman, Interhemispheric Resource Center ( IRC )Foreign Policy In Focus www.fpif.org The frustration of the American officer on the streets of Baghdad was almost palpable in the CNN report: “They’ve got 25 questions. I’ve got 5 answers.” That was Tuesday, April 8, the same date President Bush, during a joint press conference with British Prime Minister Tony Blair, declared: “Rebuilding of Iraq will require the support and expertise of the international community. We’re committed to working with international institutions, including the United Nations, which will have a vital role in this task.” Without question, the participation in UN-sanctioned peacemaking and peacekeeping missions by U.S. military units trained in the techniques of these operations often has been vital to their success. The mere presence of strong military forces from “coalitions of the willing” frequently was enough to re-establish the security and stability that are the prerequisites for the work of international institutions and nongovernmental humanitarian relief organizations. This was clearly the case in post-civil war Bosnia, where earlier the insufficiently armed UN peacekeepers could not prevent atrocities, and in Kosovo, where the U.S. took the lead in halting Slobodan Milosevic’s ethnic cleansing campaign. But Iraq is not Bosnia or Kosovo–nor for that matter East Timor (to which the U.S. provided materiel support but no combat forces) or Afghanistan or Haiti. Moreover, the troops who have fought their way to Baghdad over the past three-plus weeks are psychologically primed to perform traditional warfighting roles: destroying things and killing people, not peacekeeping roles. These realities raise questions of who, how, and what will be done in and for Iraq–and the region–in the post-Saddam era that is just now unfolding. Ever since the UN Security Council refused to endorse the U.S. contention that Security Council Resolution 1441 (2002) authorized military action if Saddam Hussein failed to actively cooperate with UN inspectors, administration spokespersons have insisted that members of the military “coalition” would be the dominant contributors in Iraq’s reconstruction and re-integration into the world community. Despite Mr. Blair’s attempted gloss concerning the depth of UN involvement in the process the U.S. would allow, President Bush was quite explicit in the limits he envisaged. While praising as “a positive step” the appointment by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan of a “personal representative to the process,” Bush essentially relegated the UN to a subordinate role. “Well, it’d be a vital role as an agent to help people live freely. That’s a vital role, and that means food. That means medicine. That means a place where people can give their contributions. That means suggesting people for the IIA [Iraqi Interim Authority]. That means being, you know, a party to the progress being made in Iraq.” The Pentagon’s Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance, headed by retired U.S. General Jay Garner, is to run Iraq in the initial post-war occupation phase. Its missions encompass reconstituting basic services such as electricity, water, sanitation, and medical care; screening the remnants of the Iraqi civil service for individuals acceptable for retention under a new democratic government; and coordinating humanitarian aid programs run by the World Food Program (WFP), UNESCO, the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and private aid agencies. Difficulties with this arrangement, which is not yet even in place, are already apparent. Despite the efforts of the British forces in Basra, distribution of relief supplies–a duty of an occupying power under international law–has been a shambles. Looting has been rampant. Without the cooperation of the Iraqi public, the number of British troops in-country simply are not enough to create and maintain physical security. And this is for a city of only 1.3 million; Baghdad, which will be the responsibility of the United States, has 5 million people. Euphoria may dampen appetites for a short time, but clean water and nourishing food will soon be demanded. Moreover, General Garner’s superior is General Tommy Franks, the warfighting Central Command commander. For those in the world who resent the dominating power of the United States, the narrow base of influence on which Iraq is to be reconstituted will be seen as proof of U.S. imperial ambitions–including bases in Iraq and control of its oil–potentially spurring recruitment into extremist groups and raising the risks of terrorist actions. If, as the President consistently alleged, Iraq under Saddam was a threat to the world, reconstituting and re-integrating Iraq into the international community is the responsibility of the world. Then there are the costs. As Senators Biden (D-DE) and Hagel (R-NE) recently pointed out, “Iraq is saddled with UN sanctions, an estimated $61 billion in foreign debt, and approximately $200 billion in reparations claims through the UN Compensation Commission.” And the estimated costs for post-war security, humanitarian aid, and reconstruction run from “$20-25 billion per year over 10 years.” There is no logic in the administration’s insistence that, because the U.S. chose to bear the main coalition burden in lives lost and treasure spent, the country should also choose a course restricting or even excluding many other countries that might be willing to contribute to the post-war reconstruction effort–particularly those that abstained from supporting or actually opposed military operations. Finally, as happened after the U.S.-influenced meeting in Bonn, Germany that established the interim ruling authority in Afghanistan, the selection by the U.S. of the Iraqis who will constitute an Iraqi Interim Authority could raise doubts as to the independence of that Authority, even among Iraqis. This is more likely in Iraq than in Afghanistan, for there are more exiles with little direct, recent experience in-country vying for positions and influence in Iraq. Moreover, should those who obtain positions in the interim authority succeed to positions in the subsequent government, the suspicion will arise that the “fix was in” from the very beginning. Afghanistan does offer a cautionary note in this regard: despite U.S. backing and fairly wide international support, the interim authority in Afghanistan controls little outside Kabul–and even that is due to the International Security Assistance Force. More telling is the fact that the U.S. military supplies the personal protection force for Afghan interim president Hamid Karzai. Internationalization and United Nations are not four-letter words, literally or figuratively. Only the UN, as flawed as it may be, can lay claim to neutrality and global legitimacy. The U.S. recognized the status of the UN when it sought–but failed to get–endorsement of, and thus at least the passive participation of Member states in the war against Iraq. Now it is time to secure full UN participation in meeting post-war Iraq’s humanitarian, reconstruction, and political needs. In particular, a new UN Security Council resolution providing for a UN leadership role in Iraq would help heal the breech created in the international community in the period leading to active hostilities. That much also would help relieve the American officer’s frustration over his 5 answers for the 25 questions. (Dan Smith < dan@fcnl.org > is a military affairs analyst for Foreign Policy in Focus (online at www.fpif.org ) and a retired U.S. army colonel and Senior Fellow on Military Affairs at the Friends Committee on National Legislation.) Weekly multilateralism / unilateralism analysis via our Progressive Response ezine. This page was last modified on Friday, April 11, 2003 4:44 PM Contact the IRC’s webmaster with inquiries regarding the functionality of this website. Copyright © 2002 IRC. All rights reserved. Recommended citation : Dan Smith, “Post-War Iraq: Asking the Right Questions,” (Silver City, NM & Washington, DC: Foreign Policy In Focus, April 11, 2003). Web location : http://www.presentdanger.org/commentary/2003/0304questions.html Production Information : Writer: Dan Smith Editor: John Gershman, IRC Layout: Tonya Cannariato, IRC
As the U.S. army occupies Baghdad, the peace movement is faced with a series of strategic challenges, challenges we must face openly, and challenges for which there are no easy answers. We must develop political strategies that draw on solidarity and information from activists and analysts in diverse social movements and incorporate those into our own work.
The war in Iraq has highlighted how reporting on casualties during an armed conflict is a sensitive issue. In the United States, a norm has developed that immediate family members should not have to learn through the media of their loved one’s death in a military operation. Since the war in Vietnam, another norm also has developed: that U.S. blood is rarely shown. Few U.S. wounded or dead appear in digital color on our TV screens. These U.S. norms underlie much of the outrage at independent Arab television Al Jazeera Satellite Channel’s broadcast of images of U.S. dead and prisoners of war. But this outrage masks a potentially more serious issue that should concern all citizens: Have the U.S. media been so wrapped in the flag of late that they have lost objectivity and are undercutting the informed nature of our citizenry?
While a strong majority of the U.S. public is rallying behind President George W. Bush’s invasion of Iraq, they also support the United Nations Security Council and back multilateral diplomacy rather than unilateral U.S. action, according to a major poll released in Washington, DC on Monday, March 31. The poll, conducted during the first five days of the war by the University of Maryland’s Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA), found that the current high levels of support for the war–between 70 and 75% in most polls–might be due more to a rallying effect than to real conviction on the public’s part.
Less than an hour before the initial bombs and cruise missiles rained down on Baghdad in the first volleys of the Iraq war, the U.S. military launched a major attack in its other war in Afghanistan. Pentagon spokespersons insisted that the timing of the attack was “a coincidence” and that planning for the operation had been going on for months. However, it seems clear that this escalation of U.S. military activity serves a dual purpose: to assuage the fears of those concerned that the U.S. would lose interest in Afghanistan after the onset of the war in Iraq and to send a clear signal to anti-American forces in Afghanistan and the wider region that the war on terror would not lose momentum. More than anything, though, the operation illustrates that the ongoing war in Afghanistan–involving 11,000 coalition troops, 8,000 of which are American–is far from over.
With Baghdad having fallen and the territorial consolidation of Iraq near at hand, discussion of the postwar period has intensified dramatically. The debate has provoked splits at various levels, within the United Nations, within the vaunted “coalition of the willing,” and even within the U.S. government. The acrimony that has surrounded this debate shows that even with victory in the war assured, wining the peace will be a more arduous task. How Iraq is governed and rebuilt in the first two years following the war’s conclusion may determine whether, in the rhetoric of the Bush administration, it is transformed into a beacon of democracy for the Arab world or, as many Middle East experts and observers fear, it sparks a wave of violent and destabilizing unrest in the region. In light of the monumental significance of this enterprise, it is important to examine the potential models for postwar governance in Iraq and to assess their effectiveness and impact. An examination of public statements issued by policymakers who will shape the postwar dispensation, along with an analysis of previous cases of post-conflict state building–such as post-World War II Germany and Japan, the Balkans in the 1990s, and, most recently, Afghanistan–provides a basis upon which to construct models of governance for Iraq. The model ultimately implemented will vary significantly from the theoretical constructs presented in this paper. However, the purpose of this analysis is not to predict the shape and structure of the postwar administration; it is intended to elucidate the demands and dangers of the postwar environment as a guide to state building.