After Vladimir Putin’s December 17 address to the Russian Defense Ministry board, the media have zeroed in on the Russian president’s vow to “liberate” Russia’s “historical lands” in the Donbas region and his insulting description of European leaders as “piglets” or “swine” (Vlad Vexler nailed the translation with “not yet swines”). Significantly, during the 15-minute address, Putin emphasized what he considers to be NATO’s threat to Russian security and Moscow’s efforts to expand and update its nuclear arsenal. “Our nuclear forces are 92 percent modernized,” he boasted, later adding, “Improving our strategic nuclear forces remains a priority.”
Russia’s nuclear modernization effort has been underway for decades, and the country remains the biggest nuclear power in the world with a stockpile of approximately 4,309 nuclear warheads, of which 1,718 are deployed. With Moscow lowering its thresholds for nuclear use late last year and the New START treaty set to expire in less than two months, it’s worth taking a closer look at Russia’s newest weapons systems and considering why Putin is so determined to talk about them.
After detailing the technological gains the Russian military and overall defense sector have made throughout the course of the war in Ukraine, Putin dwelt for several minutes on Russia’s latest nuclear-armed weapons systems. He described the catastrophic capabilities of the Oreshnik and Burevestnik missiles, and the Poseidon unmanned submersible, adding that the Oreshnik will enter “combat duty” before the end of the year. Today, the Belarusian President Lukashenko confirmed that the Oreshnik has been deployed in Belarus. Taking place during critical Ukraine peace negotiations, the deployment is a signal of Moscow’s commitment and willingness to deter Western interference in what Russia regards as its sphere of influence.
First deployed in November 2024 when it struck the Ukrainian city of Dnipro, the Oreshnik is an intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM) based on the modified intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) Rubezh. It was developed after the 2019 collapse of INF Treaty, which had banned ground-launched ballistic missiles with a range of 500-5,500 kilometers. The Oreshnik carries six warheads in a multiple independent re-entry vehicle (MIRV) configuration, which allows for independent targeting of each warhead and makes defense against the missile very difficult. Although the warheads that struck Dnipro were conventional and carried no explosive material, the dual-use missile is also capable of carrying nuclear payloads. Intermediate range missiles can threaten European countries as well as NATO assets throughout Europe, which is why Russia notified the United States 30 minutes before launch.
In October 2025, Russia announced the successful test-flight of Burevestnik, a nuclear-powered and nuclear-capable cruise missile. During a presidential briefing, General Valerii Gerasimov said that the missile travelled during testing for approximately 15 hours and 14,000 kilometers, and that neither figure is “the limit.” If it becomes operational, the Burevestnik’s nuclear propulsion system can, at least in theory, allow the missile to reach the United States while maneuvering to avoid detection and interception by missile defense systems.
Just over a week after the Burevestnik test, Putin said that Russia had successfully tested the nuclear-powered, nuclear-armed, unmanned underwater torpedo, Poseidon. Experts believe that Poseidon can travel at an astonishing 185 kilometers per hour at a depth of up to 1,000 kilometers while evading acoustic tracking devices. In a doomsday scenario, the monstrous torpedo-drone could unleash a massive tsunami, leveling coastal cities and destroying ports while causing radioactive contamination that renders entire regions uninhabitable.
Despite these chilling developments, there is nothing these world-destroying weapons can do that Russia’s nuclear arsenal cannot already accomplish multiple times over, which is only likely as a second-strike scenario. Moscow’s coercive nuclear threats are working exactly as intended since they have so far succeeded in deterring the United States from entering the war in Ukraine or supporting Kyiv more decisively. Concerns about escalation risks with Russia not only stalled shipments of key military aid to Kyiv but also contributed to the Biden team’s unwillingness to let Ukraine strike Russia with ATACMS missiles until after the 2024 election.
As Biden’s national security advisor, Jake Sullivan, said earlier this year, the administration’s decision-making was constrained by the “possibility of Russian nuclear use.” Feeding the fear of that possibility in the minds of its adversaries is one way Russia protects itself while sowing uncertainty in Western countries. Although nuclear risk ought to be taken seriously, Putin’s constant reminders of his country’s new capabilities suggest that he has more conventional ambitions in mind, like territorial gain in Ukraine.