Scholars, advocates, and activists seeking to make the U.S. a more responsible global partner.
defense

Republican Rule and the IFIs

by | Dec 1, 2000

For the first time in eight years the Republican Party will represent the U.S. at the international financial institutions (IFIs). The way a Bush-Cheney administration approaches recommendations made by the Meltzer Commission on the IFIs and the way it views foreign assistance and economic development will shape the positions the U.S. takes regarding the IFIs. So will the identities of the next treasury secretary, IFI executive directors, and chairs of relevant congressional committees. And though all these factors remain uncertain, one thing is clear: the new political climate will present both challenges and opportunities for advocacy groups.

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Bush’s Nuclear Doctrine: From MAD to NUTS?

by | Dec 1, 2000

Foreign policy issues were mostly an afterthought during the 2000 presidential campaign, and they continue to take a back seat in President-elect George W. Bush’s discussions of the priorities of his incoming administration. But one critical foreign policy issue—U.S. nuclear weapons policy—demands immediate attention and debate. The Bush foreign policy team is quietly contemplating radical changes in U.S. strategy that could set off a global nuclear arms race that will make the U.S.-Soviet competition of the cold war period look tame by comparison.

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The Bush Administration: What Can We Expect for the Pentagon?

by | Dec 1, 2000

Although we don’t yet know what a Bush cabinet will look like, the Pentagon will undoubtedly get a warm reception at the White House. In addition to whomever is selected as defense secretary, President Bush will be receiving advice from former Defense Secretary Dick Cheney, and it is clear that former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powell will have an important role in the administration, probably as secretary of state.

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A First Glance at the New Administration’s Policy Toward Russia

by | Dec 1, 2000

It is difficult to say what any new administration’s policy will be by the end of the president’s term of office. However, there are some clear indications of the broad outlines of U.S. policy toward Russia under the Bush administration as it prepares to take office. This policy will not seek to present a cooperative image of the relationship, as has been so under the outgoing administration. Instead it will have a more overtly “realist” or “realpolitik” approach and will concentrate in the first instance upon European security and controlling arms proliferation.

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Little Shift in Foreign Policy Under “President” George W. Bush

by | Nov 1, 2000

Little Shift in Foreign Policy Under (President) George W. Bush Stephen Zunes With the likelihood that Texas Governor George W. Bush will become the next president of the United States, there needs to be serious thought as to what kind of foreign policy can be expected over the next four years. The short answer is that there should be little difference between the old administration and the new administration. Yet there are some differences which deserve attention. Exit polls indicate that a solid majority of Americans supported Gore over Bush on the issues and that Bush’s support was based more on personal characteristics. An important exception appears to be foreign policy. At first, this would seem quite odd, given that Gore—as the most engaged vice-president in history on policy issues—clearly had demonstrable knowledge and leadership in this area, while Bush’s gaffes when commenting on foreign policy issues have become legendary. Yet, during the debates, despite very little disagreement on particular foreign policy issues (much to the dismay of many liberals and progressives supporting Gore), Bush was able to strike a chord among Americans with his contention that the U.S. may have overextended itself. In certain respects, the disagreement paralleled the debates between liberal internationalists and isolationists of the pre-cold war era, though even this was more from how the two opponents caricatured the other’s position than any great differences in actual policy. The main criticism of Clinton/Gore foreign policy stressed by Bush in the campaign was an alleged lack of preparedness and weakened military, though, ironically, Clinton and Gore had reversed the build-down of forces and reduction in military spending initiated by Bush’s father and his Secretary of Defense, Dick Cheney. The younger Bush’s charges seemed to be based primarily on concerns of an alleged over-extension of forces to support United Nations peace keeping forces, though in terms of both financial costs, equipment and personnel, support for such UN operations are relatively small relative to overall U.S. military spending, logistics, and deployment. One of the major concerns being raised by both foreign and domestic international affairs analysts is Bush’s embarrassing ignorance about foreign affairs, compounded by the view that he has not been known to be a quick study on issues with which he has little background. His supporters have argued that that should not be a problem, given the high-powered experts, consisting of retired General Colin Powell and some of the conservative intellectuals at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution, who will be at the core of the new Bush administration’s foreign policy team. Even those who do not agree with their positions on key foreign policy issues recognize that it is indeed an experienced and knowledgeable group. At the same time, foreign policy—far more than domestic policy—requires strong presidential leadership. Foreign leaders often need to be persuaded personally by the president in order to agree to support U.S. initiatives, at which Clinton was known to be skillful. Critics of U.S. foreign policy could take the cynical view that this might actually be a good thing, in that it might forestall military interventions and other questionable actions by the United States. More likely, however, it would just encourage unilateral actions and lessen the likelihood of moderating U.S. policy. A new Bush administration, therefore, would likely find itself more at odds with traditional American allies during times of crisis than the Clinton administration. Indeed, despite concerns of some isolationist tendencies by George W. Bush, his posture actually appears to be more unilateralist. In one sense, this is a continuation of Secretary of State Madeleine Albright’s dictum that the U.S. will act “multilaterally if we can, unilaterally if we must,” yet it is likely that a new Bush administration will find itself even more inclined than the current administration to opt for the latter. U.S. contributions to internationally mandated peace keeping efforts will likely lessen, in terms of money, materiel, and forces, though unilateral military actions—such as the Clinton administration’s use of air strikes against Iraq, Yugoslavia, Sudan, and Afghanistan—will likely not. Bush has articulated far bolder initiatives toward nuclear disarmament than did Gore, leading to charges from the Democrats that Bush would endanger U.S. security, which Gore believed required the continued maintenance and development of a large nuclear arsenal. At first glance, this gives supporters of de-nuclearization some hope. Unfortunately, the Bush plan is predicated on the development of a large anti-missile defense system. In order to develop the system supported by Bush, the SALT I treaty—long considered to be the foundation of nuclear arms control—would have to be unilaterally rescinded. This could result in a dangerous new arms race with Russia and China. Bush seems more open than the current administration to removing nuclear weapons from high alert and to initiate unilateral cuts in the nuclear arsenal, but he opposes the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Despite skepticism about closer cooperation with Russia, he supports continuing the current policy of assisting former Soviet states with dismantling nuclear weapons. Some liberals have expressed concern that a new Bush administration would be far less likely to stress labor rights and environmental concerns in the pursuit of economic globalization. It is highly unlikely, given Bush’s strong support for the prerogatives of big business, that he would take any leadership in this area. Yet despite some sympathetic rhetoric, the Clinton/Gore record was poor as well. Like the outgoing administration, Bush supports the ongoing Israeli repression in the occupied West Bank and Gaza and has rejected demands that Israel abide by UN Security Council resolutions requiring evacuation of the illegal settlements and withdrawal of occupation forces. Also, like the current administration, he opposes Palestinian independence outside of Israeli strictures. He has even tried to place himself to the right of the Clinton administration by complaining that they pushed for a peace agreement too quickly and that they too openly supported the centrist Israeli Labour Party against the rightist Likud Bloc. However, Bush’s support of Israel appears to be based more on pragmatic concerns about Israel’s support for American interests, so he may therefore be more willing to push Israel to compromise if its ongoing intransigence threatened the overall stability in the region. Gore’s support for Israel appears to be more hardline and ideological. Bush supports the ongoing sanctions and bombing of Iraq and has criticized the Clinton administration for allowing the coalition which supported the Gulf War to fall apart, not recognizing that it is the growing moral and legal concerns about the policy itself which has led to the growing rift. He has called for increased support for Iraqi opposition groups to topple Saddam Hussein’s regime. Like the current administration, Bush supports ongoing military aid to the repressive government in Colombia and supports closer economic ties with Latin America. Also, like the current administration, Bush supports continued strict sanctions against Communist Cuba but closer economic links to Communist China. He quite openly declared his lack of interest in African affairs, believing that what happens on that continent has little relevance to American security interests. Bush believes that the U.S. should not pay its dues to the United Nations unless the American share is reduced and “the UN’s bureaucracy is reformed.” Finally, there should be mention that Clinton’s foreign policy likely cost his vice-president the election. According to public opinion polls, a majority of Americans oppose Clinton and Gore’s support for dramatically higher military spending, arms shipments to repressive governments, free trade without adequate safeguards for worker rights and environmental protection, support for Israel’s ongoing occupation and colonization of parts of the West Bank and Gaza, opposition to the treaty to ban landmines, and similar policies. As a result, many thousands of Americans—including voters in such states as Florida, New Hampshire, and New Mexico, where the Nader vote likely cost Gore a majority of the electoral college—opted for the Green Party presidential nominee. During the campaign, Ralph Nader rarely even mentioned foreign policy outside of his opposition to the corporate-friendly economic globalization of the World Trade Organization and other multilateral institutions. Yet the Green Party platform—which called for reducing military spending by half over the next five years, suspending military aid to governments which violate human rights, vigorously pursuing nuclear disarmament, and promoting sustainable development in poor countries—appealed to broad segments of the population disgusted with the foreign policies of the two major parties. This may be a warning to the Democrats that, in the future, they cannot take for granted the votes of those concerned with peace, human rights, and international law. Indeed, progressive changes in U.S. foreign policy—from Vietnam, to nuclear arms control, to Central America, to South Africa, to East Timor—have come not from electing presidents who advocated positions in support of peace and human rights, but from popular movements forcing the administration in office to change their policies. Whoever the final victor is in this disputed presidential race, that fact will remain unchanged. Stephen Zunes < zunes@usfca.edu > is an associate professor of Politics and chair of the Peace & Justice Studies Program at the University of San Francisco. to receive weekly commentary and expert analysis via our Progressive Response ezine.     This page was last modified on Wednesday, April 2, 2003 1:37 PM Contact the IRC’s webmaster with inquiries regarding the functionality of this website. Copyright © 2001 IRC and IPS. All rights reserved.

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We Do Guns–Not Plagues

by | Nov 1, 2000

We now face, with the global spread of AIDS, a human catastrophe that is beyond history. We have never witnessed anything so devastating. In sub-Saharan Africa, there is a pandemic that threatens to exceed the toll that the Bubonic Plague took on Europe in ushering in the Dark Ages. 23 million people are infected in Sub-Saharan Africa, with new infections coming at the rate of roughly five thousand a day.

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The Election: Seen From Overseas

by | Nov 1, 2000

The world is feeling a tad superior to the U.S. these days. Smirked the Statesman of Calcutta, “Foreigners are watching with bemusement the spectacle of Americans tying themselves up in knots over election results. Nigerians have speculated on the scoldings they might have received had such confusion been theirs, while MS Gill, India’s Chief Election Commissioner, has said in jest that it is time now for America to invite international observers.”

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Vietnam

by | Nov 1, 2000

As President Clinton goes to Vietnam this week, he carries with him a heavy weight of legacy from America’s longest war. Some, of course, is personal: like many men of his generation, Clinton opposed the war and sought to avoid fighting it, decisions that had political consequences he could not have anticipated. He bears a national legacy, too. The Vietnam War still clings to Americans—to those who fought it and resisted it, to those who came of age while it was fought, and even to those who now jam college courses on the war, wondering what it was that so provoked their parents. The war has been credited with, or blamed for, everything from heavy metal rock music to the neo-brutalist architecture of the 1970s. But parts of its legacy are indisputable.

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Zimbabwe: Intersection of Human Rights, Land Reform, and Regional Security

by | Nov 1, 2000

Zimbabwe:Intersection of Human Rights, Land Reform, and Regional Security By Carol Thompson November 2000 Contentious debates in Zimbabwe resonate across Southern Africa, reflecting the post-apartheid struggles for human rights, economic redistribution, and security. Center stage is the question of governmental respect for human rights, because the ruling party, ZANU-PF, and its allies stand accused of fomenting intimidation, arson, kidnapping, and murder. For its part, the U.S. government has called on the Zimbabwean government to end human rights abuses, and Washington has provided some funds to nongovernmental legal and human rights organizations. The U.S. government has not been as vociferous in the other goals for post-apartheid Southern Africa: economic redistribution and security. Without these two as equal goals to the first, the majority will remain in dire, killing poverty and the region will know no peace. The rights to basic survival and security–and civil liberties–are all human rights. Civil Liberties The amnesty granted this October by President Robert Mugabe to those who committed political violence (excluding murder, rape, and other serious crimes) during the March-June election campaign has been met with public derision and will be challenged in the courts. The opposition party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), which won 57 seats of 120 contested, is highly organized and working with labor and civic groups to expose every breach of human rights and to hold ZANU-PF politicians accountable for their actions. In a referendum last February, the public overwhelmingly rejected the draft constitution that had been personally amended by President Mugabe to sustain his power. MDC candidates stood bravely for parliamentary elections during the height of the violence, and Zimbabweans voted courageously and in large numbers (more than 63% turned out). Today, the MDC is a strong opposition voice in parliament. During the coming opposition campaign leading up to presidential elections in 2002, demands for respect of human rights and governmental accountability will persist. Zimbabweans struggled for too long against white minority rule–when most citizens were legal minors for almost a century–to permit any government to trample their human rights for long. Civil society is responding militantly and, for the most part, nonviolently. If Zimbabweans can succeed in holding their current government accountable, it will be more likely that the next government can also be held to civil standards. The U.S. government has helped to finance open forums, costly legal challenges, and constitutional debates. It has also conditioned continued economic aid on respect for human rights. Yet Washington has been noticeably quiet about the other two important goals for post-apartheid Southern Africa: economic redistribution and regional security. The Challenge of Land Reform The issue of land reform illustrates well the problems in achieving the goal of economic redistribution. The U.S. and other industrialized countries want the Zimbabwean, Namibian, and South African post-apartheid governments to pay a fair market price for underutilized land that is willingly offered. This sounds fair enough–until you consult history. For example, in America, after the war of independence, the new U.S. government simply confiscated land from the Tories, such as Lord Baltimore’s and Lord Fairfax’s vast estates (Baltimore, MD, and Fairfax County, VA). A Zimbabwean study of land reforms around the world found that no country, except the Republic of Ireland and Zimbabwe (until recently), paid fair market prices for land. Zimbabwe paid market prices through 1999 for the redistributed land (about 3.6 million hectares). In most countries, land that governments redistributed was commonly devalued by political tactics–such as strikes, land invasions, and high taxes–designed to encourage owners to sell. In other countries, land was simply confiscated. When the U.S. assisted South Korea and Taiwan in agrarian reform, American aid provided hard currency to pay for the parcels that were distributed in the land reform programs. And the U.S. army accompanied the South Korean army in enforcing the removal of the former landowners. Such forceful policies were considered major successes against the spread of communism among the landless and malnourished masses. Why the double standard for Southern Africa? Isn’t the inequity of land distribution a legacy of apartheid? Not only have the countries of the region had to honor debt incurred by the white minority regimes (in spite of Jubilee 2000 efforts), they must now also pay a fair price for land on the current market. No international agency has offered the sums needed to pay a fair market price or to assist in the settling of new farmers. The U.S. continues to push for title deeds to land, but this issue is still being debated in Zimbabwe and elsewhere in Southern Africa. After the end of Renamo’s brutal war in Mozambique, the people rejected private land ownership in a referendum and land can now only be leased. Zimbabweans should also be allowed to choose among the various options of private land ownership, community rights, and state land. Those who claim that the current government has had 20 years since independence to redistribute land forget that apartheid South Africa regularly sent commando raids into Zimbabwe in the 1980s. Until 1992, Zimbabwe was engaged militarily in supporting Mozambique against the Renamo army, which was trained, financed, and led by apartheid South Africa. In fact, soon after independence in 1980, the Mugabe government did begin to redistribute land, averaging 430,000 ha/year from 1980-84. The Zimbabwean government might have accelerated redistribution had it pursued other tactics, such as high tax rates on underutilized land. Another factor accounting for the delayed land reform program in Zimbabwe is the fact that some of the largest landholders in Zimbabwe are South African corporations, such as Anglo-American. This would have made it particularly difficult to pursue full-scale land reform before South African political apartheid was dismantled in 1994. In addition, the government had become convinced that the international community would offer little funding to back its demand for a land purchase program. The U.S., for example, has given no funds for land reform in Zimbabwe. Zimbabweans remember that in 1976, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger pledged $1.5 billion for the Zimbabwe Development Fund to assist with land reform after independence. Part of the reason for the pledge–which was never honored–was to help end the war and to compensate for the history of U.S. support of the white minority regime. International experts estimate it would take about $40 billion to redistribute land, with “market price” compensation and with providing inputs to new farmers. By 2000, Zimbabwe had received $45 million from donors. Even if all conditionalities were honored by the government, international support does not begin to address the multi-billion dollar cost. These observations are not intended to rationalize or excuse the terror of the land invasions in Zimbabwe. Certainly, land reform that benefits party cronies is reprehensible. But simply removing land invaders will most likely not resolve the land question in Zimbabwe. Further, land redistribution remains an urgent, unresolved issue in South Africa and Namibia as well. Regional Insecurity U.S. foreign policy has long been a major source of insecurity in Southern Africa. U.S. support of UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) and other right-wing guerrilla forces in Angola, dating from the 1970s, is well-documented. Currently, the U.S. is complicit in the marketing of “blood diamonds”–diamonds being sold by UNITA to finance its war atrocities in Angola. UNITA commander Jonas Savimbi has been declared a war criminal by the UN, yet he is still able to sell his diamonds freely on the international market. In 1997, with the acquiescence of the U.S., the rebel army of Laurent Kabila, the current ruler of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC, formerly Zaire), toppled the notorious Mobutu Sese Seko. The U.S. demanded that Kabila hold elections within a few months of taking power, a demand rejected by all Southern African leaders, including Nelson Mandela. The DRC, a vast territory the size of the United States east of the Mississippi River, was in economic and political chaos after four decades of Mobutu’s tyrannical rule. In addition, the political violence associated with the 1994 genocide campaign in Rwanda had spilled over the border into eastern Congo. Kabila’s troops were accused of massacres, committed during their military campaign to seize power, and of assisting militia who fled from Rwanda to eastern Congo.. In August 1998, about one year after the fall of Mobutu, Rwanda and Uganda invaded the Congo. (The International Court of Justice recently ruled that this aggression violated international law.) Coming to the defense of the DRC were three other countries in the region: Zimbabwe, Namibia, and Angola, all of which sent troops, as requested by Kabila. The three governments cited their obligation to defend a recognized leader in the Southern African Development Community (SADC). SADC countries have responded with force more than once when the political stability of a member nation faced a military threat. Zimbabwe and Namibia have helped protect the Angolan government, and South Africa has twice used military force in Lesotho to thwart coups. Zimbabwe, Angola, and Namibia have also mounted military operations to remove UNITA’s rear bases in southern Congo. (Mobutu had served as a conduit for U.S. funds to UNITA under several U.S. administrations, most notably during the Reagan years.) The economic stakes in the Congo are high. The Inga Dam alone could provide enough hydroelectric power to meet all the current needs of SADC nations, including South Africa. The Congo has been the world’s largest cobalt exporter and has ranked among the top ten world producers of uranium, copper, manganese, and tin–all vital to aerospace and military industries. The major importer of these low-cost minerals has been U.S. industry. In addition, the biodiversity riches of the vast rain forest have yet to be mapped. U.S. and Belgian mining corporations continue to mine Congo’s minerals, including diamonds, making enormous profits during the instability. The World Bank and IMF have sanctioned Zimbabwe for its war expenditures, although both financial institutions continue to lend to Uganda, whose troops support the rebels in the Congo. Although Zimbabweans believe the U.S. and international agencies are not being evenhanded, they are also overwhelmingly against Zimbabwean troop involvement in the war because it diverts funds from development needs. SADC leaders have consistently been in the forefront of negotiations for peace, beginning one month after the Uganda/Rwanda invasion in 1998. The struggles for civil liberties, economic redistribution, and regional security are still very much on the agenda of post-apartheid Southern Africa. These goals must be pursued together, for the absence of one will destroy the others. U.S. foreign policy should not sanctimoniously advocate respect for human rights while ignoring pervasive economic inequality and regional security issues.(Carol Thompson < carol.thompson@nau.edu >is a specialist on Southern Africa and a professor of political economy at Northern Arizona University. She is on sabbatical, doing research and writing at the University of Zimbabwe.) to receive weekly commentary and expert analysis via our Progressive Response ezine. This page was last modified on Wednesday, March 5, 2003 5:43 PM Contact the IRC’s webmaster with inquiries regarding the functionality of this website. Copyright © 2001 IRC and IPS. All rights reserved.

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