Ellner Rosen Chavez Venezuela

Venezuela’s Failed Coup, the U.S.’ Role, and the Future of Hugo Chávez

On Monday, April 15, the day after his dramatic return to power, Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez called for a “national dialogue.” He acknowledged the “large number of Venezuelans who were in disagreement with the government, and who would continue to demonstrate peacefully,” and he called for a lowering of the levels of confrontation in Venezuela. The current polarization, he said “is not positive. There has to be communication among the different sectors” of Venezuelan society.

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Linking Textiles to Labor Standards: Prospects for Cambodia and Vietnam

FPIF Policy Report June 2002 Linking Textiles to Labor Standards: Prospects for Cambodia and Vietnam By Andrew Wells-Dang Andrew Wells-Dang < washington@ffrd.org > is the Washington representative of the Fund for Reconciliation and Development, a nonprofit organization advocating for normal economic, cultural, educational, and diplomatic relations with Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam. Contents Overview The Debate over Labor Standards in Cambodia The Politics of Textiles and Labor in Vietnam Sources for More Information PRtxt-labor.pdf Overview Efforts to craft effective vehicles to link trade and labor rights continue to be a major goal for fair trade advocates and members of the global justice movement. Much of this debate has focused on the issue of a social clause in the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the appropriate use of sanctions as a policy tool to advance labor rights. Alongside this debate, a different approach linking trade and labor rights has emerged in the context of the textile trade between the U.S. and Cambodia. The first trade agreement of its kind, the 1999 U.S.-Cambodian textile compact links increases in garment export quotas to improvements in labor conditions. Labor provisions similar to those in the Cambodian textile agreement, but applying to all sectors of the economy, also make up part of the U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement, signed in 2001. Senate Finance Committee leaders Max Baucus (D-MT) and Charles Grassley (R-IA), despite their different political views, see both the Jordan and Cambodia agreements as setting a precedent for future negotiations. This policy report focuses on the cases of Cambodia and Vietnam, two countries with clear historical reasons for wanting trade and improved relations with America. In the quarter century since the end of the Vietnam War, normalization of relations with both countries has come gradually. Since Cambodia was granted Normal Trade Relations (NTR) in 1996, however, its total exports to the U.S. have skyrocketed from $3.7 million in 1996 to $300 million in 1998 to nearly $1 billion in 2001. Clothing constitutes over 95% of this total. After years of delay, Vietnam’s bilateral trade agreement (BTA) with the U.S. was signed in 2000 and ratified in the fall of 2001. As part of the debate over NTR for Vietnam, several members of Congress conditioned their approval on the approval of a textile agreement along similar lines with Cambodia’s. Preliminary negotiations between Washington and Hanoi have already begun in what is bound to be a contentious process on both sides. In light of the Cambodian experience, American and Vietnamese officials need to consider a number of complex policy issues as they work toward an agreement. In the U.S., responses to the Cambodian textile agreement have been generally positive across partisan lines. Labor activists, while continuing to criticize working conditions and legal abuses in Cambodia, agree that labor standards are improving. Free traders, while opposed to quotas and other trade barriers, have also responded favorably to the agreement’s use of incentives for good behavior, rather than sanctions for noncompliance. Textiles are not included in general trade agreements due to the provisions of the Multi-Fiber Agreement (MFA) and the WTO Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC). The MFA, which dates from 1975, assigns quotas as a means to limit textile imports to America. It is due to MFA quotas that clothing sold in U.S. stores often comes from unlikely locations such as Nicaragua, Bangladesh, or Mauritius—as well as Cambodia. Quotas may benefit some small country producers that might otherwise have difficulty selling to the U.S., but in general, the MFA is a prime example of how the U.S. has sought to protect key domestic industries while preaching free trade for others. In the words of a recent Oxfam report, “from its inception, the MFA has been a clear departure from the principles underpinning the entire multilateral trading system.” Few other industries have such obvious double standards. Not surprisingly, developing countries have sought the elimination of the MFA since it began. With the establishment of the WTO in 1995, the MFA became the ATC, a binding commitment for all WTO member countries to phase out all garment quotas by 2005. When a country joins the WTO, any bilateral textile agreements become invalid, along with labor or other “nontrade” provisions. In theory, removal of garment quotas through the ATC should benefit U.S. consumers, who should see lower prices, as well as the most competitive foreign producers, who should be able to export more of their products to America. In practice, many small producers may be unable to compete with larger competitors, which could result in a greater concentration of garment production in the lowest-cost economies. Cambodia and Vietnam are not yet members of the WTO, and hence are not bound by the ATC. Together with some 30 other developing countries, however, they do have observer status at the WTO, with a commitment to begin accession procedures within five years. At an April 2001 meeting with Southeast Asian economics ministers in Bangkok, U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) Robert Zoellick said the U.S. supported Cambodia, Vietnam, and Laos joining the WTO. Negotiations for WTO accession are typically a long and complex process, however, and Cambodia and Laos in particular are perceived to be far from meeting the organization’s requirements.   The Debate over Labor Standards in Cambodia On December 31, 2001, U.S. Ambassador Kent Wiedemann and Cambodian Commerce Minister Cham Prasidh signed a three-year extension of the U.S.-Cambodian Bilateral Textile Agreement. Cambodia had demanded a 28% quota increase, but settled for 15%: a 6% normal yearly increase plus an additional 9% in return for improvements in labor standards. After internal debate, Robert Zoellick certified that Cambodia has demonstrated “substantial compliance” both with its own labor law and with internationally recognized “core labor standards,” in particular International Labor Organization (ILO) conventions including those on freedom of association, child labor, forced labor, and workplace discrimination. Zoellick concluded that Cambodia has seen “positive links between trade, economic growth, and labor standards.” After the first review of the textile agreement in December 1999, Cambodia entered into an agreement with the ILO to set up an external monitoring program comprising representatives from the ILO, the Cambodian government, and the Garment Manufacturers’ Association. The program’s $2 million budget is being largely financed through U.S. government assistance. Although some labor activists criticize the inspection teams for not being strict enough, most observers agree that monitoring creates pressure to comply with Cambodia’s own laws and greatly limits the extent of violations in the garment industry. A November 2001 ILO report based on data from a baseline survey of 30 factories (out of approximately 300 in Cambodia) showed “no evidence of child labor, forced labor, or sexual harassment,” but it did find “some problems” with forced overtime and antiunion discrimination. An April 2002 report on an additional 34 factories presented a similarly mixed picture. On the positive side, Cambodia has ratified all core ILO conventions, implemented a progressive, though imperfect, labor code, and provided for the registration of independent unions. Enforcement of these regulations continues to be constrained, however, by corruption, a lack of resources, and a weak judicial system. Policy change is a difficult enough task, but effective implementation and monitoring to ensure compliance with these policies is an even greater challenge. Part of the difficulty lies in the uneven nature of the ILO inspection regime, which does not differentiate between factories producing for the U.S. market and those that trade with other destinations. There is no way for an outside observer to know which factories are relatively more compliant than others. Nor is there any direct connection between factory compliance and allocation of quota increases, which is done by a Cambodian government panel with no outside involvement. Proponents of the bilateral textile agreement overstate their case when they attempt to give the accord primary credit for Cambodia’s rapid export growth. For instance, Zoellick stated in a January 2002 press release that “our Bilateral Textile Agreement [with Cambodia] is an excellent example of the way trade agreements lead to economic growth and promote a greater respect for workers’ rights.” USTR cites studies by the World Bank and Brookings Institution claiming that free trade and open markets form “the most reliable way to improve the condition of third-world workers.” Given that the textile agreement is based on the protectionist MFA, such claims are a little difficult to take seriously. Cambodia has certainly benefited from increased trade with the U.S., but it is disingenuous to give the textile agreement credit for this growth, which was well underway before the agreement entered into force. One trade lobbyist who works for textile importers notes that two-thirds of the specific clothing items that the U.S. imports from Cambodia, such as nightwear and women’s dresses, are not covered by quotas at all. Without quotas on other items such as shirts, trousers, and sweaters, Cambodia might be able to export even more. At best, the argument can be made that the quotas contained in the textile agreement have not impeded Cambodia’s trading relations with America. Do the labor restrictions in the textile agreement affect Cambodia’s competitiveness? With little market share in the coming post-MFA trading system, smaller countries risk becoming trapped in what many global justice advocates term a “race to the bottom.” As long as the market is determined by quotas, these critics argue, countries with higher standards are at no disadvantage. But in a free market, and with labor expenses forming a large percentage of the cost of production in this sector, countries with the lowest wages and weakest labor and environmental standards are likely to outcompete countries with stricter regulations and more rigorous enforcement. As Gary Burtless points out in the Fall 2001 Brookings Review, providing for many of the most basic labor rights—freedom from child labor, forced labor, or workplace discrimination—costs virtually nothing. But Burtless claims that other key rights, such as environmental protections, workplace safety requirements, or wage floors, come at “a real efficiency cost.” Even here, however, it is difficult to see how unlocking doors and providing fire extinguishers will cut too deeply into a factory’s profit margin. There might even be positive externalities to higher standards, as a World Bank study argues: “Adherence to core labor standards promotes effective labor market institutions that can contribute to economic growth and reduce workplace risks faced by the poor.” Wages in Cambodia’s factories remain quite low by international standards. Garment workers earn between $45 (the minimum wage, raised from $40 in 2000) and $100 per month. Even at minimum wage, however, workers earn substantially more than Cambodia’s per capita income of $350 annually. A Cambodian woman quoted by Oxfam International captures the ambivalence many workers feel: “In the countryside, we have more freedom, but no money. In the factory we have no freedom, but we have money to support our families.” When assessing a country’s competitiveness in international markets, however, wages are only one of many components to consider. Oxfam cites a survey of textile manufacturers in Hong Kong that concludes that labor costs are the fourth main factor of competitiveness, behind political stability, transportation, and communications. Since wages make up only a small portion of the price of a finished good, a small increase in labor costs has only a marginal effect on total costs. As a result, Cambodia’s garment sector remains competitive by any global measure. When the MFA is abolished in 2005, Cambodian exports will face increased competition from larger producers, but improvements in labor conditions need not have any adverse effects on productivity, competitiveness, or export growth. Although the race-to-the-bottom argument may hold some water in terms of companies moving to low-cost production sites, it does not necessarily apply to core labor rights. The growth of the anti-sweatshop movement in Western countries has shown that consumers prefer, when given the choice, to purchase clothes made in conditions where basic labor rights are protected. And U.S. corporations are beginning to listen. The negative publicity accorded to name brands who have violated these standards has prompted voluntary compacts to uphold basic rights and obtain SA 8000 quality certification. Pressure from labor rights groups and anti-sweatshop groups might even keep some producers in Cambodia who would otherwise go elsewhere. Of course, just because Cambodia is currently competitive in textiles does not necessarily mean that it will remain so. From a broader economic development standpoint, Cambodia and other clothing exporters may need to diversify their economic bases to include industries with higher value-added components. In any case, it is generally unwise to depend too heavily on earnings from just one sector. In this respect, Cambodia’s larger neighbor Vietnam is in a somewhat better position, though its nonclothing exports still consist largely of primary commodities and natural resources with unstable prices on the world market.   The Politics of Textiles and Labor in Vietnam What is the likely outcome as Congress and the executive branch consider a textile agreement for Vietnam along Cambodian lines? The potential economic benefits to Vietnam are beyond dispute. Before the BTA was passed, Vietnam exported only $47 million worth of textiles to the U.S. in 2001 and faced tariff rates ranging from 48-90%. With NTR garment tariffs averaging closer to 10-12%, trade analysts estimate overall Vietnamese exports to the U.S. will double within one or two years. Vietnam’s Ministry of Industry hopes to export as much as $400 million in garments to the U.S. in 2002. A textile agreement has yet to be formally negotiated or signed, but the main components of it are already known to both sides, a product of the long delays in approval and implementation of the U.S.-Vietnam BTA. Unlike NTR, a textile agreement does not require congressional approval; the USTR has standing authority to negotiate such agreements, but Congress can play a significant role in shaping their contents. On the pro-agreement side are longtime congressional supporters of normalization with Vietnam (notably Senators John Kerry (D-MA) and John McCain (R-AZ)), the Bush administration, and Vietnam’s ministries of Foreign Affairs, Trade, and Planning & Investment. Some congressional Democrats who opposed the BTA, such as Senator Russell Feingold (D-WI), might look more favorably on a textile agreement that includes labor incentives. Vietnam may also become a test case or carrot to attract support for other items in President Bush’s trade agenda. Opponents of a textile accord with labor provisions include certain critics of human rights in Vietnam, the Vietnamese Communist Party-sponsored trade union, and both Vietnam’s Ministry of Labor, Invalids and Social Affairs (MOLISA), and its Ministry of Public Security. Many U.S. corporations are also opposed. In March 2001 testimony before the Senate, U.S. Chamber of Commerce President Thomas Donohue used economic-nationalist arguments: “Handing foreign governments the means to sanction U.S. companies under the guise of labor or environmental concerns will prove disastrous to American interests.” Donohue emphasized that U.S. business should support trade agreements only if they do not include “blue/green” linkages. Indeed, according to one source, Western companies pressured the Vietnamese government to weaken the power of trade unions, which had began to criticize labor practices in foreign-owned garment and shoe factories. It is interesting to note how hard-liners on both sides often end up taking similar positions, as if Leninist party bureaucrats and their most strident U.S. opponents were actually working together. Conservative nationalists in Hanoi will view U.S. demands for labor standards both as an encroachment on Vietnam’s sovereignty and as hypocritical given the past U.S. role in Vietnam. The fact that labor provisions apply specifically to the garment sector may also raise fears of trade wars and protectionism. Questions of nationalistic principle aside, Vietnam should have little to fear from the labor-related incentives that might be included in a textile agreement. Though less open than Cambodia in terms of freedom of association, labor conditions in Vietnam are arguably no worse overall. Vietnam’s unions are centralized under the Vietnam General Confederation of Labor (VGCL). The VGCL is viewed by labor experts as well-intentioned but ineffective, at best, although less restrictive in practice than the similarly structured labor regime in China. Strikes are permitted, in theory, and unions are given some freedom to organize, particularly in foreign-owned enterprises. Vietnam has ratified three of the eight core ILO conventions to date (on child labor, nondiscrimination, and equal pay for equal work), and it reportedly has plans to ratify others over the next several years. (The U.S. has only ratified two—on child labor and forced labor.) Up to now, the Vietnamese government has resisted negotiation of a textile agreement, with or without a labor clause. Exporters would understandably prefer to operate without any quota restrictions. Unlike Cambodia, which may have benefited from quota allotments as it started up its garment industry, Vietnam’s export sector is already well-established. In the absence of a textile agreement, however, exports could still be subject to unilateral quota restrictions, which the Vietnamese would prefer to avoid. In the longer view, Vietnam also needs American support to join the WTO and take advantage of the more open ATC rules beginning in 2005. Despite this mixed picture, Vietnam’s record of pragmatism in economic policy matters suggests that the government will accept a textile agreement as an intermediate step toward WTO membership. It is difficult to imagine the ILO taking the same sort of active role in Vietnam that it has in Cambodia, however, and decisions about compliance or noncompliance with labor standards will not be easy. The best possible solution to the dilemma of bilateral agreements would be an international accord on labor standards that applies to all U.S. trading partners and all sectors of the economy equally, rather than individual pacts that must be negotiated separately. But such a common standard is still a long way off. In the meantime, Vietnam and the U.S. both stand to benefit from a textile agreement, with or without labor conditions. Given the inherent inequalities and political obstacles in trade negotiations, both sides may have to settle for second- or third-best choices. With patience and a little luck, a compromise should be possible in the short term, though much work still lies ahead.   Sources for More Information Organizations American Center for International Labor Solidarity (AFL-CIO) 1925 K St. NW, Suite 300 Washington, DC 20006 Voice: (202) 778-4500 Fax: (202) 778-4525 Email: tryan@solidaritycenter.org Contact: Timothy Ryan Fund for Reconciliation & Development 355 West 39th St., Suite 101 New York, NY 10118 Voice: (212) 760-9903 Fax (212) 760-9906 Email: info@ffrd.org Website: http://www.ffrd.org/ Contact: John McAuliff, Susan Hammond International Labor Rights Fund 733 15th St., NW #920 Washington, DC 20005 Voice: (202) 347-4100 Fax: (202) 347-4885 Email: laborrights@igc.org Web: http://www.laborrights.org/ Contact: Bama Athreya U.S.-Vietnam Trade Council The International Center, 731 8th St. SE Washington, DC 20003 Voice: (202) 547-3800, ext. 2 Email: vbfoote@aol.com Website: http://www.usvtc.org/ Contact: Virginia Foote Vietnam Labor Watch 733 15th Street NW, Suite 920 Washington, DC 20005 Voice: (202) 518-8461 Fax: (202) 518-8462 Email: vlw@vlw.org Contact: Thuyen Nguyen Publications Gary Burtless, “Workers’ Rights: Labor Standards and Global Trade,” Brookings Review , Fall 2001, pp. 10-13. Kimberly Ann Elliott, “The ILO and Enforcement of Core Labor Standards,” International Institute of Economics policy brief , no. 00-6 (updated April 2001). Online at http://www.iie.com/policybriefs/news00-6.htm . William Greider, “A New Giant Sucking Sound,” The Nation , December 31, 2001, pp. 22-24. Mark Manyin, ed. Vietnam’s Labor Rights Regime: An Assessment . (Washington: Congressional Research Service, March 2001.) U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of International Labor Affairs. Cambodia Labor Trends Report, August 2000. On the website of the U.S. embassy in Phnom Penh ( http://usembassy.state.gov/cambodia/ ). Vietnam News Service, “Textile Agreement with U.S. Not Sewn Up Yet” (March 7, 2001). Kevin Watkins and Penny Fowler. Rigged Rules and Double Standards: Trade, Globalization and the Fight Against Poverty . Oxfam International, 2002. Summary available at http://www.maketradefair.org/ . Andrew Wells-Dang, “Establishing Normal Trade Relations with Vietnam and Laos,” Foreign Policy in Focus , vol. 6, no. 30 (July 2001). World Bank, “Core Labor Standards Toolkit for Staff Preparing Country Assistance Strategies,” July 2000. World Wide Websites Cambodia-U.S. Bilateral Textile Agreement http://www.ustr.gov/text/99-07.txt International Labor Organization report on Cambodian garment industry http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/inf/pr/2001/50.htm Royal Cambodian Embassy in Washington http://www.embassy.org/cambodia/ Senate Finance Committee hearing on trade negotiations (February 2002) http://www.senate.gov/~finance/sitepages/hearing020602.htm U.S. Chamber of Commerce press release (March 2001) http://www.uschamber.com/Press+Room/2001+Releases/March+2001/01-42.htm U.S. Trade Representative press release (January 2002) http://ustr.gov/releases/2002/01/02-03.htm     to receive weekly commentary and expert analysis via our Progressive Response ezine.   This page was last modified on Thursday, March 13, 2003 3:43 PM Contact the IRC’s webmaster regarding the functionality of this website. Copyright © 2002 IRC. All rights reserved.

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Fallacies of U.S. Plans to Invade Iraq

In the months following the September 11 terrorist attacks, there were leaks to the media about alleged evidence of a meeting in Prague between an Iraqi intelligence officer and one of the hijackers of the doomed airplanes that crashed into the World Trade Center. Subsequently, however, both the FBI and CIA have declared that no such meeting occurred. It is unlikely that the decidedly secular Baathist regime–which has savagely suppressed Islamists within Iraq–would be able to maintain close links with Bin Laden and his followers. Saudi Prince Turki bin Faisal, his country’s former intelligence chief, noted how Bin Laden views Saddam Hussein “as an apostate, an infidel or someone who is not worthy of being a fellow Muslim.” Much of the money trail for Al Qaeda comes from U.S. ally Saudi Arabia; none has been traced to Iraq. Fifteen of the nineteen hijackers were Saudi; none were Iraqi. Admitting that there was no evidence of direct links between Iraq and Al Qaeda, the best that CIA Director George Tenet could come up with in testimony before Congress was that the “mutual antipathy” the two have for the U.S. “suggests that tactical cooperation between the two is possible.” Most observers consider this to be an extraordinarily weak justification for war.

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The U.S. “War on Terror” and East Asia

On January 29, President Bush’s State of the Union speech served clear notice that the U.S. “war on terror” is coming to Northeast Asia. To date, U.S. media attention has focused on the U.S. bombing campaign in Afghanistan, the worldwide manhunt for al-Qaeda leaders and supporters, and domestic security scares. U.S. policies in East Asia have been understandably overlooked. No longer. With the president’s upcoming visit to Japan, South Korea, and China, Bush administration policies in East Asia and their dangerous implications for regional security are now coming under closer scrutiny.

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Africa Policy Outlook 2002: Africa’s Priorities Ignored Due To Washington’s War on Terrorism

By almost any measure, the war on AIDS is more important than the war on terrorism. Yet Washington’s fixation with the latter—still loosely defined—campaign threatens to crowd out attention to Africa’s priorities. And those priorities, from obtaining support for international peacemaking and peacekeeping, to canceling illegitimate debts and arresting the growing disparities between rich and poor in the world, to defeating the AIDS pandemic, are all equally global priorities.

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Addressing the Demand Dimensions of Small Arms Abuse: Problems and Opportunities

FPIF Discussion Paper #7 September 2001 Addressing the Demand Dimensions of Small Arms Abuse: Problems and Opportunities By Alejandro Bendaña, Centro de Estudios Internacionales (CEI), Nicaragua Alejandro Bendaña < Pedro47@aol.com > is the Director of the Centro de Estudios Internacionales http://www.ceinicaragua.org.ni/ , in Managua, Nicaragua. Contents The Causes of Violent Conflict: Beyond Blaming the Victim Economics, Small Arms, and Violence Opportunities for a Way Forward Final Reflections: Which Discussion Framework? DParms.pdf (We offer this analysis as a FPIF discussion paper and part of FPIF’s effort to promote South-North Dialog. It does not necessarily reflect the views of the FPIF staff or the boards of either sponsoring organization. Comments are welcome. Please send to John Gershman < john@irc-online.org >.) The conclusion of the UN Conference on the Illicit Trade of Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects in July 2001 provides a useful opportunity to reflect on the state of the small arms campaign and the challenges facing this citizens agenda. International humanitarian attention has underscored the importance of confronting the proliferation, accumulation, and misuse of small arms. The conventional approach to controlling small arms abuses—one embedded in the recent Plan of Action approved at the UN meeting and included in many nongovernmental (NGO) campaigns—is the following: The violence associated with small arms abuse is linked to criminality and can be best addressed by controlling the trade in illicit arms; This requires reducing the demand for such arms and making the illicit trade in small arms more difficult (the legal trade is of less concern); The best approach to reducing demand is a security/law and order approach that focuses on strengthening the security apparatus of Southern governments. This conventional approach, driven by a laudable humanitarian imperative, often tends to sideline, intentionally or not, more contentious political issues. These issues have become even more important in the aftermath of the conference, particularly given the Bush administration’s unwillingness to engage seriously with the process of addressing small arms abuse. Three questions have to be placed squarely on the table in our discussion: Have we decided not to address the underlying and systemic causes of violence? Are we diverting attention away from the important consideration of the supply and production dimension by focusing primarily on the demand for small arms? In addressing the demand side, do we use a security or a development/peacebuilding perspective? The Causes of Violent Conflict: Beyond Blaming the Victim In focusing on the demand-side of small arms, the conventional framework for controlling small arms abuses has ignored two key elements that are necessary to a comprehensive and effective approach to addressing the violence associated with small arms abuse. First, it ignores the systemic causes of violence, especially the economic and political sources of violence. Second, reducing demand is approached in a narrow law and order style that ignores the developmental and empowerment agendas that must be at the center of any sustainable and effective approach to ending the violence associated with small arms abuse. Such an approach also lets the Northern countries and their arms manufacturers off the hook. These governments support repressive regimes, subsidize weapons exports, and promote development policies that aggravate poverty and inequality through the international financial institutions, all of which contribute to the violence associated with small arms. Failing to address these causes of violence will insure failure in addressing small arms abuse. Does the availability of weapons in and of itself help trigger violent behavior? The question is academic in regions such as Central America or Central Asia where it seems weapons, like the poor, shall always be with us. Thanks to the cold war—and thanks to the technology that makes them cheap, maintainable, and easy to transport—the use of small arms and light weapons will remain instruments not simply of the military, but of militarized crime and economic survival or rebellion. The “culture” of these countries has little to do with this, and arguments about the ostensible “permissiveness” of some societies verge on the patronizing. Governments, along with the political “right,” will never tire of exonerating the economy and blaming crime on the criminals. This is nonsense because small arms are not merely symptoms of the loss of “values.” The impact of demand factors such as crime, corruption, and violence can not be denied. However the law-and-order or the security approach to the problem of the trade in small arms has its own limits and pitfalls. It tends to reduce policy to police actions pitting “good guys” against “bad guys.” Experience shows that law-and-order crusades usually do not win the “war on crime.” On both the national and international level, the security-first approach lends itself to abuse. In the face of history, one is naturally suspicious of the militarized prescriptions of how to deal with arms flows in an “internal” conflict: tougher laws, more police, bigger prisons, fewer civil liberties, and tougher punishment. How convenient to criminalize the protesters, and for some repressive governments, to count on yet another tool in their counterinsurgency arsenal. The “narcoguerilla” epithet employed by the U.S. and the Colombian military to justify massive military spending, increased repression, and counterinsurgency operations comes to mind, while civilian populations end up suffering more from the cure than from the disease. The national security “guns and thugs” approach can be as narrow as it is opportunistic. Proliferation and abuse are linked of course but, as the examples of Switzerland or Texas would show, the first does not necessarily lead to the second. Governments in this context often prefer not to address another discernible component of the small arms problem: namely, the relationship between small arms proliferation and the character of economic, social, and political development. As Bobi Perseyedi argues, in The Small Arms Problem in Central Asia: Features and Implications, “…it could also be argued that the growing international interest in small arms is due, to a large extent, to the lack of political will on the part of the international community to address the underlying causes of internal conflicts.” Widespread gun ownership and use raises important questions about fundamental relationships between state and society. It is more than a question of “governance”—a blanket term often used to blame national governments for conflict. The character of the state itself helps shape social behaviors. Where repression is the official norm, and where people are seeking to build more democratic societies and movements, and wish to gain access to power, the implications regarding gun supply and demand are obvious: People’s guns against government thugs. Simply blaming “proliferation” does not explain why so many small arms are in the hands of so many Palestinians, for example. It may just have something to do with foreign occupation, widespread Israeli military presence and repression, or the fact that about 90% of Palestinian families have experienced relatives being detained, tortured, wounded, killed, or otherwise abused by Israeli authorities. Similarly for Tamil families at the hands of the Sri Lankan military. While that, of course, cannot constitute a justification for resorting to the same politics of terror and vengeance, the issue of oppression does factor in heavily on the “demand” side. In the same way, massive amounts of weapons supplied to the governments of Israel, Sri Lanka, or Colombia constitutes a “supply” consideration that, while legal, is immoral and sparks an “illegal” counterflow of armaments. Economics, Small Arms, and Violence Some recent research has focused upon the relationship between economic issues and violence, analyzing the economic agendas of competing factions in violent conflicts. The resulting policy prescriptions emphasize changing the behavior of national (Southern) elites and their regional networks. (See for example, Mats Berdal and David M. Potter, Greed and Grievance, Economic Agendas in Civil Wars , (Reinner/IDRC, 2000)) While this is a welcome development, the analysis and therefore the prescriptions, are still partial and limited. Such analyses need to expand their scope to examine how globalized privatization creates new opportunities for particular groups to multiply their capital, by engaging in multifaceted national and international trade that includes weapons. In certain countries, these are private sector firms that under the rules of liberalized banking systems and diminished capital controls can freely move the money that moves the weapons (or drugs, diamonds, etc.). Conflict entrepreneurs are more a by-product than a cause of war, although they may feature prominently in its perpetuation. People do learn to survive in militarized economies and sometimes it is difficult to unlearn how to live without weapons as instruments of economic subsistence, or protection thereof. In any case, one must warn against new versions of “blaming the victim”—such as the faddish portrayal of local corruption as the explanation for economic stagnation—in which outsiders, including former colonial patrons and neocolonial international bureacracies, comfortably pretend they have nothing to do with the problem. The conventional policy prescriptions of development aid conditionality or international police repression are not the answers. In fact, there are no quick fix answers. Effectively contesting the pain produced by war and weapons will be the product of a long term and incremental process of organizing social energy (what some misleadingly term “social capital” or “civil society”). The fact is that segments of civil society do benefit from the militarization and privatization of economies, weakening of the state, and that an “anti-social capital,” can also develop. In the neoliberal scheme of affairs, the opportunities for free market rewards outweigh risks of juridical penalization. “Blame the local and the national, forget the international” Citizen insecurity (and with it gun proliferation) may be as much the product of a repressive and corrupt authority as of a nonexistant or ineffective one. The problem here may be less one of political will than of political capacity. Here we must examine the contentious connection between a so-called failing or failed state and the need for a community to assume responsibility for its own security. Failure here may not be as much the product of internally sparked war and destruction, as of globalization economics and impoverishment. The steady contraction of state capacity, however, also calls forth the examination of the relationship between the international economic setting and governments in developing countries. Where police and courts are ineffectual and where impunity is the norm, citizens will assume responsibility for their own security. Security becomes privatized and security agencies proliferate, along with the demand and supply of weaponry. There are now abundant reports of criminal elements being better armed in quality and quantity than the legitimate forces of the state. While such a situation is, in part, the result of excessive availability, it is also the result of diminished capacity on the part of local security authorities. Capacity, in turn, cannot be divorced from neoliberal privatization, fiscal austerity, and state-debilitating consequences of global rules set down by the rich countries and enforced by the Bretton Woods twins. In other words, the failure of the state to meet its most basic obligation—to provide security (let alone other human rights and equity)—is also the failure and responsibility of the global rulemakers. Donors call for demand-side action with one voice, yet with another, demand structural adjustment programs and external debt repayment, suspiciously oblivious to the connection between the two. And they ask the small arms campaigns to focus their attention on analyzing the pieces of the problem to death, thereby diverting attention from the larger global picture. Opportunities for a Way Forward Assume a Development and Justice perspective Conceptual and policy horizons regarding gun abuse can and must be expanded so as to arrive at a positive engagement of the external possibilities of impacting the demand dimension. Examples and research now abound showing how humanitarian assistance may have profoundly negative impacts on the dynamics of conflict and small arms demand. But the refrain “do no harm” is not enough. The question is how to do some good from the outside. Campaigns, particularly in the North, working from a development and justice perspective can and should raise fundamental questions about development assistance and humanitarian aid, as an often indispensable complement for efforts on the legal and normative realm. On a research and practical level, we need to understand and tap indigenous, bottom-up efforts to end the abuse of small arms and to prevent violence. This means enhancement of local capacities for community-building, for the tapping of social energies, for communication and coalition networking, and for peacebuilding in general. It just may be that the most effective means of contributing to efforts to control the abuse of guns will take the form of strengthened norms and networks of national civic engagement on the one hand, and the democratic expansion of national spaces by diminished international power asymmetries on the other. Peace and Weapons Abuse Control: The Indispensable Linkage In countries like Sri Lanka, Colombia, or Sierra Leone, the problem of small arms cannot be addressed without an understanding of the phenomena of “militarized violence.” Past or ongoing conventional military engagements between organized forces spill over, in time or geography, into abuses and paramilitarism. Perpetrators, not always men in uniform, or potential victims are both sources of “demand,” as institutions and society itself make all social, political, and economic problems a security problem at the same time. Review Policies on Foreign Aid We need to respond to small arms abuse in a more coherent and coordinated manner with a view to long term sustainability and capacity building. Demand-side discussions and recommendations could benefit from ongoing reviews of the application of development assistance to violence prevention. (See, for example, the UK Overseas Development Administration 1996 briefing paper Conflict Reduction Through The Aid Programme: A Briefing For Agencies Seeking Support For Conflict Reduction Activities .) For example, can donors support activities that prepare for, prevent, and mitigate the effects of violent conflict and small arms abuse? In certain national and regional contexts, aid projects could, it has been argued, be designed to contribute to conflict prevention, resolution, or reduction by building either the will or the capacity of the state and civil society to create an environment in which differences could be resolved without recourse to violence. Diminishing available stockpiles and restricting supply avenues is insufficient, at least from a humanitarian perspective. What the South does not need is new conditionalities on rapidly diminishing aid flows. Whatever the pretext, it is there on account of the fact that a select few governments brand others as “rogue” states (a term returned to favor under the Bush administration). Many in the South, and not only its governments, feel that linking development assistance or debt relief to political behaviour is in general a bad idea. Over and above the implications for domestic democratic processes, and whether “aid” is a matter of charity, self-interest, or justice, there is the question of whether the donors or the international financial institutions have the competency to impose or justify imposing governance or security-related conditionalities. Donors must come to grips with the gap—or indeed perhaps incompatibility—that exists between addressing the small arms problem (or peacebuilding in general) in a comprehensive fashion and managing the workings of current structures, processes, and operating procedures regarding development and security policy. It just may be that many of the assumptions of market-driven corporate globalization are part of the roblem. Gun abuse or violence prevention may therefore be less a question of methodologies or “tools” than a matter of approaches and genuine commitment to empowerment. We perhaps would do well to lend as much support to building local and national containment and prevention capacities, as we do to international conferences and international conventions. Final Reflections: Which Discussion Framework? Central to these reflections is the idea that we must recognize that it is not only the content of the policy debate that is important, and work to influence the issues discussed within that debate, but also recognize that the framework itself of that debate is critically important. We will run into problems if the framework is only partial, and not comprehensive in character. By this I refer to the very decision to organize single-issue campaigns that, in and of themselves, may deflect political attention and organizational resources away from the broader understanding of (and action upon) direct and economic violence. Many civil society campaigns argue that a well-defined focus and specialization is critical to effective advocacy and policy reform. But is this policy at the expense of politics (let alone power and paradigms)? Governments have their own reasons for compartmentalizing the issue. In the case of the small arms trade, the more “independent” the demand problem, the smaller the embarrassment over the lack of political will to address the production dimension and the causal factors of violence and crime. In addition, they can more easily manage their public relations and provide a “sexier” image to the public. So, one day we witness a Permanent Member of the Security Council shedding crocodile tears over small arms abuse. And the next day, that same government bombs Baghdad. Of course the silence of arms producers is explainable. However, by extension, corporate investors in certain industries may not wish to be reminded of how their decisions exacerbate the social problems that create crime—for example poverty and joblessness—and transform the institutions of the global economy to make it easier for arms pushers to move their money. Expanding the parameters of our analysis (and action) may well reveal that many of the rich countries do not stand above the problem but indeed are a part of it. The point, therefore, is not to expand, but to contract those parameters. Civil society organizations and concerned citizens working on small arms issues must ask themselves whether they choose to operate within such “political constraints,” constraints that are so clearly expressed in the agenda and workings of the UN process. This process emphasizes the concentration on the tools of violence, not on the toolmakers or on the causes of violence. Is this political realism? Analytic dishonesty? Ethical incoherence? Or donor dependence? Most of us would agree that the presence of an issue on the agenda, albeit in a compartmentalized and partial a way, is better than the absence of the issue altogether. But it is problematic (or at least should be) to extend this argument further by arguing that we should work within the prevailing power relationships—sometimes camouflaged in the term “political viability”—to contain at least some of the negative effects caused by small arms abuse. By dealing with problems at the level of symptoms rather than essence, we may be simply legitimizing, and thereby reinforcing, the macro power structures—the very structures that lay at the root of the violence being condemned. Other Discussion Papers available from Foreign Policy In Focus Strategy and Self-Activity In the Global Justice Movements By Patrick Bond How to Debate the China Issue without China Bashing By John Gershman Don’t Strengthen the WTO by Admitting China By Sarah Anderson, John Cavanagh, and Bama Athreya Progressive Unilateralism? By Ian Robinson to receive weekly commentary and expert analysis via our Progressive Response ezine.

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