Some CIA officers involved in the agency’s drone strikes program in Pakistan and elsewhere are privately expressing their opposition to the program within the agency, because it is helping al Qaeda and its allies recruit.
Yesterday was almost equally violent for both India, where suspected sabotage of train by Maoists left at least 74 dead in West Bengal, and Pakistan. In Lahore, an equivalent number were killed in the attacks on the two Ahmadi mosques. According to the New York Times: “Geo TV, a leading news channel in Pakistan, reported that members of the Punjab branch of the Pakistani Taliban were claiming responsibility for the attacks.”
People tend to balk at pressure. Isn’t it time to find an alternative to deadlines and timelines?
The competing assertions about Times Square-bombing suspect Faisal Shahzad’s links relationship with Pakistani Taliban reflects a broader debate both within the U.S. and between the U.S. and Pakistan over how to handle Taliban elements in Waziristan province.
The bubble is bursting.
I’m not talking about the Greek economy, the collapse of which has bankers and finance ministers trembling from Athens to Antarctica. Nor am I talking about the oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, which reminds us once again that our current energy security rests on shaky foundations.
Afghan President Hamid Karzai is in Washington this week, where he’ll be meeting with President Obama on Wednesday. Afghan government officials have said that a top priority for these talks is to win President Obama’s full support for the Afghan government’s efforts to reconcile with senior leaders of the Afghan Taliban insurgency in order to end the war.
The Afghan problem can’t be addressed, let alone solved, by force. Nor can it be solved through negotiations between the Afghan government and the Taliban. The conflict, after all, is not between two distinct segments of the population. Negotiation is an appropriate strategy when there is indeed a two-party conflict—as in a civil war—and both sides have support among different factions of the population. But neither the government nor the Taliban has much popular support. The problem is not the presence of the Taliban; it’s the absence of good governance.
As President Obama and his advisors debate future troop levels for Afghanistan, a new report by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) muddies the water on one of the most important issues in the debate — the effects of Afghanistan’s drug production.
There are currently more than 100,000 foreign troops in Afghanistan, about 65,000 of which are American. U.S. General Stanley McChrystal is asking for more, perhaps as many as 45,000 soldiers. However, there is rising opposition to the war in the United States and several NATO countries. The Taliban now have a permanent presence in 80% of Afghanistan, up from 72% in November 2008, and are spreading their influence to the north. The recent elections have been marred by fraud, and it is still unclear how and when the problems will be resolved. Obama has a lot on his plate and hears many conflicting voices on what should be done. But what do Afghans actually think?
We certainly should aid Afghanistan’s reconstruction after its latest civil war, but we can’t do that until the war ends. Al-Qaeda has left Afghanistan. We should leave, too, before another soldier or civilian dies without purpose.