Your local hospital shuts down, your kids’ school closes, and your power cuts out regularly. The only organization stepping in to help is one your government considers a terrorist group. While this might sound unthinkable in New York or London, it’s an everyday reality in Lebanon, Yemen, Syria, and Iraq. It’s daily life for millions of people in the Middle East, where groups like Hezbollah often do a better job at basic governance than actual governments.
If this sounds backward, you’re not alone in your confusion. The reality of who really runs things in the Middle East challenges everything we think we know about how countries should work. And in an era of failing states and rising global tensions, it has huge implications for global stability, U.S. foreign policy, and even the future of how countries work.
With Lebanon’s currency having lost 90 percent of its value, getting sick means facing an impossible choice: a crumbling government hospital with unreliable power and scarce medicine, or a modern clinic run by Hezbollah—yes, the same group on U.S. terrorism lists. For millions across the Middle East, where state services are crumbling under economic pressure, this isn’t a hard choice. When your child has a fever, you go where the doctors show up and the lights stay on. Increasingly, that means turning to organizations that Western governments label as terrorists, but local people know as their most reliable source of healthcare, education, and basic services.
In Lebanon’s Shiite neighborhoods, for instance, Hezbollah runs networks of schools, clinics, and power stations. The Iraqi Sadrist Movement has transformed from a militia into a massive social service provider. These aren’t dismal operations. They’re daily presences in millions of lives.
When non-state groups become better at providing basic services than actual governments, it fundamentally changes how power works. The traditional idea of what makes a government legitimate starts to blur. For millions of people, legitimacy isn’t about international recognition. It’s about who can keep the electricity running and the hospitals open.
Who’s Really Running the Show?
Groups like Hezbollah and the Sadrist Movement have transformed themselves from opposition movements into phantom governments. They don’t just provide occasional help. They’ve built entire parallel systems of governance. When a power station fails in southern Lebanon, people don’t call their local government official; they contact Hezbollah. When schools in Baghdad’s Sadr City need supplies, they often turn to Sadrist Movement networks instead of the Ministry of Education.
The Houthis in Yemen have stepped in where the government has failed, especially in war-torn regions. They’ve established makeshift clinics, distributed food, and even rebuilt some local infrastructure. This service provision fills essential gaps, making the Houthis more than just a militant force. By addressing critical needs, the Houthis gain both loyalty and influence. For many Yemenis, they’ve become a de facto authority where state support is absent.
This phenomenon isn’t unique to Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen. In Palestine, Hamas provides similar services. The model has even spread beyond the Middle East, with groups like the Muslim Brotherhood in North Africa and al-Shabaab in Somalia filling service gaps left by weakened governments.
By stepping in where the state falls short, these organizations blend governance and social support with their political agendas. This isn’t just about filling gaps in government services. It’s about fundamentally changing how power works in these regions. These organizations have built deep roots in their communities not through force or ideology, but through something far more practical: consistently showing up when people need help
What about the Governments?
The short answer: governments in the region are broken. Years of war, corruption, and economic disasters have left many Middle Eastern governments unable to do the basic things that governments are expected to do, like running hospitals or keeping the power on.
The longer answer is that these government failures created a vacuum, and nature isn’t the only thing that hates a vacuum. When states can’t provide basic services, other organizations step in. And once they start providing these services, they build deep loyalty in their communities. In an environment where electricity shortages are routine and state-run institutions fail, any organization that can keep medical supplies stocked or schools running are not just providing services, they’re winning hearts and minds. It’s not about ideology anymore; it’s about who can actually get things done.
These groups aren’t just filling temporary gaps. They’re building entire alternative systems of governance. They’ve gone beyond solving immediate problems. They’re reshaping what legitimate authority looks like in these regions.
When Terrorists Are More Trusted than the Government
How do you deal with a group that’s on your terrorist list but is also providing better healthcare than the government you support? Western aid might be inadvertently undermined by labeling service providers as terrorists. The mismatch between policy and reality creates real-world diplomatic headaches. When U.S. sanctions target groups like Hezbollah, they’re not just hitting militant organizations. They’re potentially disrupting healthcare and education for thousands of families. And while Western diplomats might meet only with official government representatives in marble-floored ministries, the real power often lies with organizations running neighborhood clinics and local schools. This forces an uncomfortable question: what happens when “security threats” become essential to regional stability.
When groups labeled as terrorists become better at governing than actual governments, it creates problems that can affect everyone. Global stability shifts when states fail but other groups succeed, changing how power works in entire regions. Groups that provide services gain loyalty and influence that can be used for various purposes, good or bad.
Traditional diplomatic approaches don’t work well when the real power isn’t with the official government. When the United States or UN wants to help rebuild a school or distribute emergency supplies, they’re required to work through official government channels—the same ones that local people have learned to bypass. This creates a dangerous disconnect where international efforts might actually be undermining effective local solutions, while strengthening institutions that have already lost public trust.
Is This the Future of Government?
Maybe what’s happening in the Middle East isn’t just a regional anomaly but a preview of future challenges to traditional governance. When non-state groups provide better services than governments, it raises huge questions about what makes a government legitimate. It affects how we think about international aid, who we negotiate with to solve regional problems, and how we approach state-building in troubled regions.
The implications stretch far beyond the Middle East. Just look at how similar patterns are emerging in other fragile states, where traditional government authorities are increasingly challenged by groups that can actually deliver basic services. When international organizations need to vaccinate children or distribute food aid, they’re often forced to choose between working with officially recognized governments that lack real power or partnering with unofficial groups that actually control territory and command public trust.
The uncomfortable reality is that these organizations aren’t going anywhere. They’ve become too important to daily life in their regions. Any policy that treats them simply as security threats is doomed to fail.
This leaves Western policymakers with tough choices: continue treating these groups primarily as threats, ignoring their governance role; find new ways to engage with complex organizations that are both service providers and security concerns; or rethink fundamental assumptions about how states should work. When Western aid gets channeled exclusively through state institutions, it can actually weaken local trust if they fail to deliver services effectively. This creates a paradox: policies meant to strengthen state authority often end up undermining it. Meanwhile, these alternative providers that are developing increasingly sophisticated parallel systems are essentially building states within states. This pattern is becoming a blueprint for how power works in fragile states worldwide.
Any effective policy needs to recognize this complexity rather than wishfully hoping these organizations will simply disappear. This might mean developing targeted approaches that distinguish between militant activities and essential social services or finding ways to strengthen state capacity without disrupting the services people rely on. But whatever path policymakers choose, one thing is clear: continuing to treat these organizations as pure security threats while ignoring their governance role isn’t just ineffective, it’s counterproductive.