Belarusian dictator Alexander Lukashenko recently released two groups of political prisoners, including his outspoken critic Sergei Tikhanovsky. The move coincided with a visit by Keith Kellogg, President Trump’s envoy for Ukraine—part of official U.S. visits to Belarus under the Trump administration. The timing fueled hopes of a thaw in relations between Minsk and the West, with speculation that the release of all political prisoners might follow, potentially delivering a significant diplomatic victory for the Trump White House.
But those hopes have not yet been fulfilled.
Why did the negotiations stall? What role has the conflict in Iran played in this context? And what’s next for Belarus’s imprisoned dissidents?
A Win for Trump?
After Trump’s long, failed efforts to end the war in Ukraine—or at least broker a ceasefire—it became clear he needed a quick foreign policy win to revive his shaky image as a peacemaker. It didn’t take long for interested parties to step in to offer competing scenarios for just such a win. Trump just had to step in for the final act. Among those parties were Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and, surprisingly, elements within Russian President Vladimir Putin’s broader sphere of influence.
One of those elements, Putin’s closest foreign crony and longtime Belarusian dictator Alexander Lukashenko, released about 20 political prisoners, including his prominent enemy Sergey Tikhanovsky. He did so both before and after the visit of Trump’s diplomat, Keith Kellogg, to Minsk as an apparent bid to prompt the West to ease sanctions on key economic sectors. Lukashenko greeted the delegation with handshakes. He even exclaimed, “Why doesn’t know him!” The Belarusian leader was clearly hoping that railway cars from Belarus would once again flow like a river to the West, as they did before 2020.
But nothing changed. Newly freed, Tikhanovsky reunited with his wife—the former presidential protest candidate recognized by the West—and resumed his fierce criticism of the Belarusian regime, calling for stronger sanctions. That was seen as a betrayal of an American promise that those released remain silent. Feeling cheated and under pressure from hawks at home, Lukashenko dismissed Tikhanovsky’s claim that Trump could free all political prisoners with a single word. If Trump “dares to say even a word,” Lukashenko warned, “everything will stop.”
Trump seemed not to hear the warning because he had already moved on, switching to the lower-hanging fruit of a quick victory over Iran—an opportunity neatly handed to him by Netanyahu.
Who Gained?
Trump’s brief “victorious” attack on Iran, which surprised even his inner circle, ended just as abruptly with a ceasefire and a switch to a diplomacy. Critics and the mass media quickly forgot both the unconstitutional nature of the attack and its flimsy justifications. Trump’s objectives seem to be achieved: the image of a decisive, peace-making leader was partially restored.
Co-beneficiary Netanyahu set the stage for this win-win by launching airstrikes in early June and forcing Iran to seek cease-fire negotiations in less than two weeks. When the United States entered the war early on June 22, the date that symbolically coincided with Hitler’s attack on the Soviet Union, it was almost over. Netanyahu facilited this American “success,” but it was really his win because he shifted some of the responsibility for this unmotivated attack on another country to its more powerful ally, the United States.
A few days earlier, the Trump administration was offered a competing scenario—likely from the Putin-Lukashenko alliance—that was portrayed as a Belarusian “win” for Trump, or even a win-win-win for all three. Under this plan, Lukashenko would release his most vocal critic along with several political prisoners, framing it as a concession to U.S. demands for justice, democracy, and human rights. In return, the United States would ease certain sanctions. The latter could provide the Putin–Lukashenko bloc with a vital opening for grey imports and the rerouting of sanctioned goods into Russia through Belarus—a scheme they’d once used. This became crucial as Putin, who entered a new phase of his war of attrition against Ukraine, urgently needed electronic components for intensified airstrikes on Ukrainian civilians and renewed ground advances. Some components were being produced at Belarus’s Integral plant, but seemingly not at the necessary scale.
Putin and Lukashenko misread the moment. They failed to see that the MAGA base had little interest in democracy or political freedoms. General Kellogg may leave the door open because a Ukrainian ceasefire is still on the table, but the Belarusian regime came away empty-handed. Lukashenko now complains that the United States did not deliver on its promises of sanctions relief and ensuring that the released prisoners would stay silent.
Lukashenko’s Calculus
The Belarusian dictatorship might soon realize that freedom of speech and democracy are not priorities for the Trump administration, which is intensifying political repression within the United States. A telling example are the ICE raids conducted by masked agents, without prosecutorial approval or due process, and marked by unjustified violence. This approach is essentially a direct copy-and-paste of Lukashenko’s tactics used to crush protests in Belarus in 2020. Why should American policymakers now care about Belarusian political prisoners or democracy itself?
Dissidents, once Lukashenko’s key currency, have been sharply depreciated. But can he still spend this “political asset”?
The recent attack on Iran demonstrates the limits of Trump’s foreign policy. He lacks strong initiative, acting almost alone and impulsively. Without allies, like Netanyahu, his actions are doomed to fail. For the time being, Trump, his administration, and his grand old party have little to offer except new tariff deal with other countries. Unlike the previous proactive foreign policy, this position consists merely of a basic cycle of hostile pressure and waiting for reciprocal responses. What other countries’ proposals include and whose interests they serve seem irrelevant to the administration. When Qatar’s royal family offered a jet, Trump accepted it. Trump plans to wait another 50 days in the hopes that Putin will beg for mercy and accept a ceasefire deal.
However, these deals will not earn Trump a Nobel Peace Prize—something he likely realizes by now. In this context, if a peace deal like the possible Minsk-3 agreement were initiated, Lukashenko could reemerge as an actor—much like his role as a facilitator during the Minsk-1 and Minsk-2 negotiations with Russia, Ukraine, and European allies. For this to happen, Lukashenko needs only two things. First, as Tikhanovsky insists, he must immediately release all political prisoners. This is exactly what the EU demands as a prerequisite for further dialogue. The Belarusian dictator can then realistically claim a role as a peacekeeper, but only if the United States and EU adopt more aligned positions on Ukraine.
Given Putin’s stubbornness, however, Trump has no choice but to rely on force and sanctions. If sanctions are imposed, Belarus will become a bargaining chip, much like Iran or Syria, to be discarded by Putin at its most vulnerable moment. It’s not clear whether Lukashenko understands how disposable he really is.