The bad dream unfolding in Mali is less the product of a radical version of Islam than a consequence of the West’s scramble for resources on this vast continent, and the wages of sin from the recent Libyan war.
From Twitter trending to the front page of The New York Times to public statements by the White House and the Pentagon, the Kony 2012 campaign has shown the power of social media to affect U.S. public debate. But it has also demonstrated the dangers posed by oversimplification in an age when policy is made in the 24-hour news cycle. This has proven especially so on issues concerning Africa where, lacking historical context, over-simplistic media framing can quickly take root and lead to problematic policy “solutions.”
Kenya’s ill-advised incursion into Somalia on Oct. 16 after a rash of kidnappings in the tourist paradise of Lamu will most likely lead to a long and expensive quagmire. The escalation will further destabilize a region already reeling from war, piracy, famine, and international terrorism.
An informal competition took place during the Bush years for the title of “second front” in the war on terror. Administration officials often referred to Southeast Asia as the next major franchise location for al-Qaeda, with the Philippines in particular slated to become the “next Afghanistan.” Then there was the border between Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay, which State Department officials termed a “focal point for Islamic extremism in Latin America.” Worried about the spread of al-Qaeda operatives in North Africa, the Bush administration also developed the Pan-Sahel Initiative, which became the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative before finally being folded into the Pentagon’s new Africa Command.
The United States announced this past week that it is deploying a 100-man mission to assist the Ugandan government in tracking down the remnants of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), a force whose bloody conflict with the Ugandan military has devastated northern Uganda and its environs since 1987. But why now, in 2011, is the U.S. government making this commitment to combat the LRA?
Algeria was able to extend its influence over its southern neighbors. The U.S. was able to “piggyback” on Algeria’s concerns, real and imagined, to create a security network extending from Algeria to Nigeria.
For three years, critics of AFRICOM have charged that it serves to militarize U.S. foreign policy in the region, as opposed to aid and diplomacy.
From carving up Switzerland to initiating a multilateral pirate peace process, Gaddafi doesn’t lack for opinions.
Can Obama change Africa policy as Big Oil and other powerful U.S. companies remain a serious challenge to peace and stability on the continent?
Operation Flintlock was part of the Bush administration’s Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism Initiative. It was designed to address the specter of terrorism in the Sahel region, between the Sahara desert to the north and the savannas to the south, by building the capacity of local militaries and preventing terrorist organizations gaining a foothold there. It also signaled the increased importance that the Pentagon assigned to Africa with the development of AFRICOM, the U.S. military command for Africa.