Governments across the globe have expressed varied responses to the GOP’s stunning midterm defeat as Democrats are poised to take control of the House and Senate in just a couple of months. Russia’s media outlets have been reporting on the results with a focus on how the altered congressional landscape might impact U.S.-Russia relations, particularly regarding the war in Ukraine. Since Moscow often deploys media statements as trial balloons to gauge which narratives resonate with the public, Russia watchers should take heed of the midterm explanations that are making the rounds of Russian state-owned and pro-Kremlin news services, and what purpose these narratives might serve.

The government-owned news organization RIA Novosti observed that the blue wave heralded the end of Trumpism, concluding, “None of this bodes well for Russia. Full control of Congress will allow the Democrats to push pro-Ukrainian and anti-Russian legislation and to secure funding for Kyiv in the budget. Under Trump, the United States ruled out directly supplying weapons to the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Now, [weapons supplies] will most likely be renewed, and all the president’s initiatives are doomed to fail.”

The pro-Kremlin newspaper Vedomosti tapped political analyst Dmitrii Novikov for his take on the elections, who similarly prognosticated that Democrats will aim to pass legislation committing the United States to providing security guarantees to Ukraine. “If the Trump administration doesn’t avoid this effort,” Novikov warned, “the Democrats in Congress may well try to insert additional obligations regarding Kyiv to the [potential legislation], both in terms of language and additional military and economic aid.”

These observations are not far off from Democrats’ stated intentions. For example, newly elected Democratic senators James Talarico and Abdul El-Sayed, who won Senate races in Texas and Michigan respectively, have both expressed strong support for economic and military assistance to Ukraine, with Talarico arguing that continued aid is a “cost-saving measure” and El-Sayed casting the conflict as “a war between democracy and autocracy” in a 2022 op-ed. Their position is consistent with Democratic and bipartisan efforts during Trump’s second term to expand Ukraine aid and strengthen sanctions against Russia, many of which met have with GOP opposition. Bills like Rep. Gregory Meeks’s Prohibit Corrupt Russia Oil Deals Act, which seeks to reverse the Trump-brokered diesel agreement with Russia and has already received bipartisan support, are likely to gain momentum in both chambers come January.

However, if a Democrat-controlled Congress succeeds in constraining the president’s policy objectives on Ukraine, Trump may behave more chaotically on the world stage, not least because dealing with opposition is not his forte. Prevented from carrying out his domestic agenda, Trump may well seek to achieve his goals in the foreign policy sphere, where since 9/11 the executive has accumulated more power to pursue its aims, such as heading diplomacy efforts and military operations, with limited congressional involvement. Post-election, Trump has reminded voters of his veto authority, which Congress can only override with two-thirds majorities in both chambers, and which the Democrats do not have.

In its analysis of the U.S. midterms, the Kremlin-aligned Lenta.ru news site made a similar observation, with political analyst Georgii Asatrian predicting that a frustrated American president is more likely to focus on the international arena: “A paradox is possible: the president will try to compensate for his limitations within the country by increased foreign policy activity.’” Political scientist Anastasia Gafarova told Kremlin-aligned Gazeta.ru the same thing: “Given his severely weakened domestic political powers, it seems Trump will try to achieve historic successes precisely in that dimension which is institutionally more vested in the executive branch, namely, foreign policy.”

A far more defiant note was struck by the state-controlled media organization RT, which insisted that U.S. policy toward Ukraine and Russia is unlikely to change. Associate Professor at RUDN University Nikolai Parkhit’ko told RT: “It’s too early to talk about a landslide Democratic victory. […] The Democratic Party has sensible politicians who are discussing reducing aid [to Ukraine] which comes primarily from the pockets of American taxpayers. Kyiv is celebrating right now, as though Ukraine has flown to Venus and the rest of us are all left here to die. But it’s utterly immature and ill-conceived to think that tomorrow Zelensky will be given a trillion dollars, it’s shortsighted.” Although there are no Democrats who publicly discuss reducing Ukraine aid, this sally aligns with similar RT efforts that target U.S. voters as part of wider influence operations that weave populist grievances into pro-Russian narratives, in this case lamenting the loss of hard-earned American tax dollars in order to undermine public support for Ukraine.

The media assessments vary because they serve different purposes. If Russia is unable to achieve its objectives in Ukraine or make dialogue breakthroughs with Washington, it will be convenient to blame Democratic interference and military support for Kyiv. At the same time, the coverage reassures Russian readers that Trump ultimately has final say over U.S.-Russia relations, and even if he didn’t, Moscow’s decision-making does not rely on political shifts in Washington. After all, although Russia has often regarded Trump as useful, its most recent foreign policy concept has assessed that the United States seeks to weaken Russia and undermine its economic and technological capabilities while threatening its sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Finally, the repeated prophecy in pro-Russian news outlets of escalating tensions between the U.S. Congress and a president who, they insist, will be aggressively focused on making unilateral foreign policy decisions that undermine the Democratic agenda, is consistent with the Kremlin’s own preference for American disruption, distraction, and gridlock. The more disunited and dysfunctional the American government is, the less effective it will be in challenging Russian ambitions.

Sveta Yefimenko is a research director at the Massachusetts State House of Representatives where she works on legislative and policy research and analysis. She holds a PhD in Russian Studies from the University of Exeter, and her recent scholarship focuses on war narratives and memory politics in Russia and Eastern Europe.