On the fifth anniversary of the launch of the U.S.-led war against Afghanistan, the Taliban is on the offensive, much of the countryside is in the hands of warlords and opium magnates, U.S. casualties are mounting, and many, if not most, Afghans are actually worse off now than they were before the U.S. invasion.
On the fifth anniversary of the launch of the U.S.-led war against Afghanistan, the Taliban is on the offensive, much of the countryside is in the hands of warlords and opium magnates, U.S. casualties are mounting, and many, if not most, Afghans are actually worse off now than they were before the U.S. invasion.
Somalia today is very much like Afghanistan was in 1996. In the wake of years of civil war, chaotic rule by warlords, and the death and displacement of countless Muslims, a ragtag Islamic militia has moved in to take control of much of Somalia.
“He sat, in defiance of municipal orders, astride the gun Zam-Zammah on her brick platform opposite the old Ajaib-Gher—the Wonder House as the natives called the Lahore Museum. Who hold Zam-Zammah, that ‘fire-breathing dragon,’ hold the Punjab; for the great green bronze piece is always first of the conqueror’s loot.”
The forthcoming “London Conference” on Afghanistan (January 31-February 1, 2006), to be attended by President Hamid Karzai, British Prime Minister Tony Blair, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, and Paul Wolfowitz, head of the World Bank, brings together high ranking dignitaries from the government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the international development community to endorse a new multilateral agreement to be known as the “Afghanistan Compact,” the successor of the Bonn Agreement.
The Bonn Agreement, signed on December 5, 2001, provided the road map for the transformation of the Afghan state, culminating in the September 18, 2005 legislative elections. The landmark polls, which proceeded largely peacefully, have elected an Afghan Parliament for the first time in more than three decades. 1 Although the Bonn political process has made great strides toward facilitating Afghanistan ‘s transition to democracy, the costs and challenges associated with the reform agenda are immense and continue to spiral. With a narrow revenue base, Afghanistan will remain dependent on support from the international community for many years to come, not just to cover the capital costs associated with reconstruction and poverty reduction but also to underwrite core operating expenditures. Once funding for Coalition military operations is factored in, the cost of maintaining relative peace and stability in Afghanistan could exceed the $16-18 billion per year currently being spent—a prohibitively high figure in light of creeping donor fatigue. With the security situation in the country still volatile, regional posturing intensifying, and the United States signaling that troop withdrawals are imminent, Afghanistan’s transition remains fragile and uncertain. Senior Washington officials already quietly acknowledge that the reform process has failed to maintain the critical momentum that the Afghan government’s landmark report, Securing Afghanistan’s Future: Accomplishments and the Strategic Path Forward, appeared to generate when it was launched at the spring 2004 Berlin Donors Conference.
As donors met in Berlin last week to review Afghanistan’s progress and reaffirm their commitment to its reconstruction, the Afghan National army was swiftly moving into the northern province of Herat. Its mission was to quell an upsurge in factional fighting, following the murder of Mirwais Sadeq, the Afghan aviation minister and son of the powerful warlord and governor Ismail Khan. Although the army may have prevented the escalation of violence, the episode highlights the weakness of the central government and the fragility of security in the country. Almost two years after the fall of the Taliban, peace and security in Afghanistan still remains elusive.
The reason why Washington is having such a difficult time persuading the world of its good faith and its good works in the “war on terror” was best illustrated on the day U.S. President George W. Bush went to the United Nations.
The United States has supposedly created new “democracies” in Afghanistan and Iraq, but these endeavors give democracy a bad name. Sure, the two countries have some ingredients of representative democracy, such as elected officials and a constitution. But both countries are still beset by grinding poverty, insurgencies, and entrenched militia forces that make the exercise of democracy either impractical or dangerous. Both countries have high numbers of foreign troops occupying their land and terrorizing the population while hunting “terrorists.” And both countries’ governments answer to their respective U.S. ambassador on most issues. In the midst of such a violent and coercive environment, Afghans are pressing ahead with the latest in a series of “democratic” exercises imposed by the United States: the first Afghan parliamentary elections in four decades will take place this Sunday, September 18. Even though many Afghans hope that the elections will empower them to end their troubles, the fear is that the elections will probably be as undemocratic in practice as every other U.S.-inflicted Afghan institution.