Middle East & North Africa
Paying the Price: The Mounting Costs of the Iraq War
This report attempts to look comprehensively at the human, economic, social, security, environmental, and human rights costs of this war and the ensuing occupation. An Iraq Task Force of the Institute for Policy Studies spent several months scouring sources as diverse as professional engineers, economists, non-profits with expertise in Iraq, the United Nations, the U.S.-led Coalition Provisional Authority, and the most accurate journalistic accounts we could find.
It is our conviction that democracy is strengthened through informed debate. If this report helps stimulate broader debate and discourse in this country and around the world about the costs and legitimacy of the war and occupation in Iraq, then we will consider this report a success.
Thoughts On Cordesman’s “Post-Conflict” Lessons From Iraq
Anthony Cordesman, the thoughtful incumbent of the Arleigh Burke Chair in Strategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, titled his May 19, 2004 testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee “The ‘Post-Conflict’ Lesson of Iraq and Afghanistan.” Cordesman presented a devastating critique of the pervasive lack of planning and preparedness throughout the Executive Branch in general and the Pentagon and White House in particular for translating success in war into success in peace.
U.S. Public Diplomacy: A Tale of Two Who Jumped Ship at State
In politics, the name of the game is often zero sum. At times one country may have a positive advantage in reputation and influence while others like North Korea, China and Cuba may be on the negative side. At the end of World War II, no country could compete with the victorious United States in ascendancy. Through its competitive economic and ideological advantage, the United States was able to rebuild war-torn Japan and Germany through the Marshall Plan and to create a marketplace for goods and ideas that overshadowed its formidable but lesser competitor, the Soviet Union.
Nuclear Dominoes: Will North Korea Follow Libya’s Lead?
The Libyan Foreign Ministry’s December 19, 2003 “Statement” outlining its plan to “get rid of [weapons of mass destruction] materials, equipment and programs, and to become totally free of internationally banned weapons” prompted some to ponder whether North Korea might be next.(1) Will the Northeast Asian “rogue state” join the Middle East “rogue state” in renouncing its nuclear weapons programs? The Japanese weekly magazine Aera questioned whether Kim Jong Il would follow the cooperative path of Moammar Gadhafi, or continue along the confrontational, and ultimately self-destructive, path that Saddam Hussein trod.(2) In an interview with the Nikkei Press, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage held out this offer: if they chose to voluntarily end their weapons programs like Libya, North Korea “would very rapidly find herself integrated into the vibrant community of East Asia.”(3) Neither of these two statements, however, addresses the central fact that the capacity to produce nuclear weapons, or the threat of their production, is the lone asset that the North Korean government under U.S. threat has as a bargaining chip in its effort to survive. Like other states, North Korea and Libya respond to international developments not as part of a “rogue alliance” but on the basis of analysis of their specific interests and needs.
Libya’s Return to the Fold?
Libyan leader Colonel Muammar Qadhafi’s surprise announcement on 19 December to commit to “disclose and dismantle all weapons of mass destruction” has furthered speculation that Tripoli may soon be removed from the American list of state sponsors of terrorism. Such a move would bring about an end to U.S. economic sanctions that have been in place in one form or another for the past 30 years. Since the September 11th terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, DC, the Libyan regime has made significant and progressive steps to rejoin the international community. Tripoli’s desire to emerge from international isolation and end its pariah status now stands at a critical juncture: Does Qadhafi mean what he says and will Washington reciprocate and normalize relations with Libya?
The Peace Movement One Year Later
One year after the start of war in Iraq, the peace movement in the United States faces an unusual predicament. Critics of the invasion had many of their key arguments vindicated in the past year, as President Bush’s case for war has collapsed. Likewise, activists can take substantial credit for emboldening Democratic criticisms of the Bush administration and for keeping war-related scandals in the spotlight. Yet even as we sense that greater space for progressive activism in the country is opening, it has been hard to maintain a sense of unity and purpose within the peace movement itself.
The Iraqi Constitution
The signing of the interim Iraqi Âconstitution by the Governing Council represents a significant step in U.S. efforts to legitimize its invasion and occupation of Iraq. By achieving the codification in a U.S.-supervised process of an ostensibly ÂIraqi legal document, the U.S. as occupying power is hoping that its planned June 30th Âtransfer of power will be accepted globally as the Ârestoration of sovereignty to Iraq. In fact, that Âtransfer of power will not end the U.S. occupation, will not lead to the withdrawal of U.S. troops, and will not result in any real sovereignty for Iraq. The Constitution itself implies recognition of its impotence, as it recognizes that all Âlaws, regulations, orders, and directives issued by the U.S. occupation authorities will remain in force.
Capturing Saddam Hussein: Will It Mean a New Day for Iraq?
The capture of Saddam Hussein is an historic event by any standard. But aside from providing some dramatic footage for global TV audiences, what has really changed, for the people of Iraq, the Middle East, the United States, or the world? Despite the wave of triumphalism that has seized the Bush administration and certain U.S. media outlets, the harsh bottom lines in Iraq remain the same.
The Axis of Incoherence
The drama of the recent capture of Saddam Hussein will likely serve as a short-term distraction from the broader challenge facing the administration of U.S. President George W. Bush: its continued search for a viable “exit strategy” from an Iraqi quagmire, its policy there is appearing ever more incoherent.