nuclear weapons Archives - Page 52 of 105

Nuclear War in South Asia

by Zia Mian, Foreign Policy In Focus | Jun 1, 2002

There is a history of war in South Asia. India and Pakistan fought in 1948, 1965, 1971, and 1999. There is good evidence that in no case was there the expectation of a war on the scale and of the kind that ensued. Rather, war followed misadventure, driven by profound errors of policy, political and military judgement, and public sentiment. Nuclear weapons do nothing to lessen such possibilities. There is even reason to believe they may make them worse in South Asia. One lesson of the 1999 Kargil war is that Pakistan saw its newly acquired nuclear weapons as a shield from behind which it could fuel and stoke the conflict in Kashmir, safe from any possible Indian retaliation. During this war, nuclear threats were made publicly by leaders on both sides. It took international intervention to stop the slide to a larger, more destructive war.

America’s Nuclear End Game

by Conn Hallinan | Jun 1, 2002

With India and Pakistan poised on the edge of war, it is hard to focus on much other than preventing a nuclear holocaust in South Asia. But even if the rounds of shuttle diplomacy manage to ease the tension between the two countries, any respite promises to be temporary unless the major powers finally fulfill a pledge they made 34 years ago to abolish nuclear weapons.

Watch Out Kofi Annan: Washington’s New Witch Hunt

by Ian Williams | Jun 1, 2002

At one time many of us were worried that the U.S. would pull out of the UN and other international organizations in a fit of isolationism. As it happens, almost as frightening is an equally xenophobic American determination to stay in and hack them to our own image under the war cry of “Do as we say, not do as we do.” The administration wants the world to realize: America is the only Superpower and its decisions on the rules are final. Watch out Kofi Annan.

A Cure for the CIA’s Disease

by Melvin Goodman | Jun 1, 2002

In 1986, CIA Director William Casey and his deputy, Robert Gates, created a flawed Counter-Terrorism Center. Casey and Gates believed that the Soviet Union was responsible for every act of international terrorism (it wasn’t), intelligence analysts and secret agents should work together in one office (they shouldn’t), and the CIA and other intelligence agencies would share sensitive information (they won’t). The Center never understood the connection between Ramzi Ahmed Yousef, the coordinator of the 1993 World Trade Center attack, and the al Qaeda organization until it was too late. And the Center expected an attack abroad, not at home. Last year’s WTC attack exposed the inability of analysts and agents to perform strategic analysis, challenge flawed assumptions, and share sensitive secrets. The intelligence community claims that it must protect sources and methods, but that is not the issue. Each agency is trying to protect its position in the bureaucratic competition for access to the president. So what needs to be done?

The World Food Summit: What Went Wrong?

by Peter Rosset | Jun 1, 2002

Why do more than 800 million people still go hungry in a world marked by incredible affluence? 180 nations are gathering in Rome from June 10 to 13 to address just that question at the “World Food Summit: Five Years Later” meeting. At the 1996 World Food Summit, also held in Rome, 185 nations signed a commitment to cut the number of hungry people in half by 2015. There, Cuban President Fidel Castro made waves–echoing the feelings of many–when he called that goal “shameful” for its abandonment of any notion of eliminating hunger. Subsequent trends have been more shameful still.

America’s Global Leadership Measured by International Law

by Don Kraus | Jun 1, 2002

When history looks back on the rise and fall of American global leadership, May 6, 2002 may well be highlighted as the “beginning of the end.” The Bush administration’s “unsigning” the International Criminal Court (ICC) has ramifications far beyond this one particular treaty, which holds the perpetrators of the most heinous crimes–genocide, mass murders, mass rapes, enslavement, ethnic expulsions, and torture–accountable for their actions.

Military Training Programs: A Need for Oversight and Human Rights Courses

by Lora Lumpe | Jun 1, 2002

Beginning the first week of June, the Senate is debating an “emergency” supplemental budget bill to fight terrorism–and part of that White House request should be rejected. President George W. Bush is asking for a sharp increase in foreign military aid–including an extra $1 billion for training programs and other forms of military assistance–and he also wants Congress to lift all aid restrictions based on human rights concerns.

Supporting Indonesia’s Military Bad Idea Second Time Around

by Conn Hallinan | Jun 1, 2002

As part of the war on terrorism, U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld recently called for rebuilding military relations with the Indonesian army. In a joint May 13 press conference with his Indonesian counterpart, Matori Abdul Djalil, Rumsfeld said the Bush administration intended to work with Congress, “to reestablish the kind of military-to-military relations which we believe are appropriate.”

Bush’s Speech a Setback for Peace

by Stephen Zunes | Jun 1, 2002

Bush’s Speech a Setback for Peace by Stephen Zunes June 26, 2002 0206israelspeech.pdf [printer-friendly version] President George W. Bush’s speech on Monday represents a setback for Middle East peace. On the one hand, it is reassuring that after thirty years of rejecting the international consensus that peace requires the establishment of a Palestinian state alongside a secure Israel, an American president now formally recognizes that need. The bad news is that while President Bush correctly views Israel’s right to exist as a given, Palestine’s right to exist–even as a truncated mini-state on the West Bank and Gaza Strip–is conditional first and foremost on the removal of Palestinian President Yasir Arafat. This despite the fact that Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon is more hardline than Arafat on all outstanding issues of the peace process–final borders, Jewish settlements, the status of Jerusalem, and refugees. In fact, Arafat’s positions have been more consistent with international law and UN Security Council resolutions than the policies of any Likud or Labor-led Israeli government. But President Bush still insists that it is the Palestinians, not the Israelis, who must replace their elected leadership in order for the peace process to move forward. The Bush administration’s distorted priorities could not have been more glaring when in the course of his speech, the president mentioned terrorism eighteen times but did not mention human rights or international law even once. Nor did he mention the peace plan of Saudi Prince Abdullah–endorsed by the Palestinian Authority and every single Arab government–which offered Israel security guarantees and full normal relations in return for withdrawal from the occupied territories seized in the 1967 war. The Abdullah peace plan is largely a reiteration of UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, long considered by the U.S. as the basis for Middle East peace. While President Bush mentioned these resolutions briefly in his speech, he failed to challenge Israel’s false claim that the resolutions do not actually require it to withdraw from virtually all of the Arab lands conquered 35 years ago, an interpretation rejected by almost the entire international community. The Palestinians are insisting on statehood in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, which is just 22% of historic Palestine. They have already recognized Israeli sovereignty over the remaining 78%. But not only did President Bush fail to demand a total withdrawal of Israeli occupation forces, he called for merely a freeze on additional Israeli settlements, when international law–reiterated in UN Security Council resolutions 446 and 465–clearly requires Israel to abandon the existing settlements. The Palestinians have such a strong case, in fact, that the Bush administration has chosen to focus instead upon their weakest link: their corrupt and autocratic leadership and the terrorist reaction to the occupation. While many Palestinians are deeply disappointed in Arafat’s leadership, President Bush’s insistence that the United States has the right to determine who shall lead the Palestinians will only breed enormous resentment in the Arab world. Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres, upon hearing President Bush’s speech, was quoted in Israel’s largest daily Yediot Aharonot as declaring that “making the creation of a Palestinian state dependent upon a change in the Palestinian leadership is a fatal mistake…. The abyss into which the region will plunge will be as deep as the expectations from this speech were high.” As the occupying power, the onus for resolving the conflict rests upon Israel, not the Palestinians. Just as occupation and repression can never justify terrorism, neither can terrorism justify occupation and repression. (Stephen Zunes < zunes@usfca.edu > is an associate professor of Politics and chair of the Peace & Justice Studies Program at the University of San Francisco. He serves as Middle East editor for the Foreign Policy in Focus Project ( www.fpif.org ) and is the author of the forthcoming book Tinderbox: U.S. Middle East Policy and the Roots of Terrorism (Common Courage Press).) to receive weekly commentary and expert analysis via our Progressive Response ezine. This page was last modified on Wednesday, April 2, 2003 12:36 PM Contact the IRC’s webmaster with inquiries regarding the functionality of this website. Copyright 2001 IRC and IPS. All rights reserved.

India Flirting With Disaster: Washington has a Moral Responsibility to Prevent War in South Asia

by Muqtedar Khan | Jun 1, 2002

India is playing a highly risky game of brinkmanship in Kashmir. Its recent deployment of forces along the line of control (LoC), the de facto border between India and Pakistan in Kashmir, and the extremely provocative rhetoric from Delhi have brought the region closer to a nuclear war than ever before.