Since fighting began in late February, Iranian retaliation has reached U.S. bases and Gulf infrastructure while disruption in the Strait of Hormuz has repeatedly threatened energy exports and maritime trade. Roughly a fifth of global oil flows normally passes through the strait, giving any sustained disruption consequences far beyond the battlefield.
Qatar’s economy contracted 7 percent year-on-year in the first quarter as the conflict weighed on energy production. Other Gulf states have faced higher shipping risks, weaker investor confidence, and pressure to find alternative export routes. For economies built around energy, trade, and an image of stability, those costs are strategic rather than temporary.
The deeper damage, however, is to confidence in the old security bargain. For decades, the U.S. military presence in the Gulf rested on an implicit promise: U.S. bases and capabilities would deter major threats and help protect partners from regional instability. During this war, some of those same bases became targets, while Washington struggled to keep the Strait of Hormuz reliably open. Middle East expert Marc Lynch has argued that this failure has undermined the bargain that long justified the U.S. military network in the region. Whether one accepts that conclusion in full or not, Gulf leaders now have stronger reasons to ask what American protection actually guarantees when a conflict involving Washington itself exposes their territory and economies to retaliation.
That question is already shaping policy. The UAE is accelerating investment in pipelines, ports, and logistics routes designed to reduce dependence on Hormuz. Saudi Arabia has preserved its relationship with Washington while deepening defense coordination with Turkey and Pakistan through a a new collective security pact. Qatar continues to emphasize mediation, and Oman remains central to efforts to manage maritime and diplomatic channels with Iran. Gulf states have also looked to China to use its economic influence with Tehran. The common thread is not an anti-American realignment. It is insurance: more routes, more partners, more defense options, and fewer single points of failure.
The war also exposed a broader strategic problem. Military superiority does not automatically translate into control over political and economic consequences. Iran has absorbed severe damage, yet its geography and ability to threaten regional infrastructure have allowed it to impose costs beyond the immediate battlefield. The Gulf states have often borne those secondary costs even when they were not the principal combatants. That experience gives them a direct incentive to seek more influence over the security arrangements that can expose them to war in the first place.
This is why the relationship with Washington is becoming more conditional and transactional. Gulf governments still value U.S. military power, intelligence, technology, and diplomatic access, and there is no obvious replacement capable of providing the same security umbrella. Hedging therefore should not be confused with strategic divorce. But American centrality no longer necessarily means American exclusivity. Economic ties with China, defense cooperation with middle powers, dialogue with Iran, and investment in indigenous capabilities all give Gulf governments greater room to maneuver when their preferences diverge from Washington’s.
That distinction matters for the slogan “America First.” From Washington’s perspective, the phrase can mean limiting open-ended commitments and putting U.S. interests first. From the Gulf, however, it can also sound like a reminder that American guarantees will always be filtered through domestic political priorities, economic pressures, and the willingness of U.S. leaders to sustain a crisis. The more uncertain those calculations appear, the more rational it becomes for regional partners to build alternatives before the next emergency arrives.
The Iran war therefore is unlikely to end the U.S. role in the Persian Gulf, but it is accelerating the end of one-sided reliance on it. Diversification could make the region more resilient if it produces stronger local capacity and more diplomatic channels. It could also create new risks if competing defense arrangements fuel arms races or deepen mistrust. What is already changing is the assumption that one external power can indefinitely guarantee Gulf security on terms set largely in Washington. If the United States wants to prevent “America First” from becoming “America Alone,” it will have to adapt to partners that increasingly insist on having a Plan B.