Nuclear weapons rival free-market economics for generating far-fetched and convoluted lines of thought. Here’s an example from a book I’m rereading (and with a much greater appreciation of its importance): the third edition of Lawrence Freedman’s The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy (Palgrave Macmillan, 2003). Regarding the Cold War (emphasis added):
If it came to nuclear war the Russians did consider, as an article of faith, that their society was better suited to cope with a nuclear war than capitalist societies. They also took practical steps to improve their civil defences, though much of this took the form of reassurances to the population that atomic war could be survived if sensible precautions were taken. There was, however, an important cultural point that needs to be borne in mind when considering the pronouncements of Soviet and American commentators when assessing the strengths and weaknesses of themselves and each other. There has always been an element of reassurance in Soviet pronouncements on the state of the strategic balance, a function perhaps of the inferior position from which the Soviet Union began the nuclear age and the consequent desire to avoid defeatism (and the generally optimistic tone about all thing encouraged by the prevailing ideology). The Americans, because of a sense of declining superiority, erred in the opposite direction, stressing the gains being made by the Soviet Union. Often a motive could be found in the desire to encourage a more determined national effort in the arms race. It was quite possible for the Americans to offer gloomy assessments of a decisive tilt in the balance toward the Soviet Union, have it confirmed by Soviet leaders, and yet still be wrong. As will be seen, this is precisely what happened in the late 1950s.
In other words, Russian authorities sought to reassure a Russian public concerned its country’s nuclear-weapons program was weaker than that of the United States. On the other hand, American military and civilian authorities, despite having the nuclear upper hand, constantly sought to fear-monger the American public into supporting the expansion of the U.S. nuclear-weapons program.
Thus, to repeat, bearing in mind again that the United States had the larger nuclear-weapons program:
It was quite possible for the Americans to offer gloomy assessments of a decisive tilt in the balance toward the Soviet Union, have it confirmed by Soviet leaders, and yet still be wrong.
Funny — if one can summon laughter at the brink of the precipice.