Humanitarian work has never been safe. Those who choose to work in war zones understand the risks. They may be caught in crossfire, killed by bombs, kidnapped for ransom, or attacked by those who see humanitarian organizations as frustrating their purposes or even taking sides.
For decades, the humanitarian community has attempted to manage these risks through negotiation and by securing acceptance of its presence by all parties, based on the principles of neutrality, impartiality, and independence.
But then something changed—actually three things.
There was the increasing instrumentalization of humanitarian action by Western governments following the attacks of 11 September 2001, when aid, stabilization, counterterrorism, and political objectives became ever more closely intertwined. Also, the post-Cold War international order gradually eroded to be replaced by a much more contested and multipolar world, in which many of the norms and institutions strengthened during the 1990s came increasingly to be seen, rightly or wrongly, as Western constructs. More simply, armed groups and governments came to understand that humanitarian organizations themselves could be a source of leverage.
Whatever the precise explanation, the consequences are becoming increasingly clear. The distinction that humanitarian organizations have worked so hard to maintain between themselves and the political, military, and strategic objectives of governments has become progressively harder to defend.
In some conflicts, humanitarians are no longer seen as outsiders attempting to create a small space in which assistance can be provided according to need. They are increasingly regarded as political actors, sources of intelligence, representatives of a hostile international order, or, quite simply, useful bargaining chips.
As a result, humanitarian workers are increasingly targeted not merely because they happen to be operating in dangerous places but because of the work they do and the organizations they represent.
Growing Use of Arbitrary Detention
Detention gives those exercising power the ability to intimidate staff, influence the behavior of organizations, extract concessions, and send a warning to everyone else who remains. The detention of a humanitarian worker is therefore rarely only about the individual behind bars. It is also a message to the organization for which that person works and, increasingly, to the humanitarian system as a whole.
The figures are striking. According to the Aid Worker Security Database, 2025 saw 352 aid workers killed, 323 wounded, and 234 kidnapped. Another 280 humanitarian workers were detained, compared with 103 the previous year. Humanitarian Outcomes has consequently devoted its 2026 Aid Worker Security Report specifically to the growing phenomenon of detention by state authorities.
There is an important distinction to be made between kidnapping and detention. A kidnapping is generally recognized immediately for what it is. Governments mobilize. Security specialists become involved. Negotiations begin.
Detention is more complicated.
It comes wrapped in the language of sovereignty and law enforcement. Humanitarian personnel are accused of espionage, terrorism, political interference, or violations of national security legislation. What may in reality be an attempt to intimidate an organization or extract concessions is presented as a legitimate judicial process.
The Case of Yemen
As of September 18, the de facto Houthi authorities have arbitrarily detained 73 United Nations personnel, some since 2021. Five former UN personnel and dozens of employees of NGOs, civil-society organizations and diplomatic missions are also being held. One UN colleague has died in detention, and some detainees have been held incommunicado.
Those detained are national staff. They are Yemenis who chose to work for organizations attempting to assist their own communities. Yet the political attention, diplomatic pressure, and public visibility that might accompany the detention of an international employee are rarely available to them.
The situation has now become still more serious. Detainees are being referred into proceedings before the Houthi-controlled specialized criminal justice system, an institution that in the past has liberally applied the death penalty.
There is now an additional complication.
The resumption of fighting in Yemen, and the worsening humanitarian situation resulting from it, inevitably increases the pressure on the UN and other humanitarian organizations to expand their operations. And with that comes growing pressure to separate, or “delink,” decisions concerning humanitarian operations from efforts to secure the release of detained personnel.
The humanitarian argument is understandable. The Yemeni population cannot be made to suffer because humanitarian personnel have been detained. Assistance has to continue.
But simply separating the two questions creates another problem. It risks removing one of the few remaining sources of leverage without putting anything equally effective in its place. And it risks sending a very unfortunate message: detain humanitarian workers for long enough and eventually the organization will adjust. Operations will resume. The detention will become part of the background.
That cannot be the answer.
A Different Approach
What is required is a strategy that addresses both issues at the same time: how to respond to the increasing humanitarian needs of the Yemeni population while also strengthening the efforts to secure the release of those detained.
The two objectives are not incompatible. But they do need to be considered together. There may be times for quiet diplomacy and times for greater political pressure. There may be operational decisions that can provide leverage and others where humanitarian need has to prevail. Legal action, public advocacy, and engagement with governments will all have their place.
The difficulty is that such an approach requires someone with the authority to make those judgements and to ensure that the different parts of the system are pulling in the same direction.
At present, responsibility is dispersed across agencies, security structures, political offices, and diplomatic channels. Many individuals are doing important work. But there is no single senior figure whose primary responsibility is to secure the release of detained humanitarian personnel.
The secretary-general should designate a sufficiently senior international figure with the political authority and institutional standing to work across the UN system and engage governments and other interlocutors at the highest level.
This person would not replace the existing operational machinery. The purpose would be to give it political weight, coherence, and sustained attention, and to ensure that decisions concerning humanitarian operations and those concerning detained personnel form part of the same overall strategy.
The families of those detained have a very understandable fear. As the humanitarian crisis worsens, operational pressures will grow. Their relatives may gradually disappear from the equation. That must not happen.
Although Yemen is perhaps the most striking example today, this is not only about Yemen.
Ensuring Access
Humanitarian access has traditionally rested on a relatively simple understanding: humanitarian organizations may negotiate with everyone, but they are not instruments of anyone. They provide assistance according to need, and those delivering that assistance should be protected.
That understanding is being eroded.
When humanitarian workers can be detained because of whom they spoke to, where they travelled, the information they collected, or simply because their organization offers useful leverage, humanitarian action itself becomes hostage.
The consequences extend well beyond those imprisoned.
Arbitrary detention sends a message to every humanitarian worker that they too can be taken. It creates fear and encourages self-censorship. Staff become reluctant to travel, to ask difficult questions, or to speak openly to the communities they are there to serve. Organizations, understandably concerned about the safety of their staff, restrict movement or reduce programmes.
Detention therefore achieves considerably more than silencing the individual behind bars. It changes the behavior of those who remain.
Eventually, it is humanitarian action itself that is constrained. And the people who suffer are the very people humanitarian organizations were established to assist.
There is therefore a danger in treating these cases principally as security incidents to be handled quietly. Discretion will sometimes be necessary. There are cases in which publicity can make a release more difficult. But silence cannot become the institutional response to what is now a much broader erosion of the protection afforded to humanitarian workers.
Governments, the UN, and humanitarian organizations need to recognise arbitrary detention for what it has become: a threat to humanitarian action.
That requires collective diplomacy, sustained political pressure, legal support for detainees, proper assistance to their families, and, above all, clear responsibility at the highest level for securing their release.
Those who detain humanitarian workers must also understand that time will not make the problem go away. Detention cannot be allowed slowly to become normal. There is a principle at stake that goes far beyond any individual organization or employee.
If humanitarian institutions gradually learn to work around the imprisonment of their own personnel, if detention becomes simply another operational constraint to be managed, then something fundamental will have been lost.
And if those who deliver humanitarian assistance are imprisoned, intimidated, and prosecuted for doing their jobs, one day there will be nobody left willing, or able, to deliver the assistance at all.
