People tend to balk at pressure. Isn’t it time to find an alternative to deadlines and timelines?
Kyrgyzstan: Tinderboxes and Tangled Webs
If Kyrgyzstan becomes a pawn on a larger board, then the “Great Game” will shift from Afghanistan and Pakistan to the rest of Central Asia.
Reader Challenge: Does Afghanistan Spell the End of NATO as We Know It?
Will confining NATO to its own backyard and scaling back its mission could spell the beginning of its end?
Hello, Has Anybody Seen Our Idea of Governance in Afghanistan?
Turning Afghanistan over to the Taliban may actually be a win-win situation for the United States.
The Breakup
“I need a little space.”
When lovers utter these words, it’s usually a bad sign for the relationship. They feel suffocated. They’re reexamining their commitment. They’re checking out other options. But they don’t have the courage to make a clean break.
Afghanistan: Should We Stay or Should We Go?
Almost nine years after the United States invaded Afghanistan, public support for a continued military presence has wavered and many politicians have called for an exit strategy. However, some observers believe a withdrawal of U.S./NATO troops would create a dangerous vacuum in the region. For those who opposed the invasion from the start, there is further debate: Can the “Out Now” position the antiwar movement has advocated for Iraq also be valid for Afghanistan? Or should activists voice a more nuanced stance that addresses, in particular, the prospective plight of Afghan women under Taliban rule?
‘Going Local’ in Afghanistan
I’m in overall agreement with the “going local” spirit of David Castonguay’s piece. If the overriding objective of U.S. policy is to end the war in Afghanistan as quickly as possible — as it should be — then the United States can’t wait on the central government for permission to promote local reconciliation. A key component of local reconciliation is giving locals greater responsibility for local security, regardless of their relationship with the central government, and regardless of what their relationship to U.S. forces has been in the past.
In Praise of Warlords
The United States helped develop and gradually train the Afghan National Forces (ANF) to defeat the resurgent Taliban. The Obama administration is stepping up this effort. The United States plans to makes the ANF the basis of a strategy that will allow the gradual turnover of tasks in July 2011. However, the United States is banking too much on the ANF. A better approach would be to empower the tribes, their elders, and the local militias to reject insurgency and play a greater role in the politics of their country.
Postcard From…Jakarta
If Barack Obama showed up one afternoon in front of his own statue in Jakarta, he would almost certainly feel embarrassed. Erected at the end of 2009, the three-foot bronze statue depicts a young boy in shorts with a slightly loopy grin on his face. His left hand, on which a butterfly is landing, points toward the sky.
Don’t Negotiate with the Taliban
The Afghan problem can’t be addressed, let alone solved, by force. Nor can it be solved through negotiations between the Afghan government and the Taliban. The conflict, after all, is not between two distinct segments of the population. Negotiation is an appropriate strategy when there is indeed a two-party conflict—as in a civil war—and both sides have support among different factions of the population. But neither the government nor the Taliban has much popular support. The problem is not the presence of the Taliban; it’s the absence of good governance.
