The contradictions and confusions in U.S. policy in South Asia were on full display during Secretary of State Hilary Clinton’s recent visit to India. U.S. support for India, which centers on making money, selling weapons, and turning a blind eye to the country’s nuclear weapons, is fatally at odds with U.S. policy and concerns about Pakistan.
The United States is struggling with Pakistan. The problem is manifold, encompassing a resurgent al-Qaeda, a Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan with bases in Pakistan, and Islamist militancy in Pakistan’s tribal areas and North-West Frontier Province.
In Preparing for Peace in Pakistan and Is Pakistan Appeasing the Taliban?, Mehlaqa Samdani and Sharad Joshi offered different interpretations of the ongoing negotiations between the Pakistani government and extremist groups operating along the country’s frontiers. Here they respond to each other’s arguments. In addition, Tarique Niazi, author of several FPIF briefs on Pakistan, responds to both initial essays.
Criticism has been leveled against the Pakistani government’s efforts to hold talks with militant groups. While concerns about the Taliban regrouping remain valid, it is in America’s long-term security interest not only to support the multidimensional peace plans being formulated, but refrain from words and actions that could jeopardize the process.
Against the backdrop of fear and horror spread by suicide bombers, a groundswell of hope has emerged in Pakistan after a decisively anti-Musharraf election result. Even as secular opposition parties gained a clear majority in the February 18 parliamentary election, the Pakistani president dismissed any thought of resigning and said he’ll work with the new elected civilian setup. To back him up, the State Department reaffirmed America’s main policy objective in Pakistan for which it deems Musharraf to be indispensable.
From its Cold War role as a bulwark against the irreligious, evil empire of the Soviet Union to its status as a major non-NATO ally in the post-9/11 war on terrorism, Pakistan has flaunted its various religious credentials. Vacillating from jihad to enlightened moderation, Pakistan’s ruling civil and military elite has unscrupulously employed religion as a means to gain domestic and international legitimacy.
In the aftermath of the imposition of emergency in Pakistan, there’s a sense of acute anxiety about what’s happening there and its implications for U.S. security. Fears that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons could fall into extremists’ hands, that anti-U.S. sentiments could ramp up, that there could be a regime change that leaves fundamentalists in power, and that there could be other fallout of instability, are being fanned by the media.
After more than two weeks of supreme military command, Pakistan’s General Pervez Musharraf has had enough. Enough of international pressure to lift martial law, that is.
In his 2005 inaugural address, President George W. Bush declared that the United States would support
democratic movements around the world and work to end tyranny. Furthermore, he pledged to those struggling
for freedom that the United States would "not ignore your oppression, or excuse your oppressors." Despite
these promises, the Bush administration—with the apparent acquiescence of the Democratic-controlled
Congress—has instead decided to continue U.S. support for the dictatorship of General Pervez Musharraf,
Pakistan’s president.
In a desperate bid to stay in power, General Pervez Musharraf has staged a coup against the rule of law in Pakistan. His declaration of martial law, suspension of the constitution and basic rights was aimed at overthrowing Pakistan’s Supreme Court, which was expected to rule next week that Musharraf could not continue as both president and chief of the army.