We certainly should aid Afghanistan’s reconstruction after its latest civil war, but we can’t do that until the war ends. Al-Qaeda has left Afghanistan. We should leave, too, before another soldier or civilian dies without purpose.
The official results of Afghanistan’s presidential elections won’t be known for weeks. The ballots cast around the country need to be brought to Kabul — some by donkey and helicopter — and counted. Nevertheless, U.S. officials have rushed to celebrate the process, and NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen heralded the elections as "a testimony to the determination of the Afghan people to build democracy." This despite more than 75 reported incidents of violence throughout the country, an estimated 26 civilians and security forces dead, reports of more than a handful of districts where no one voted, and complaints about impermanent ink, intimidation, and other irregularities.
On the surface, it appears that Pakistan’s greatest internal threats stem from the dangerously autonomous Swat Valley and Southern Waziristan. Look deeper and you’ll see that the country’s ailment is rooted in a crisis of national identity.
If the bucolic Swat valley, tucked into the Himalayas less than 100 miles from the capital city of Islamabad, is a bellwether for Pakistan’s war against the Pakistani Taliban, the war is going badly. The Swat District — an integrated part of Pakistan’s North West Frontier Province (NWFP) as opposed to the autonomous Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) — has been beyond government control since 2007. In this period the Tehreek-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (Movement for the Enforcement of Mohammaden Islamic Law), a militant Pakistani Taliban group, thoroughly destroyed the threadbare state institutions that existed in the area. Most notably they targeted schools and the police force. Rebuilding these will take years.
This is part of a strategic dialogue on Pakistan and counterterrorism. See Fouad Pervez’s initial argument here and Sharad Joshi’s argument here.
This is part of a strategic dialogue on Pakistan and counterterrorism. See Fouad Pervez’s opposing argument here, and their respective responses here.
America’s image of Pakistan is of a nation on the brink of total chaos. While there is certainly a great deal of instability in Pakistan, a more serious problem is the severe disconnect between the emerging crises in Pakistan and U.S. foreign policy toward the country. Unresolved, this disconnect could have tragic consequences for the security of people in both countries.
The United States is struggling with Pakistan. The problem is manifold, encompassing a resurgent al-Qaeda, a Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan with bases in Pakistan, and Islamist militancy in Pakistan’s tribal areas and North-West Frontier Province.
In Preparing for Peace in Pakistan and Is Pakistan Appeasing the Taliban?, Mehlaqa Samdani and Sharad Joshi offered different interpretations of the ongoing negotiations between the Pakistani government and extremist groups operating along the country’s frontiers. Here they respond to each other’s arguments. In addition, Tarique Niazi, author of several FPIF briefs on Pakistan, responds to both initial essays.