The daring attacks last week on Israeli interests in Kenya sent shock waves throughout the East African region. The United States was obviously also deeply perturbed. Three East African leaders were immediately summoned to Washington for discussions with President George W Bush. Two, Kenya’s President Daniel Arap Moi and Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Meles Zennawi, accepted the invitation. A third, Djibouti’s President Omar Guelleh, declined the invitation to join Moi and Zennawi at the White House on the pretext that he had to be in his country to celebrate the end of the holy month of Ramadan. Djibouti, an Arab League member state, is strategically situated on the crossroads between the Arabian Peninsula and the Horn of Africa. More than 95% of its population is Muslim and it is inhabited by ethnic Afar and the not-so-distantly related Somalis–an ethnic group that has unfortunately come under increasing scrutiny and suspicion for fomenting trouble in the region. Indeed, ethnic Somalis make up a large and restive minority in both Ethiopia and Kenya as well.
Lessons from Mombasa: Al Qaeda’s Long-term Strategy
An analysis of the status of al Qaeda published a month ago, entitled Is al Qaeda winning?, came to the conclusion that the organization had experienced disruption in Afghanistan as well as a number of recent reversals, but was, on balance, more active than 18 months ago. While major attacks in Paris, Rome, Singapore, and elsewhere had been prevented, their very planning demonstrated the power of the organization and its affiliates. Moreover, many other attacks had succeeded in their aims–not least the Bali bombing, the attack on the Tunisian synagogue, several bombings in Pakistan, and assaults in Yemen.
North Korea is Asking for Too Much in the Nuclear Crisis–Or is It?
Although it is generally known that the recent North Korean crisis has deep roots, what is not understood is just how these roots have grown over the past several years.
The Troubles Are Back
The “Troubles” in Northern Ireland are back, courtesy of an unholy Trinity of British Prime Minister Tony Blair, Protestant loyalists who refuse to share power with Ulster’s Catholics, and the Bush administration.
In Afghanistan, Paying for War is Easier than Paying for Peace
As Washington prepares for war in Iraq, officials are trying to reassure Afghanistan that it will not be lost in the shuffle. Muhammad Ali, heavy weight champ and UN Messenger of Peace, recently completed a three-day tour of Afghanistan where he tried to focus international attention on the country’s plight and gave volleyballs and jumping ropes to children. U.S. Treasury Secretary Paul O’Neill also came, bearing promises that the war in Iraq would not derail Washington’s commitment to rebuilding Afghanistan.
Afghanistan: Donor Inaction and Ineffectiveness
The fall of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan in November 2001 presented the international community with an unprecedented opportunity to restore peace and security to a perennial trouble spot. Almost one year later it appears that it has failed.
Losing Focus
A year ago, in his address to the nation, President Bush vowed, “I will not yield, I will not rest, I will not relent” in leading the war against terror. For about five months, it appeared that he intended to carry through on this solemn commitment–the war in Afghanistan was waged with vigor and dispatch, and Al Qaeda was severely damaged. But since January, the president has turned American attention and resources away from Al Qaeda to lead a crusade against Iraq’s Saddam Hussein, pushing the anti-terrorism campaign to the sidelines.
Trading Liberty for Security after September 11
Contents
The Arrogance of Power
Two years after the passage by a unanimous House of Representatives and all but two senators of the August 7, 1964, Gulf of Tonkin resolution, and amid continuing escalation of the Vietnam War, then Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman J. William Fulbright published The Arrogance of Power, in which he attacked the war’s justification, Congress’ failure to set limits on it, and the dangerous and delusional impulses that gave rise to it. Fulbright’s critique, to which he had already given voice in unprecedented hearings on the war, legitimized the growing anti-war movement in a way that had not been possible before the book’s publication and shattered what until then had been an elite consensus that U.S. military intervention in Indochina was necessitated by cold war geopolitics.
The Prisoner as Message
The United States’ recent stance on the case of Saadeddin Ibrahim is the first time since the signing of the Camp David Accords 25 years ago that America has made its aid for Egypt conditional upon a human rights issue. This decision has raised many questions within both Arab and international circles. What position do human rights occupy in U.S.-Egyptian relations? Or in the policies of the United States itself? Is the attempt to link human rights to the case of Ibrahim a sincere decision, or some sort of fabrication? If the latter, what is its goal? And what is the impact of this move likely to be, both on the future of U.S.-Egyptian relations, and on the future of Ibrahim himself?
