As the saying goes, there are three kinds of lies: lies, damned lies, and statistics.
The Bush administration has embraced this adage in Iraq, which has suffered
one of the worst humanitarian crises to strike the Middle East since the Mongols
sacked Baghdad.
Iraq
Winning or Losing in Iraq
If al-Qaida in Iraq loses–we win. If the insurgents in Iraq lose–we win. If the Iranian influence in Iraq loses–we win. If we just can sell the occupation to the Iraqis–we win. And in order to “win”, we need to sell the invasion and occupation to the Iraqis.
Beyond the Green Zone
Editors Note: The following is an excerpt from the introduction to Beyond the Green Zone: Dispatches from an Unembedded Journalist in Occupied Iraq (Haymarket Books, 2007).
The Surgeon Fails in Iraq
If a surgeon botches an operation, few patients would ask him to stick around and try again. This is especially true if the operation was elective and the surgeon insisted on performing it. Yet this is exactly how the Bush administration is trying to justify the continued U.S. occupation of Iraq. This time, the administration’s latest addition to the reasons to stay in Iraq is that we have a moral obligation to the Iraqis to prevent them from having a blood bath.
The Costs of War for Oil
“We have to decide, as a nation, whether our need for Middle Eastern oil is more important to our future than our conduct as a moral and ethical people.” Which brave presidential candidate would lay it on the line so clearly? None yet. And that’s the problem with the national debate on the war in Iraq, and possibly, our foray into Iran as well.
The Royal Treatment: Saudi Involvement in Iraq Overlooked
Annotate This… President Bush’s Sept 13 Speech to the Nation on Iraq
Instead of charting a new direction for U.S. policy in Iraq, President Bush’s speech to the nation last evening was an impassioned plea to the American public to stay the course. But much of Bush’s argument for staying the course was based on spin instead of reality. In this edition of Annotate This… Stephen Zunes and Erik Leaver analyze Bush’s statements and offer an alternative interpretation of the situation on the ground.
Bush Won’t Stop the Bucks
Having already sacrificed its international and domestic political effectiveness to prolong the ill-fated war in Iraq, the White House now stands poised to throw more money at the problem. The ethical and strategic costs of the war in Iraq have always been too great to bear, but the ever-increasing financial costs imperil future American economic solvency.
The Dangers of Scolding an Embattled Arab Leader
The last few days have brought a flurry of tense words between the Bush administration and Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki. At a press conference earlier this week, Bush lamented the ongoing violence, strife, and sectarianism and then pointed the finger quite directly at Mr. Maliki suggesting that the real question in all this mess is "will the Iraqi government respond to the demands of the people?" U.S. Ambassador Ryan Crocker was even harsher; phrases like "extremely disappointed" and "our support is not a blank check" tumbled from his mouth with a dire tone not heard from the administration before. Mr. Maliki registered his offense at the words (if politely, given his precarious position), noting he found them "discourteous."
Misunderstanding Muqtada al-Sadr
In a July 11 Wall Street Journal op-ed, writer Kimberly Kagan touted the success of the Iraq surge strategy. Kagan noted, among other supposed triumphs, that the Maliki government had "confronted Muqtada al-Sadr for promoting illegal militia activity, and has apparently prompted this so-called Iraqi nationalist to leave for Iran for the second time since January." While one can perhaps excuse Kagan’s sunny defense of the surge, (the plan was partly devised, after all, by her husband, Frederick Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute, a fact which the Wall Street Journal did not reveal to readers) the repeated attempts by conservative defenders of Bush’s Iraq policy to dispute Sadr’s nationalist credentials and treat him as an Iranian puppet indicate a real and troubling lack of knowledge of the Iraqi political scene, and of Sadr’s place within it.