Iraq Archives - Page 60 of 140 - Foreign Policy In Focus

The U.S. Invasion of Iraq: The Military Side of Globalization?

by John Gershman, Stephen Zunes | Oct 26, 2004

The major justifications for the U.S.-led invasion of IraqÂSaddam HusseinÂs supposed possession of weapons of mass destruction and Iraqi ties to the terrorist al-Qaida networkÂare now widely discredited, and WashingtonÂs claims that its efforts are creating a democratic Iraq are also highly dubious. Although economic factors did play an important role in prompting a U.S. invasion, the simplistic notion that IraqÂs makeover was undertaken simply for the sake of oil company profits ignores the fact that even optimistic projections of the financial costs of the invasion and occupation far exceeded anticipated financial benefits. Furthermore, Saddam Hussein was already selling his oil at a level satisfactory to Western buyers, and his standing among fellow OPEC members was low, so he could not have persuaded the cartel to adopt policies detrimental to U.S. interests. So what actually motivated the United States to take on the problematic task of conquering and rebuilding Iraq?

The Hand-Over that Wasn’t: How the Occupation of Iraq Continues

by Antonia Juhasz | Jul 19, 2004

The U.S. occupation of Iraq officially ended on June 28, 2004, in a secret ceremony in Baghdad . Officially, “full sovereignty” was handed from the Americans to the Iraqi Interim Government. But it was clear from the start that this was sovereignty in name, not in deed. First, there is the continued military occupation: 138,000 U.S. soldiers and Marines, plus 20,000 troops from other countries and an estimated 20,000 contractors, all fully under U.S. control and immune to Iraqi laws. Equally debilitating, however significantly less well reported upon, is the continued political and economic occupation by the Bush administration and its corporate allies.

Paying the Price: The Mounting Costs of the Iraq War

by Sarah Anderson, Phyllis Bennis, John Cavanagh, Karen Dolan, Erik Leaver, Miriam Pemberton, Marcus Raskin, Emira Woods | Jun 24, 2004

This report attempts to look comprehensively at the human, economic, social, security, environmental, and human rights costs of this war and the ensuing occupation. An Iraq Task Force of the Institute for Policy Studies spent several months scouring sources as diverse as professional engineers, economists, non-profits with expertise in Iraq, the United Nations, the U.S.-led Coalition Provisional Authority, and the most accurate journalistic accounts we could find.

It is our conviction that democracy is strengthened through informed debate. If this report helps stimulate broader debate and discourse in this country and around the world about the costs and legitimacy of the war and occupation in Iraq, then we will consider this report a success.

Thoughts On Cordesman’s “Post-Conflict” Lessons From Iraq

by Col. Daniel Smith (Ret.) | Jun 15, 2004

Anthony Cordesman, the thoughtful incumbent of the Arleigh Burke Chair in Strategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, titled his May 19, 2004 testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee “The ‘Post-Conflict’ Lesson of Iraq and Afghanistan.” Cordesman presented a devastating critique of the pervasive lack of planning and preparedness throughout the Executive Branch in general and the Pentagon and White House in particular for translating success in war into success in peace.

The Iraqi Constitution

by Phyllis Bennis, Erik Leaver | Mar 17, 2004

The signing of the interim Iraqi ÂconstitutionÂ by the Governing Council represents a significant step in U.S. efforts to legitimize its invasion and occupation of Iraq. By achieving the codification in a U.S.-supervised process of an ostensibly ÂIraqiÂ legal document, the U.S. as occupying power is hoping that its planned June 30th Âtransfer of powerÂ will be accepted globally as the Ârestoration of sovereignty to Iraq.Â In fact, that Âtransfer of powerÂ will not end the U.S. occupation, will not lead to the withdrawal of U.S. troops, and will not result in any real sovereignty for Iraq. The Constitution itself implies recognition of its impotence, as it recognizes that all Âlaws, regulations, orders, and directivesÂ issued by the U.S. occupation authorities will remain in force.

Capturing Saddam Hussein: Will It Mean a New Day for Iraq?

by William D. Hartung | Dec 18, 2003

The capture of Saddam Hussein is an historic event by any standard. But aside from providing some dramatic footage for global TV audiences, what has really changed, for the people of Iraq, the Middle East, the United States, or the world? Despite the wave of triumphalism that has seized the Bush administration and certain U.S. media outlets, the harsh bottom lines in Iraq remain the same.

The Axis of Incoherence

by Jim Lobe | Dec 18, 2003

The drama of the recent capture of Saddam Hussein will likely serve as a short-term distraction from the broader challenge facing the administration of U.S. President George W. Bush: its continued search for a viable “exit strategy” from an Iraqi quagmire, its policy there is appearing ever more incoherent.

Fighting By the Rules, Not Against Them

by Col. Daniel Smith (Ret.) | Dec 18, 2003

The guiding maxim of medicine, “Do no harm,” has a common-sense counterpart in anti-guerrilla military operations. This should not be surprising, for these military operations, when conducted by lawful governments, try to excise a perceived imminent and grave danger to civil society without causing additional trauma to the body politic.

Critical Collaboration: Empire versus Sovereignty in Iraq

by Herbert Docena | Nov 21, 2003

The U.S. has shown the Iraqi Governing Council the door, not just because of the need to speed up the transition to self-government, but because the council has become a little too independent for its own good. With the council to be replaced by another set of U.S.-installed Iraqis, the search is on for a new batch of collaborators.

Spoilers Gatecrash the Iraq Spoils Party

by Herbert Docena | Nov 5, 2003

Despite new offers for broader participation in Iraq’s reconstruction bonanza, the United States-convened donors’ conference on Iraq ended in stifled disappointment, with only $13 billion raised–a far cry from the $36 billion target. To dampen expectations further, up to two-thirds of the total pledges will take the form of loans, not grants. And if the Afghanistan fundraising experience is any indication, many of the pledges could still end up being just more broken multi-million-dollar promises.