In the current crisis on the Korean peninsula, the Obama administration is virtually repeating the 2004 Bush playbook, one that derailed a successful diplomatic agreement forged by the Clinton administration to prevent North Korea from acquiring nuclear weapons.
The “Pacific pivot” of the United States is nothing new. At the same time, it doesn’t really exist. And yet, even though it doesn’t exist, this pivot is partly responsible for the escalation of tensions in and around the Korean peninsula. How can all three of these statements be simultaneously true? Such are the paradoxes of the U.S. shift in attention toward the Pacific Rim.
From the eight-lane Nairobi-Thika highway built by Chinese construction companies to the ubiquitous Chinese restaurants around town, the signs of China’s activity are everywhere in Kenya—right down to the friendly nihao called out by Kenyans as I walk down a Nairobi street. Elsewhere on the continent, however, the seams of this tight relationship are becoming stretched.
Over the last two years, the Obama administration has executed what the president has termed the “Pivot to Asia” strategy, whereby the United States’ global military force posture is being reconfigured to focus on the Asia-Pacific region as Washington’s central front. Containment of China is the aim of the Pivot strategy, which has drawn criticism from liberal critics of the policy.
What war between China and Japan could cost us.
Sudan and China have enjoyed cordial relations for decades, developing a fruitful economic and political partnership dating back to their mutual estrangement from the West in the late 1980s and early 1990s. But Sudan’s 2011 partition has presented China with a new set of challenges. Namely, Beijing will be challenged to advance its interests in the Sudans while upholding its foreign policy principle of non-intervention in other states’ affairs.
It’s time for the Obama administration to start withdrawing the American military from Korean soil. Not only would such a move save billions of dollars annually ($15 billion, according to a 2006 article by the Cato Institute’s Doug Bandow) at a time when the cost of maintaining America’s global garrison is coming under increasing scrutiny, but it would shift the impetus for negotiating solutions to the long-running dispute squarely onto the shoulders of the key players in the region.
It’s old, and likely thoroughly forgotten now, but last summer the Washington Post ran an excellent article on the U.S. military‘s “pivot” toward Asia, its origins, and its budget implications. It presented some meaningful background on where the pivot came from, and how it so quickly became dogma in Washington as the decade-long ground wars receded in the national rear-view mirror.
Washington has been reluctant to reevaluate “soft power” when it seems so obviously a fig leaf for the assertion of military dominance. But perhaps by looking at the palpable failures of Chinese efforts in Asia, U.S. policymakers could learn some lessons about strategy. Other countries in Asia that aspire to cultivate both hard power and soft power – Japan, South Korea – should also take note: you rarely can have it both ways.
China understands that aircraft carriers are no longer flagship crafts.