Diplomats are currently scrambling to find a solution to the problem that is Syria. The country is already in a civil war. The dictator Bashar al-Assad doesn’t look like he’s packing his bags any time soon, though plenty of pundits are quick to label him a “dead dictator walking.” Russia and China are reluctant to support measures that would precipitate regime change. Talk about a diplomatic nightmare.
More than a year after the onset of anti-regime protests, the Syrian uprising increasingly resembles a bloody marathon with no finish line on the horizon. With more than 7,000 people killed and ongoing deadly clashes between security forces and the armed opposition, the international community —splintered along geo-strategic lines — is still struggling to craft and establish a clear “road map” for Syria.
Many nonviolent protesters have tragically been killed as will many more. However, proportionately a far greater number of armed resisters have been killed and will continue to be killed. The question is not whether thousands will continue to die but what is the best way for the Syrian people to overthrow the hated regime, end the violence, and bring democracy and social justice.
Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s regime must step down immediately—without Western military intervention. Certainly, the Syrian people deserve support to protect them from the brutal and barbaric onslaught of the Syrian’s security forces. But such assistance and safe haven should come from Arab countries and Turkey. Help from other Arab or Muslim countries would be less offensive to the Syrian people, would be less likely to entail an occupation force, and would likely be less long-lasting than an intervention by Western countries.
Kenya’s ill-advised incursion into Somalia on Oct. 16 after a rash of kidnappings in the tourist paradise of Lamu will most likely lead to a long and expensive quagmire. The escalation will further destabilize a region already reeling from war, piracy, famine, and international terrorism.
Coming to terms with NATO’s intervention in the Libyan civil war is a little like wresting a grizzly bear: big, hairy, and likely to make one pretty uncomfortable no matter where you grab a hold of it. Is it a humanitarian endeavor? A grab for oil resources? Or an election ploy by French President Nicolas Sarkozy?
In the second part of our strategic dialogue on the Libya War, Robert Naiman and Ian Williams respond to their initial essays. You can read the original essays here: Naiman’s anti-intervention essay Surprise War for Regime Change in Libya is the Wrong Path and Ian Williams’ pro-intervention essay Armchair Anti-Imperialists and Libya.
In its threat to use force against the Libyan government, the international community put Muammar Gaddafi into what chess aficionados calls zugzwang. This clever gambit traps the opponent so that any move worsens his or her position. Thus, if Gaddafi continued to battle the opposition in Benghazi, several air forces were at the ready to bombard his army. And if the Libyan leader pursued a ceasefire and political negotiations, he risked a further outbreak of protests in Tripoli from an emboldened population. Along either path lay probable checkmate.
Unlike the despots in Egypt and Tunisia, Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi is resisting the popular revolutions sweeping the Arab world. As of this writing, the pro-democracy rebels successfully control Benghazi, Libya’s second largest city, and most of the eastern part of the country. Gaddafi still controls most of the military, revolutionary committees, and foreign mercenaries. More importantly, Gaddafi controls the capital city of Tripoli with a population of 2.5 million out of a total population of 6.5 million. Gaddafi is attacking the rebels, taking back Zawiya, Ras Lanof, and pushing forward east to take more rebel areas.
This escalating rhetoric of military intervention from pundits and the administration toward Libya is not surprising. Libya has oil, and the West needs it. But we should not repeat the mistake of Iraq. The United States – or Europe – should not send troops to Libya except as part of a UN peacekeeping mission.