Recent inter-Korean tensions have rekindled debate over methods for moving the North Korean government away from weapons development. If an upcoming United Nations human rights report can establish a framework and funding mechanism to assist refugees who have crossed the border into China, it might be more effective than either sanctions or traditional engagement.
John Kerry’s ascent to U.S. Secretary of State generated a discussion about taking Cuba off the State Department’s list of “state sponsors of terrorism.” Given Kerry’s generally reasonable position on Cuba in the past, it was perhaps not surprising that he considered this option. Nonetheless, on May 1, the U.S. State Department announced that Cuba would remain on its list. It’s a serious mistake.
In April 2009, President Barack Obama gave hope to nuclear disarmament activists around the globe. Speaking in the Czech Republic, he affirmed “America’s commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons.” It was, and remains, the most laudable of objectives. Unfortunately, it is becoming increasingly difficult to believe that the president is truly committed to eliminating these terrifying weapons of mass destruction.
In the current crisis on the Korean peninsula, the Obama administration is virtually repeating the 2004 Bush playbook, one that derailed a successful diplomatic agreement forged by the Clinton administration to prevent North Korea from acquiring nuclear weapons.
Only North Koreans can change North Korea. Attempting to impose a solution from outside – whether from Beijing, Seoul, or Washington – will just not work. North Koreans are a proud people, even more so after several decades of austerity and government-sponsored nationalism. Like Afghans and Iraqis, they will not take kindly, to say the least, to military invaders. And they know the limitations and leverage points of their society better than any outside political missionary bent on a softer version of regime change.
The “Pacific pivot” of the United States is nothing new. At the same time, it doesn’t really exist. And yet, even though it doesn’t exist, this pivot is partly responsible for the escalation of tensions in and around the Korean peninsula. How can all three of these statements be simultaneously true? Such are the paradoxes of the U.S. shift in attention toward the Pacific Rim.
The stability of the Kaesong operation is considered a bellwether for the state of affairs between North and South Korea.
It’s easy to forget that Seoul lies only about thirty miles from the Demilitarized Zone.
News about North Korea falls into two categories: the comical and the frightening. Examples of the former type of story abound, but unfortunately, the news from North Korea has of late been of the frightening variety. What the North Korean leadership is hoping to achieve by its belligerence is anyone’s guess, but the aggressive U.S. response has only escalated tensions.
With all eyes on North Korea since its third nuclear test, remarkably little has been said about how we arrived at this crisis point. Inadequately contextualized as North Korea’s response to fortified UN sanctions, the latest nuclear test bespeaks the failure of U.S. diplomacy toward its historic enemy. As he enters his second term, Barack Obama must confront the role of strategic patience as a central driver of the simmering crisis in Korea.